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Commentator Assesses NATO's Altenburg Interview

LD1408165189 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] In his interview for the Italian daily IL MESSAGGERO, the chief of NATO's Military Committee, General Wolfgang Altenburg, suggested that progress at the conventional arms talks in Vienna can be made during the next year already expressed the view that the positive changes in the Soviet Union had created favorable conditions for concluding a final document that would reflect the common wish for a lesser degree of tension and confrontation.

Our commentator, Yuriy Solton, writes that Moscow, too, has been determined to reach an early agreement on specific cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. Despite the holiday season, Soviet experts have been carefully studying the relevant proposals they received from NATO. One may expect them to have prepared a detailed reply by the time another round of Vienna talks begins in early September. Already today one can state that the NATO package contains quite a few constructive suggestions. The North Atlantic leadership has agreed to the level to which the Warsaw Treaty proposed to reduce the tank, armored vehicle, and artillery potentials. It also consented to negotiate personnel cuts and air force reductions, a point on which there was no agreement only recently. Early analysis shows, however, that serious differences still exist, although they are not at all insurmountable. Gen Altenburg seems to be right in supposing that an agreement can well be signed as early as this year, providing for the initial removal of balances and a tangible drop in the level of military confrontation in Europe.

Yet the general has made a different kind of pronouncement, as well. During the recent satellite link-up between Brussels and Moscow, broadcast by Soviet national television, he positively assessed the unilateral reductions of armed forces in the Soviet Union and allied countries, but defended the NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence and tried to justify the NATO leadership's reluctance to immediately launch negotiations on reducing and subsequently eliminating all tactical nuclear arsenals in Europe. Meanwhile, preservation of these weapons, an idea favored by the United States, may impede the process of slashing conventional arms. Gen Altenburg insisted that a minimum amount of nuclear weapons should be preserved for rebuffing a likely attack. The question arises, however, where such an attack may come from and what's the exact borderline beyond which a nuclear deterrent's potential turns into a potential of aggression.

The Soviet Union has unilaterally begun withdrawing 500 tactical missile nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe and it's ready to withdraw more if NATO agrees to start negotiations. Moscow has not been dramatizing the existing differences. In his speech in Strasbourg, in France, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, said this country had been looking for acceptable solutions and was inviting other countries to follow suit. One can only hope that solutions of this kind will be found so that Europe can embark on a road of military detente, setting an example for the rest of the world.

Missile Issue Remains Geneva Stumbling Block

PM1508074589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Results Summed Up"]

[Text] Geneva, 9 Aug—The latest, 11th round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms has ended. The leaders of the two delegations exchanged updated texts of the documents being formulated.

Summing up the results, Yu.K. Nazarkin, the USSR delegation head, pointed out that in the draft treaty on strategic offensive arms, in the protocols on inspections and on conversion or elimination, in the memorandum on initial data, and even in the protocol to the agreement on observance of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty there has been an increase in the number of agreed wordings and a corresponding reduction in the number of parentheses around points that have not been agreed.

"The only things to have remained unchanged are the draft agreements on the question of space. Here our approaches remain too far from one another for progress to be possible. The U.S. stand is still based on the possibility of deploying ABM defenses, including space-based ones, in accordance with the SDI program. This approach runs counter to the existing ABM Treaty. We seek an agreement on observance of that treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, and we proceed from the premise that an interconnection objectively exists between strategic defensive and offensive arms. Therefore it is only possible to conclude a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms under conditions of observance of the ABM Treaty," Yu.K. Nazarkin said.

With regard to the main questions which have not been agreed, relating to the substance of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the Soviet delegation has expressed a number of new views, which must help to resolve them. The provisions of the future treaty and the attendant documents relating to the problem of verification were subjected to further development and coordination.

The U.S. side in turn voiced satisfaction with the businesslike and positive atmosphere of the talks and noted the importance of the work done during the round which has ended.

Supreme Soviet Nuclear Moratorium Appeal Viewed
OW1308122389 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 4 Aug 89

[Unattributed commentary from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] We have reported that the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted an appeal to the U.S. Congress 2 days ago calling for a moratorium on nuclear explosions and for a halt to nuclear tests. The appeal points out that the issue of a total halt to nuclear testing has [words indistinct] more than practical on the agenda. In this connection, a station observer writes:

This issue, to be exact, has been on the agenda for 26 years. On 5 August 1963, the foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, and Britain signed a treaty in Moscow on banning atmospheric, space, and underwater nuclear tests. The Moscow treaty became the first international accord that limited nuclear testing and the nuclear arms race. A treaty also was signed several years later that banned nuclear tests on the seabed and the underground deployment and testing of nuclear weapons. [Words indistinct] nuclear explosions could only be conducted underground. The treaty provides that the signatories will continue to meet until nuclear tests are banned totally and universally.

Fully 26 years have elapsed since that time, and the goal of banning nuclear tests totally still has not been realized. Of the many reasons accounting for this, a major one is the failure by two nuclear powers—France and China—to sign the treaty. The main reason, however, lies in Washington's policy. The U.S. authorities are unwilling to end the nuclear arms race. Dictated by its policy of nuclear deterrence, the United States follows the course of improving its nuclear arsenal. Of course, this has obstructed the path leading to an accord with the USSR on a total halt to nuclear tests.

The USSR, nevertheless, has been working hard toward this goal. Moscow was the initiator of the USSR-U.S.-UK negotiations on banning underground nuclear tests. The Soviet Union's unilateral suspension of nuclear explosions continued for approximately 1 and ½ years. Although the United States did not reciprocate this move, the cause of Soviet leaders brought about a widespread response throughout the world. The moratorium won enormous international support, especially from the socialist and developing countries.

We also evaluated China's stand highly. During the Soviet Union's 1 and ½ year moratorium, China did not conduct a single nuclear test. Today the world situation is improving and gradual developments can be observed in many issues. The Soviet-U.S. negotiations on limiting and halting nuclear tests are underway. During the negotiations, the USSR has made an all-out effort for the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-U.S. accords on limiting underground nuclear tests and halting nuclear tests immediately. The problem of the issue lies in supervision. The joint experiments conducted by Soviet and American experts not long ago have proved the reliability of supervising the implementation of the accords. The time for action has come.

The Supreme Soviet's appeal to the U.S. Congress says that the USSR is ready to suspend all nuclear tests temporarily and at any time on the basis of reciprocity. It says that such a moratorium can become the prerequisite for the signing of an accord on banning nuclear tests in all fields, and that the reliability of the accord can be subjected to inspection.

Gremitskikh Conducts 14 Aug News Briefing

Reveals Contact With Lebanon Sides

LD1408133689 Moscow TASS in English 1315 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS—There is profound concern in the USSR over developments in Lebanon, Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, told a briefing here today. Despite calls of many states, as well as of the international public to the warring Lebanese sides to stop the bloodletting, the situation in Lebanon has deteriorated still more over recent days, he said.

The question of concentrating efforts to achieve a ceasefire now requires urgent attention, the spokesman said. Much depends on how actively the Committee of the Three will continue its peace-making mission. Gremitskikh expressed the opinion that the committee needs more vigorous and coordinated support by the international community.

The Soviet Union has been in contact with the sides involved in the Lebanese conflict, the spokesman revealed. These contacts are aimed at putting an end to the armed confrontation and starting a dialogue. Specifically, agreement was reached on consultations with France. Jacques Andreani, chief of the Office of the Minister of State, and Roland Dumas, French foreign minister, are expected in Moscow in this connection.

Welcomes Reduction of NATO Maneuvers

LD1408134289 Moscow TASS in English 1319 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, August 14 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh welcomed the reduced scale of NATO's "Autumn forge'89" maneuvers and the cancellation of the "reforger" war games as a step toward greater trust and a positive atmosphere in Europe.

Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Ministry's Information Directorate, was commenting at a briefing here on reports that the headquarters of NATO's supreme commander-in-chief in Europe had announced that the scale of the alliance's largest military exercise, codenamed "Autumn Forge'89", was being reduced for the first time and that the United States had decided against holding the traditional "reforger" maneuvers this year.

The maneuvers were to practice airlifts and sealifts of American troops to West Germany.

Gremitskikh said that the reduction of the scale and intensity of military activity in Europe could positively influence the Vienna talks on scaling down conventional armed forces and on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

The Soviet Union, the spokesman noted, had already taken similar steps.

Although the USSR had never held exercises of a scale comparable to the "Autumn forge" and "reforger" war games, it was reducing even its usual exercise activity, cutting the number of troops involved in maneuvers and replacing troop maneuvers with command-and-staff exercises.

Following the NATO move, Gremitskikh said, one could state that the reduction of military activity in Europe was becoming reciprocal.

Expresses Condolences for Congressman

LD1408134989 Moscow TASS in English 1331 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS—The Soviet Union has expressed sincere condolences in connection with the death in Ethiopia of Mickey Leland, a member of the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, and other officials who accompanied him on a humanitarian mission, Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate, told a briefing here today.

Mickey Leland arrived in Addis Ababa on August 7 as head of an eight-strong delegation. The objective of the visit was an on-site inspection and study of the situation in Sudanese refugee camps on Ethiopian territory. On the same day, the U.S. delegation accompanied by five Ethiopian officials left Addis Ababa by plane for the town of Gambela, a hundred kilometers from which a Sudanese refugee camp was located in Fugnido. The aircraft never arrived at its destination.

Chairman of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Yevgeniy Primakov asked the Foreign Ministry spokesman to express condolences on behalf of the Soviet Parliament in connection with the death of the U.S. Congressman and other American and Ethiopian citizens, Gremitskikh said.

Condemns Verbal Attacks on Berlin Wall

LD1408140189 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS—The establishment of a border between the capital of the German Democratic Republic and West Berlin on August 13, 1961, only confirmed a long-standing reality—the existence of a special political entity (West Berlin) within the GDR, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a news briefing here today.

He made the statement in connection with attempts in some Western countries to take advantage of the border establishment anniversary for further verbal attacks on the "Berlin wall".

A united Berlin under the administration of four powers, which the city was during the first post-war years, has long receded into the past and "it is not the Soviet side that is to blame for this", the spokesman said.

Subsequent events have demonstrated that the border helped to defuse tension in the region and assisted the achievement of the quadripartite agreement of September 3, 1971, and other international understandings, he continued.

West Berlin today is closely involved in international contacts, millions of West Berlin residents and GDR nationals visit one another, and the city has extensive commercial, economic and cultural relations with the outside world, Gremitskikh said.

Views U.S. Military in Singapore

LD1408140889 Moscow TASS in English 1359 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS—The Soviet Union closely follows the developments in South East Asia in connection with the recently expressed readiness of Singapore to admit U.S. military facilities to its territory. This is said in a statement of USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman. It was read out by Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR foreign Ministry Information Directorate, at a briefing here today.

The statement says that the decision of the Singapore Government evoked concern of Singapore's partners in ASEAN. When ASEAN was instituted in 1967 it was solemnly proclaimed that the association's member countries will be striving to eliminate military bases in the region. Singapore's plans evoked an extremely negative reaction of the official circles and public of a number of South East Asian countries. They hold that these plans run counter to ASEAN concept of turning South East Asia into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, and a nuclear-weapon free region.

The Soviet Union cannot but share concern over the possibility of the further increase of the United States' military presence in the region. The United States insists on the continuation of power politics in the Asia-Pacific region and tries to bring pressure on other countries, in this case on Singapore. It is understandable that the deployment of new U.S. facilities in South Asia would substantially alter the military-political situation there and would be fraught with the destabilisation of the situation, deterioration of the political climate.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the view that the strengthening of security and stability on a global and regional scale is possible only through the easing of tension and arms reduction. As is known, the USSR advanced the idea of the elimination of foreign military presence in territories of other countries by the year 2000.

It declared decisively against the setting up of new bases on lands of others. The Soviet initiatives advanced in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk are imbued with ideas of consolidating peace, development cooperation, easing military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region. People in the USSR are firmly convinced that precisely this road would be in keeping with the aspirations of countries and peoples of the Asia-Pacific region, the statement says.

Notes Search for French Collector

LD1408141389 Moscow TASS in English 1406 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh today voiced hope that the search for French collector Garrik Basmajian, who went missing in Moscow, will be successful.

"According to information that we have," he told a news briefing, "Basmajian arrived in Moscow on July 21 at the invitation of the Soviet Culture Ministry and (the Foreign Trade Association) 'Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga' to complete legal formalities concerning his donations to Armenian victims of last year's earthquake."

The last time the Frenchman was seen was on July 29 when he was leaving Russia Hotel.

The Interior Ministry and other law-enforcement agencies have mounted a large-scale search for Basmajian in Moscow, the Moscow Region, Leningrad, Yerevan and other Soviet cities and tourist centres, the spokesman said.

East-West Economic Seminar Opens in Helsinki

LD1408144189 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Helsinki August 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Dodonov:

A three-day international seminar on the subject "the future of East-West economic relations" opened at one of bank training centres of the Finnish capital on Monday.

The seminar, arranged by the Finnish branch of the International Organisation of the Students of Economics and the Student Council of Finland's Higher Commercial School, is being attended by more than a hundred representatives of the business community and students of various countries, including a delegation of faculty members and students of economic departments of the Soviet Union's institutions of higher learning as well as a delegation of the Soviet Young Communist League.

Urpo Kiiskinen, chairman of the seminar's organising committee, told TASS that the newest trends of the development of East-West economic relations would be considered at the seminar.

Much attention, he said, will be devoted to new trends in the development of the Soviet Union's foreign economic relations, and to prospects for Finland's participation in strengthening international trade and economic cooperation.

When declaring the seminar open, Ilkka Suominen, Finnish minister of trade and industry, emphasised that the Soviet Union is one of Finland's major trading partners.

He pointed to new promising forms of trade and economic cooperation: the establishment of joint ventures and economic zones, as well as the training of economic management specialists. All these forms of cooperation are being successfully applied in Soviet-Finnish relations, the minister said.

Anniversary of GDR Border Closure Marked

PM1408150689 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Ye. Korolev report: "The Lessons of 13 August"]

[Text] Berlin—It was 28 years ago, on the night of 12-13 August 1961, that GDR National People's Army units, together with workers' combat militias, closed the GDR's borders with West Berlin. In the morning a GDR Council of Ministers resolution was published, dated 12 August, stating that to stop hostile activity by revanchist and militarist forces of West Germany and West Berlin, the same control is being imposed on the borders of the GDR, including the border with West Berlin, as on the borders of any sovereign state.

As the newspaper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND notes, the events of 13 August were preceded, in general, by two processes. The first was an attempt at economic plunder and political destabilization. And the second was direct military preparations for "Day X." In fact, the enemies of the republic made no secret of their intentions to destroy the socialist system in the GDR. By an FRG Government directive of 21 February 1961, it was laid down that Germany should be depicted on all maps within the 1937 borders, which meant a refusal to recognize the realities in Europe that emerged as a result of World War II. On 14 June of the same year the Bundestag took a decision ruling out the establishment of diplomatic relations with socialist countries until they agree to a revision of the existing borders in Europe. And on 7 July the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union bloc published a statement openly proclaiming the goal of "liberation" of East Germany.

In the summer of 1961 the FRG press launched a wide campaign openly threatening the GDR and calling for the stepping up of preparations for a coup, while the Bavarian newspaper MUENCHNER MERKUR published a call for the stepping up of subversive activity in the GDR, demanding that "the situation be brought to the point of explosion" and that a "rising against Soviet troops" take place.

The GDR and the other Warsaw Pact countries took measures during that period to avert a dangerous development of events. In particular, on 6 July 1961 the GDR Volkskammer adopted the "German peace plan," which was to ensure peace and the normalization of relations between the GDR and the FRG.

However, the FRG's ruling circles remained deaf to all attempts to promote detente. Furthermore, together with the other NATO allies, they stepped up subversive and provocative acts against the GDR.

For many years the GDR showed the utmost prudence and truly unlimited patience with regard to the constant provocations from the FRG and West Berlin. For the sake of detente and normal relations, the GDR tolerated the great difficulties and economic damage cauesd to it by the open border. According to the calculations of the Institute of World Economics in Kiel, as a result of currency speculations and the mass drain of skilled manpower, the GDR suffered damage in excess of 100 billion marks.

Thus an emergency arose which required the GDR to take resolute measures to ensure its own security and successful socialist building.

Therefore the Warsaw Pact countries recommended that the GDR Government take control of the border with the FRG and West Berlin, and this was done on the night of 12-13 August 1961.

Subsequent events showed that the measures adopted had a sobering effect on many people in the West. As NEUES DEUTSCHLAND stresses, these measures helped to pave the way for the conclusion of the quadripartite agreement and the treaty on the fundamentals of GDR-FRG relations. And in general for a whole range of European accords.

The events of 13 August also led to the creation of more favorable conditions for building socialism in the GDR. The republic acquired prestige in the international arena appropriate to a sovereign state. The GDR, like the FRG, became a member of the United Nations, and it now has diplomatic relations with 135 states. As for the "Berlin Wall," which they are again making a fuss about in the West, the GDR states quite clearly that the wall will exist as long as the factors that led to its erection still exist.

However, these factors do still exist. Clearly not everyone has yet learned the lessons of history. In Bonn, for instance, certain prominent politicians even today make no secret of their dream of restoring the German

Reich within the 1937 borders. But they forget that the world is not the same now. Moreover, it would do them no harm to remember the lessons of August 1961.

And it is not the "Berlin Wall," as people in the West try to assert, that is the main obstacle to the development of contacts between the two German states. There are more substantial barriers: A far higher invisible wall was built between East and West in the decades of confrontation and "cold war."

Steps to clear away the debris of the past have been taken in Europe in recent years. An active part is played in this process by the GDR, which has adopted a number of internal legislative acts with a view to expanding multifaceted cooperation with the West, including human contacts.

Petrovskiy Addresses Seminar on UN Role

LD0508054589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Aug 89

[Excerpts] Vienna August 4 TASS—An international diplomatic seminar on the problems of UN peacekeeping operations is being held in ancient Klesheim Castle near the Austrian city of Salzburg.

Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, addressed the seminar today. [passage omitted]

In a generalized philosophical and conceptual form, our concept of the new thinking was boldly set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly, Petrovskiy remarked. This also developed the principled, long-term line of Soviet foreign policy, which emanates from the necessity of conducting relations between states in accordance with the realities of a mutually dependent world, the deideoligization, demilitarization, democratization, and humanization, and increasing the role of multilateral mechanisms, above all, the UN.

The key distinction of the new thinking from all previously existant theories and doctrines of the development of international relations lies in the fact that it regards world politics not through the prism of the correlation of forces, but through the quest for a balance of the interests of various states.

Reassessment of the place and role of the UN in the system of international coordinates and resolute reliance on its peacemaking and preventive functions are a major component of the new approaches.

The processes of renewal that are taking place in the international community highight from a new single angle the question of the UN's work in maintaining peace, the aim of which is to leave no room in international relations for the use of military force.

The maintenance of peace in a situation of mutual dependence requires a new comprehensive approach, relating international policy to international law and universal human morality. Today it is no longer enough to ensure the cessation of warfare among human beings, which presupposes not only the achievement of disarmament and the settling of regional conflicts, but also the observance of human rights. It is also necessary to eliminate conflict of another kind: Man's war with nature, the continuation of which, without exaggeration, is fraught with dangerous consequences for civilization. In this connection, we see an immeasurable increase in the significance of worldwide political centers, institutions, and mechanisms such as the United Nations which have the task of finding optimal correlations between interests which are national and those that are common to all mankind.

Having pointed out the important role which the United Nations plays in the efforts to settle regional conflicts, Petrovskiy said that the situation concerning many of them is now characterized by predominantly positive signs. These are, primarily, the situation in Southwestern Africa and the Iran-Iraq settlement.

The conclusion of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan which paved the way for a settlement and for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country has become a major landmark of UN endeavors.

Substantial changes are taking place in the political picture of the Middle East conflict. Ways to solve problems connected with the Western Sahara, Central America, and Cyprus have become visible.

Taking into account the experience in settling the Afghan situation and the development of processes connected with other conflict situations, one can say that a number of common elements are now coming into view and could subsequently be adopted as a basis for a model for settling regional conflicts.

These are mediation, including by the United Nations and the UN secretary general, cease-fires, withdrawals of foreign troops, national reconciliation, political pluralism, the provision of international guarantees of the implementation of accords, and the self-restraint of great power.

It is important now than ever to take active steps to move from the narrow framework of localizing conflicts to the qualitatively new scope of ensuring a stable order maintained at a highly reliable level. Moreover the thesis that "prevention is better than cure" should be the model for action and be employed on a comprehensive basis in all spheres of international relations—military-political, economic, ecological and humanitarian.

To attain these goals requires that efforts be concentrated to bring into play all the mechanisms of diplomacy contained in the UN Charter and the utilization of

the impressive array of methods and means of solving disputes peacefully. The main task in this rests primarily on the shoulders of the UN Security Council. The interests of general security and of each individual state would only gain if its powers were consolidated and extended.

It is exceptionally important for the United Nations to have full information on the development of the situation in various spheres of international relations and in individual regions of the world and to be able to thoroughly analyze the information, warn about an accumulation of crisis factors, and serve as a self-regulating mechanism for their elimination.

With this end in view, it is perhaps promising to steer matters toward making the United Nations a basis for the establishment of a war risk prevention center.

The Soviet representative put forward proposals to set up a pool of military observers and armed forces from the UN, and also an international center or program for the training of military and civilian personnel under the aegis of the UN.

Should the need arise, he said, the Soviet Union would be prepared to examine the question of detaching a military contingent from its armed forces to serve in the UN troops, and also to take part in creating a system of instruction for UN personnel on a reciprocal basis with other countries.

Organically bound up with these issues, Petrovskiy went on, is one of the most difficult and acute problems of mounting operations—their funding. It is the inescapable truth that "peace must be paid for." The outcome of operations depends largely on the extent to which they rest on a firm financial footing. There are all sorts of options that are available in tackling this matter, including some that provide for a diversification of the sources of funding.

We are living in an era of exceptionally dynamic development in international relations, V.F. Petrovskiy stressed in conclusion. Before our very eyes, and with our participation, the process of establishing a new world and of searching for pioneering ways forward into the future is unfolding. Now that we have chosen this route, it is important not merely to utilize the experience that has accumulated, but to take on board a vision of the morrow. The international community has reached the stage where uncontrolled haphazardness will inevitably bring mankind to an impasse, or perhaps even to irremediable disaster. This in its turn brings to the fore the need to learn how to coordinate and manage the processes in such a way as to preserve civilization, make it safe for all and guarantee that peace is maintained at a reliable level.

Anniversary of Helsinki Final Act Noted

18070731 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 1 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA political columnist Griboryy Oganov: "Light at the End of the Tunnel; the Final Act of the CSCE Was Signed on 1 August 1975"]

[Text] The world is intricately contradictory and complicatedly interdependent.

This maxim, perceived now in the fifth year of perestroyka as an incontrovertible axiom, attests to the fundamental changes in the assessment of vital international problems that affect the global sphere, including such truly urgent and very human problems as the task of eliminating weapons of mass destruction of people, problems of catastrophically growing economic threats, problems of hunger and illness that are torturing an exhausted humanity, and many many other problems.

I think that when the heads of 35 states convened in Helsinki to set their signatures in a ceremonial situation to the Final Act of the all-European conference, they did not fully comprehend what profound changes would ensue in the world in the following 15-20 years.

Today, when we have all become witnesses to such changes, when even in such an austere document as the last report of the International Strategic Research Institute "Strategic Review, 1989-1990" the authors seemingly admit that "many quite sensible observers believe that there is reason for guarded optimism," the most authoritative scientists of the planet who joined the Pugwash movement and were inspired by the ideas expressed by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein in their famous manifesto, have come to the conclusion that the Helsinki announcement has become the most important document on the road to achieving a firm peace in Europe, and that the process itself is still continuing.

There were definite ups and downs during its course, but the very logic of its development—which is now clear to everyone—remains the most important factor for reinforcing peace and security on the European Continent.

The development of any noble cause and any initiative is preceded by quite a few doubts and vacillations of the sides, based on the fact that the so-called great powers who have been accustomed to the "cold war" for many years distrust each other too much.

Now the situation is changing. The cited "Strategic Review," contrary to its custom, contains very true thoughts. Its authors believe that future historians who study the events of 1988 will evaluate it as a year in which the "cold war" ended. According to the thoughts of the authors of the review, as the Western view of the former "evil empire" changed because of the specific

acts of the Soviet Union, especially its unilateral peaceful initiatives, the tension between the East and West slackened, and the international situation became less and less strained.

The concept of the "new political thinking" brought forth in the Soviet Union should be considered the main philosophically significant innovation of this period, more accurately, its methods and methodological fabric. For the first time, common sense that was not dimmed by anything was projected on the screen of this fabric. The first of the publicly announced conditions and results of the new thinking was the idea proposed in an announcement by M.S. Gorbachev at the beginning of 1986—a plan to achieve a non-nuclear world by the year 2000.

"We want 1986 not to be simply a peaceful year, but one that will permit the 20th Century to end under a sign of peace and nuclear disarmament," the announcement stated. "The system of new foreign policy initiatives that we propose is calculated so that humanity will greet the year 2000 under a peaceful sky and cosmos, that it will not know fear of nuclear, chemical, or any other threat of destruction, and that the human race will be firmly confident of its own survival and continuation." A plan was proposed in the announcement for a phased move toward the proclaimed aim—the elimination of all nuclear weapons on the planet.

Drama overtook this grand idea which was received by people with joy. The West, especially America, met it with silence. This reaction was obviously organized. A tautological coincidence—in this case the West was personified by the most western U.S. state, California, the headquarters of the American military-industrial complex. And this complex could not react in any other way. Because the idea of total elimination of nuclear weapons was perceived (and it could not perceive it any other way) as the elimination of huge incomes of many monopolies and firms of this giant complex. Hysteria almost seized Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Rockwell, and many other monopolies who long ago built the structure of their financial prosperity (if astronomical superprofits can be considered "prosperity") on a predatory policy of state military orders and large-scale trade in weapons on the markets of other continents. And now the Soviet Union challenged capitalist America to reject these superprofits and clipping risk-free coupons!

It is something to shudder about.... Of course, the Soviets were encroaching upon the "most reliable" source of Western income and prosperity. Well, the "insignificant" fact that this income and prosperity are founded on the production and advantageous sale of means of destruction of people should not trouble the kings of business. Business in blood.

Thus, the noble idea of disarmament collided in a skirmish with the lust of the large militaristic business. The drama of this idea could not be resolved at one stroke, and immediately. It became the first treaty in the history of mankind on the elimination of a whole class of nuclear missiles which finally received the abbreviated designation of INF Treaty.

Mankind remembers how difficult a road the treaty had. Turned down in Reykjavik when it seemed that agreement about it had already been reached, it still, even though with vexing delays, cleared a way for itself. And it is here that the Soviet side made a great contribution. First of all, the contribution was reasonable. Not to argue, but to discuss. To seek on the other side not offensive disagreement, not opposition to our ideas and expectations, but to seek even an iota of useful ideas, traces of concurrence, and to see not reasons for divergences and quarrels, but reasonable arguments that enable going forward together, to find not a straightforward arithmetic in the negotiations, but a common benefit, and to see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Incidentally, this is what Kurt (Bidenkopf), a deputy in the Bundestag and manager of the Institute of Economic and Social Policy in Bonn, said in a conversation with a Soviet correspondent: "The CDU [Christian Democratic Union] sees all possibilities in the development of relations of our countries... It would be an illusion to count on very fast movement... My concept is as follows: For a long time we vainly did not understand the profound idea of the mutual interdependence of all countries in both systems that exist in Europe. Immediately after the war our social structure underwent a tremendous takeoff politically, economically, and socially. The phenomenon of integration emerged. But it seemed that Western Europe could not develop without the development of the East. And vice-versa!.. If it can be expressed this way, the European people have a historical instinct."

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the SPD [Social Democratic Party] constituted a party that headed a movement toward a new "Eastern policy." This is what Igon Bar, a leading figure in the SPD, said in June of 1989 immediately after the visit of M.S. Gorbachev to the FRG: "The outlook formulated in the joint statement has a joint philosophy based on the idea of an indestructible peace. War in Europe has to be made impossible—a requirement that the social democrats in the FRG not long ago called utopia. Now this idea has become universal property."

Through centers to decrease the nuclear danger, a broad and free exchange of information is being implemented on the current status of decisions associated with the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles.

The process of disarmament will be workable if it is continuous. The conclusion of an agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons is now on the agenda. Numerous points of agreement on this treaty have already been coordinated. The hopes of the public for a real achievement of universal nuclear disarmament are thus more practicable.

Humanity has entered a century which, judging by everything, will be called the century of reason and humaneness.

All of the grounds for this exist.

United States & Canada

Armed Services Committee Delegation Visits USSR

Congressman Aspin Leads Group

PM1408160589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Captain 2d Rank V. Kocherov report: "L. Aspin: 'We Want To Start a Dialogue'"]

[Text] U.S. Boeings are no longer a rarity at Moscow's airports. The summit meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan 2 years ago initiated intensive flights by representatives. Buttons depicting the two countries' state flags were issued both in our country and in the United States to commemorate that meeting. I saw these buttons—symbols of the renascent good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States—on the jacket and coat lapels of a group of members of the House Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Congress, which arrived here in the evening of 7 August at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegation is headed by Committee Chairman L. Aspin.

His first interview by the aircraft steps was for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

"We are members of the House Armed Services Committee," Mr L. Aspin said. "Marshal Akhromeyev addressed us recently in the United States. We want to start a dialogue between our committee and the new USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions. We would like to continue our discussions and the discussion of important issues with Marshal Akhromeyev and to visit some military installations in the USSR...."

On 8 August the U.S. congressmen met with members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees for Defense and State Security Questions and for International Affairs. Participating in the meeting were V.L. Lapygin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, and Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev. The guests also had talks at the USSR Foreign Ministry. On 9 August, after laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall, the full U.S. congressional delegation visited the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. There the congressmen had talks with Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

Assessing the nature of the talks, L. Aspin told your correspondent: "These talks are beyond comparison. They were distinguished in terms both of subject matter and of participants. But the people with whom we met spoke frankly. They helped us a great deal. We have learned a lot and better understand the Soviet viewpoint."

On the same day the U.S. congressmen visited the K.Ye. Voroshilov Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

In the evening of 9 August the U.S. guests departed on a tour of the Soviet Union.

Congressmen Visit Ukraine

LD1108183589 Moscow TASS in English 1747 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Lvov, Western Ukraine August 11 TASS—Continuing their tour of the Soviet Union, a group of members of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Armed Services headed by the committee's Chairman Les Aspin, visited today a motorized infantry division of the Carpathian Military District.

The visitors were familiarized with the organization of combat training and living conditions of the servicemen, examined combat equipment and armament. Soviet military specialists replied to questions of American delegation members.

Delegation Tours Crimea

PM1408115189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent S. Troyan: "Dialogue of Parliamentarians Continues"]

[Text] Sevastopol—The delegation from the U.S. Congress House of Representatives Armed Services Committee headed by L. Aspin, the committee's chairman, has arrived in the Crimea. A group of Soviet parliamentarians belonging to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security, which is headed by V.L. Lapygin, arrived with the guests.

The congressmen began their familiarization with the life of the Soviet Armed Forces with talks at the USSR Supreme Soviet and trips to Rovno and Lvov oblasts, where they visited the center for the destruction of intermediate-range missile launchers and transporters, and a motorized rifle division. From Sevastopol the guests traveled to Baykonur cosmodrome.

Calls on Space Installations

LD1408142189 Moscow TASS in English 1127 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Baykonur Cosmodrome August 14 TASS—A group of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services led by Committee Chairman Les Aspin, staying in the Soviet Union, familiarised themselves today with the complex of cosmodrome installations and Soviet space technology.

The guests inspected the assembly-test building, maintenance areas of the Buran shuttle and Energiya booster rocket and the launching simulator of the Energiya-Buran space system.

Explanations were given by USSR pilot cosmonaut Gherman Titov and cosmodrome specialists. They replied to numerous questions by the guests on prospects for the development of Soviet cosmonautics and international cooperation in peaceful space explorations.

U.S. legislators also visited the Baykonur Museum and saw memorial museum houses of Sergey Korolev and Yuriy Gagarin.

Congressman Visits Chemical Weapons Site

LD1408130389 Moscow TASS in English 1103 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Alma-Ata August 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Khrustov:

U.S. Congressman Larry Hopkins has stressed the importance of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of disarmament, including chemical disarmament.

Hopkins is visiting the Soviet Union as part of a 14-member House Armed Services Committee group at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

During a tour of the country, Hopkins requested and was granted permission to visit a Soviet chemical weapons disposal site in Chapayevsk, Kuibyshev Region.

He described his visit as yet another step along the mutual confidence building road which the Soviet Union and the United States have embarked upon.

Absolutely nothing was concealed from us in Chapayevsk. We could see and photograph anything we like, he told TASS.

Since the Soviet Union and the United States want to get rid of chemical weapons, the congressman said, the best way to do this is through active cooperation in the field of chemical weapons disposal technology. This will benefit people throughout the world. Of course, there wil be problems, including those in the field of mutual verification. But all the problems are quite solvable.

People around the world have wisely decided to prevent a third world war. The best we can do now is to sit down at the negotiating table and discuss how we can get rid of these weapons, Hopkins said.

If the Soviet Union and the United States pool efforts—ideas and technologies, this will be a fine example to the whole world. I am sure there are no problems that cannot be solved jointly, Hopkins said.

Korionov Accuses U.S. of Undermining Arms Talks

PM1408125989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[PRAVDA political observer Vitaliy Korionov article: "USSR-United States: Strengthening Confidence"]

[Excerpts] The visit to Sevastopol by two U.S. warships—in return for the visit to U.S. waters by a detachment of Soviet Navy ships—is over. As is well known, last month the missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov" and another two Soviet warships visited the major U.S. naval base at Norfolk. [passage omitted]

It can be said with every justification that we are facing a new phenomenon in the practice of interstate relations—the development of military contacts, whose positive importance for the further development of the world situation is hard to overestimate.

The concerns and fears of the past were generated to a far greater extent by secrecy in the military sphere. Lifting this veil and ensuring glasnost with regard to military forces means dispelling overblown fears and opening the door to mutual understanding and trust—those catalysts of the process of establishing qualitatively new relations between countries.

And this process is gathering pace. [passage omitted]

There is a growing realization in the United States that in the nuclear missile age a state's genuine security can be safeguarded above all by political means. But now there are copious claims that the Soviet-U.S. talks on reductions to strategic and nuclear-space arms will be...jeopardized unless a fleet of Stealth bombers is created [sozdaniye].

General J. Chain, who heads the U.S. Strategic Air Command, warns: "Without this new bomber I can tell you straight that I cannot support a strategic arms agreement." Pentagon chief R. Cheney in turn makes out that the cut in appropriations for the B-2 "will do immense damage to U.S. policy in the arms control sphere." THE NEW YORK TIMES reports: "The Bush administration has issued a warning that, if Congress cancels the Stealth bomber production program it will jeopardize and possibly damage the nuclear arms talks with the Soviet Union." Moreover, the removal of the B-2 bomber from the rearmament program undertaken by the previous administration, the newspaper states, quoting unnamed administration spokesmen, "would force the U.S. negotiators to review their positions and even, perhaps, to quit the talks."

The question arises: What do these allegations mean? Are they not a return to the "position-of-strength" policy? I think if there is a threat to the talks, it actually lies in the desire of certain circles in the United States to

implement the "star wars" program at all costs, undermine the 1972 Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and launch a new round of the arms race.

And yet there have been real steps to expand contacts in the military sphere. Such contacts are no longer limited to the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations. France, the FRG, and Britain are involved in this. What seemed unlikely a few years ago is becoming a reality. The developing trend toward constructive dialogue between armed forces representatives belonging to opposed military-political alliances is helping to shape a new world situation that is favorable for the cause of peace and disarmament. We should simply not hinder this beneficial process, which has been met with good will everywhere.

China

PRC Academician on Sino-Soviet Cooperation

OW1308143289 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 4 Aug 89

[Answer given by Hu Qiheng, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, in response to a station reporter's question on Sino-Soviet cooperation; from the "Half an Hour With Wang Xiao" program—recorded]

[Text] Listeners, today we will broadcast the answer given by Comrade Hu Qiheng, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences [CAS], in response to a question from a reporter of this station. Let me remind you that she visited the USSR as a member of a Chinese Government delegation. While in the Soviet Union, she participated in the activities of the Day of Chinese Science and Technology in Moscow. Station reporter (Garipov), who accompanied the Chinese delegation's visit elsewhere in the USSR, interviewed Comrade Hu Qiheng. During the delegation's tour of Moscow, Leningrad, Novorossiysk, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostock, Comrade Hu Qiheng visited some science centers and had meetings with noted Soviet scholars. Asked to comment on the current state of Soviet-Chinese scientific and technical cooperation and the prospects in this area, Comrade Hu Qiheng said:

I believe that there is great potential for Sino-Soviet cooperation. First of all, China's system of scientific and technical research was patterned on that of the Soviet Union at the time when China learned from the USSR. During the early 1950's, many Soviet experts came to China to help us with our construction. Many CAS institutes were prepared and set up with the direct participation of and assistance from Soviet scholars. This traditional friendship and our past mutual understanding also will facilitate our cooperation. Moreover, both China and the USSR boast very outstanding scientists and technicians, and there are areas where they can learn from each other. Because of these factors, I believe that there is a good prospect for Sino-Soviet cooperation.

As for the spheres of cooperation, I believe there should be bright prospects in the fields of basic and applied research as well as in engineering and technical research. We can exchange scholars, information, journals, and dissertations with regard to basic scientific research. We also can invite each other to participate in academic meetings held in our countries. During our current visit, we have discussed with our Soviet comrades the issue concerning the participation of our two countries' scientists in each other's international academic meetings without having to use foreign currency. Furthermore, we can carry out some cooperative research projects. For example, I know Soviet scientists have been intensifying their research in the fields of high-energy physics, high-temperature superconductivity, laser technology, and supercomputers. Such research projects are identical with our endeavors. So, our two countries can carry out cooperative research in these areas.

I believe we also can cooperate in the area of exploratory research. I believe we can cooperate in the research connected with developing, producing, and marketing new products in the USSR or in China so that both countries can achieve some substantial results in restructuring their management of science and technology in a way that would more closely integrate their scientific and technical research with their economic development. There are broad prospects for cooperation in all these areas, which leads me to believe that our two countries will understand each other better and have closer cooperation in various specific areas as time goes by. [end recording]

Yezhkov on PRC Scientific-Technical Cooperation

OW1508045389 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 11 Aug 89

[From "Half an Hour With Wang Xiao" program]

[Text] Yezhkov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and chairman of the Soviet side of the Commission for Soviet-Chinese Scientific and Technical Cooperation, said that scientific and technical ties are like a tiny piece of tissue, the last thing to cover but the first thing to perish, when political relations deteriorate. In a talk with station reporter (Garipov), Yezhkov said: If we compare the development of Soviet-Chinese scientific and technical relations with the potential our two countries have, we will be dissatisfied with the current level of development. One reason why these relations have not developed vigorously is our longstanding failure to understand what can possibly be accomplished in this area.

[Words indistinct] was blank until Soviet Science and Technology Day was held in China last fall and Chinese Science and Technology Day was held in the USSR this year.

Yezhkov met with members of the Chinese Government delegation which had come to the USSR to attend Chinese Science and Technology Day activities, and exchanged views with them on prospects of the two

countries' scientific and technical cooperation. Yezhkov said: I think we can achieve a breakthrough in our cooperation in two areas. First, both countries have expressed the hope that they can carry out cooperation in a broad range of areas and that there should be more common ground for the two countries to share. This being the case, we plan to rely on accords and laws to improve the foundation of our cooperation, promote mutual understanding, and broaden our ties in the economic area.

So far, some (?economic collectives) of our two countries have already established direct ties; people in the border regions have also established ties; and some cities have become sister cities. People in these cities can now make direct telephone calls to each other. We should make the best use of this.

However, our two countries should give special importance to one special sphere. Both the USSR and China have priority plans for scientific and technical development. These plans have been approved by the two governments. Scientific and technical development plans, regardless of whether they are Soviet or Chinese, have (?worldwide significance). But our plans have their own distinctive characteristics and are in line with our respective actual situations. This being the case, there is an objective basis for Soviet-Chinese scientific and technical cooperation.

What is the Chinese view in this area? Yezhkov said: Talking about the proposals of the Chinese Government, Song Jian, head of the Chinese Government delegation and Chinese state councillor, said that Sino-Soviet cooperation is essential in major scientific and technical fields. We are greatly pleased with this proposal. The spheres of bilateral cooperation will include biotechnology, (?biodegradable) materials, (?bacteriology), power, transportation, and (?food processing). The two countries may also cooperate in studying certain basic scientific problems. In other words, Soviet and Chinese scientists engaged in basic scientific research will meet to work out specific spheres of cooperation.

Yezhkov stressed that cooperation in these spheres will receive special support from the Soviet and Chinese Governments.

PRC Friendship Group Visits USSR

OW1508071289 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 13 Aug 89

[(Mirov) commentary; from the "Radio Magazine: Along the Road of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] Recently a delegation of activists of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the China-USSR Friendship Association visited the Soviet Union. The delegation was led by (Ma Lie), member of the Council of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign countries.

Following is a talk by (Mirov), member of the Central Council of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, on the Chinese delegation's visit to the Soviet Union. He accompanied the Chinese visitors to various places in the country.

(Mirov) said [(Mirov) briefly heard, speaking in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation]: The delegation successively visited Moscow, Vilnius, Tbilisi, and Kiev before returning to Moscow, and was accorded warm reception everywhere. For example, the deputy chairman and other officials of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met with the Chinese delegation at the Kremlin and had a substantial and cordial talk with the delegation.

The Soviet people's deputies briefed the Chinese visitors about the progress in Soviet political reform, the results of the election of Soviet people's deputies, the work at the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions, and the progress in the Soviet people's social and economic reforms.

While in Moscow, the Chinese delegation visited and laid wreaths at the Lenin Mausoleum and the Tomb of Unknown Soldiers, and toured the Kremlin Palace, Lenin's former residence and museum, and the Gorkiy Memorial Hall where Lenin spent his last years.

(Mirov) continued: During the delegation's visit to Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, the Chinese delegation obtained firsthand information about Soviet policies toward ethnic groups and on solving agricultural problems, about legislative work, and about obstacles to reform in this Baltic republic.

During its visit to the capital of the Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic in the outer Caucasus, the delegation was received by the Executive Committee of the Tbilisi City Soviet. There, the Chinese visitors familiarized themselves with how the city government solved social problems and the progress made in urban construction. The delegation visited a horticultural, grape-growing, and wine-making institute which conducted contacts with a similar institute in Xian City. There, the Chinese delegation also met with officials of the Georgian Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Georgian chapter of the USSR-China Friendship Society. During the meeting, the two sides discussed the development of exchanges between Georgia and China's Guangdong Province and between Tbilisi and Guangzhou City.

On its visit to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Chinese delegation called on the Kiev Institute of the Housing, Civilian, and Public Utilities Construction Bureau, the (Ulyskiy) State Heavy Machinery Plant, and the Kiev Engineering College, and had a meeting with officials of the Ukrainian Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Ukrainian chapter of the USSR-China Friendship Society.

In conclusion, (Mirov) said: Overall, the Soviet side did its best to make the Chinese friendship delegation's visit to the Soviet Union a beneficial and pleasant one. I believe that the Chinese visitors are sure of the Soviet people's friendly feelings toward the great Chinese people.

Northeast Asia

Leaders Greet DPRK on Liberation Anniversary

PM1508104889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 89 Second Edition p 1

[Message from CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Ministers to Kim Il-song and Yon Hyong-muk on DPRK liberation day]

[Text] To Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee and president of the DPRK;
To Comrade Yon Hyong-muk, premier of the DPRK Administration Council.

We cordially congratulate you and, through you, the working people of the DPRK and all the Korean people on a noteworthy event in the history of Korea and Soviet-Korean relations—the 44th anniversary of the country's liberation from Japanese colonial domination.

In August 1945 the Korean working people, as a result of the Soviet Army's routing of militarist Japanese troops occupying Korea, took power in the northern part of the country into their own hands, and, under the leadership of the Workers Party, embarked on a path of building socialism. Your republic's successes in boosting the economy and culture and improving the people's material well-being inspire great satisfaction.

Our country values the efforts of the DPRK Government to lessen tension on the Korean Peninsula and develop North-South dialogue and contacts. The stabilization of the situation in Korea is a significant factor for ensuring peace and good-neighborliness in Asia and throughout the world.

The years since Korea's liberation are marked by the fruitful development of political, economic, and cultural ties between our countries. The Soviet Union will continue to do everything to ensure that the traditional friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and Korea are extended and deepened in the interests of the cause of socialism and for the sake of peace and universal security.

On behalf of the Soviet people, we wish the Korean people success in building a socialist society and in the struggle for the peaceful, democratic unification of the motherland.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee
The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
The USSR Council of Ministers

Deputy Defense Minister Leaves for DPRK

PM1408174789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "On Official Visit"]

[Text] On 14 August Army General I.M. Tretyak, commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces and USSR deputy minister of defense, left on an official friendly visit to the DPRK.

Tretyak Attends Wreath Laying Ceremony

LD1508102889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0320 GMT 15 Aug 89

[Excerpts] Pyongyang, 15 Aug (TASS)—On the occasion of the 44th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese aggressors, wreaths were laid here today at the "Liberation" monument, erected in honor of the soviet servicemen who died for the freedom and independence of the Korean people. [passage omitted]

In Pyongyang wreaths were laid from the Soviet military delegation which is here, headed by Army General I.M. Tretyak, USSR deputy defense minister and commander in chief of Air Defense Forces.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Philippine Senator Predicts Removal of U.S. Bases

LD1408061789 Moscow TASS in English 0609 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Manila August 14 TASS—The elimination of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines is only a matter of time, said Jovito R. Salonga, president of the country's Senate.

Speaking at a news conference in the City of Butuan (north Agusan Province) on Sunday [13 Aug], he emphasised that the Soviet Union's diplomatic activity and reforms being effected by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev are throwing the United States on the defensive.

The USA itself, Salonga believes, will come to realise the need to remove its military facilities from the territories of other countries. This will be prompted by rising maintenance costs of military bases and by mounting anti-American sentiments in the Philippines and in all other countries with U.S. military presence.

Salonga said the Senate in its present composition will hardly agree to an extension of U.S. military presence in the Philippines after 1991 when the current bilateral agreement on military bases will expire.

We are not against the United States, we are simply for the Philippines, he pointed out.

At the same time the president of the Philippines Senate said that even the termination of the agreement would not signify an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.

It will take time to soften possible friction between the Philippines and the United States in that case and to solve the problem of employment for many thousands of Filipinos who now work at the U.S. military bases, he said.

ASEAN Reaction to Singapore U.S. Bases Offer Mixed

BK1508045589 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1300 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Dispatch from Kuala Lumpur on ASEAN Countries' Reactions to the U.S. Military Presence in the Region]

[Text] More than a week has passed in Kuala Lumpur, but the scandal over the recent political initiatives of the Singapore leadership has not yet abated. George Yeo Yong Boon, Singapore minister of state for foreign affairs, disclosed in a speech the readiness to offer the Singapore territory as the site for U.S. military bases.

A strong reaction immediately came from the Malaysian leadership. Ahmad Kamil Jaafar, secretary general of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said any entry of foreign weapons into the region will undermine the peace process in Southeast Asia and the world over. Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan stressed ASEAN must strive to maintain the status quo in the region which is relatively free from the military influence of the superpowers.

Jakarta, too, has a similar stand. Suharto, president of the Republic of Indonesia, in particular characterized the Singapore offer as dangerous as this would lure external powers into the region. The offer on the stationing of U.S. military bases in Singapore runs counter to the concept of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia advocated by ASEAN. It is also not in line with a plan to turn Southeast Asia into a nuclear weapon-free zone.

Kuala Lumpur is angry specifically because the Singapore variation was not not even mentioned during the ASEAN summit [as heard] in Kuala Lumpur last July. Instead, the participants of the meeting once again reaffirmed their desire to develop peace in the region by political means.

It should be noted that incoming reports show the reactions to the Singapore step are indeed not the same. For example, Thailand which has close military relations with the United States has as a whole responded positively to the plan. Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said there is something to be learned from the plan.

The Philippine leadership has not made any direct comments even though Singapore said its decision was motivated by a desire to alleviate the burden of the U.S. military presence which is borne by the Philippines alone. The agreement on the U.S. military bases in the Philippines will expire in 1991. Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus said the bases will not remain in Philippine territory forever. Nevertheless, the Philippines has not asked Singapore for any help. Various prognoses have been made in the Philippines, and it has been affirmed that Singapore is at a certain degree moving backwards. President [title as heard] Lee Kuan Yew said the talks centered on the so-called logistic posts.

Hun Sen Cites Obstacles to Cambodia Talks

LD1408144989 Moscow TASS in English 1401 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Phnom Penh August 14 TASS—An international conference on Cambodia is a step forward in the search for a peace settlement of the Cambodian conflict, though there are still many obstacles on the way to peace, above all the Pol Pot problem, Hun Sen, members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia, chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister of Cambodia, chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister of Cambodia, has said here, the SPK news agency reports.

Speaking to senior officials of ministries and departments, representatives of provincial and municipal councils of the country, he criticised some participants in the conference who are trying to preserve the Khmer Rouge's military and political role in the future Cambodia. "All who strive for settlement of the international aspect of the problem, restoration of peace and national concord, prevention of a civil war in Cambodia, should join the efforts aimed at elimination of the Khmer Rouge who stained themselves with crimes", the Cambodian leader said. The demand that a transitional quadripartite government, involving Khmer Rouge, be formed before the general elections grossly flouts the Khmer people's right to self-determination. The Khmer people themselves can determine the composition of their future government through the free expression of their will.

Hun Sen brushed off as false the Khmer opposition's allegations that Vietnam intends, contrary to its statement on full withdrawal of troops from Cambodia by the end of next September, to leave its soldiers in the country under the guise of Cambodian servicemen and Khmer civilians. The enemies resort to such gross lies, while preparing to unleash a civil war after the Vietnamese units return home, he stressed.

Heng Samrin Says Concrete Measures Needed

BK1508081989 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 14 Aug 89

["First part" of station correspondent's interview with Heng Samrin, general secretary of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and chairman of the State of Cambodia's Council of State—recorded, place, date not given]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Comrade General Secretary, how do you assess the outcome of the Paris international conference?

[Heng Samrin] The convening of an international conference to find a solution to the Cambodian problem through negotiations is already a positive development. This is the result of a lot of efforts made by many countries, parties, and progressive forces the world over for the cause of genuine peace in Cambodia.

Generally speaking, the conference agreed on major principles, such as the respect for the Cambodian people's right to self determination; the guarantee of Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, and neutrality; the respect for two interrelated issues linking the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer troops to the opposition to the return to power of the genocidal regime, and the establishment of international cooperation with Cambodia. Apart from this, a working procedure was also agreed upon, such as the setting up of various working committees. All this represents favorable conditions for the progress of future ministerial meetings on the Cambodian problem, particularly the international aspect of the problem. Concerning a solution to the internal aspect of the issue, many complex problems still exist, particularly concerning the elimination of the possibility allowing the genocidal group to return to power again. However, this does not mean that one cannot reach an agreement on the international aspect of the problem. The conference has already agreed on a number of major issues, particularly on the people's right to self-determination.

In short, I think that the Paris conference has already agreed on many basic principles. Therefore, the following task is to find concrete measures to implement these principles. And this is the task of various working committees to tackle. If all parties continue to push ahead the positive trend achieved at the first Paris conference, I believe that, although there are still many difficulties, this conference will achieve good results. Those opposing this trend will certainly be isolated. The party of the State of Cambodia will strive to do everything in accordance with the aspiration and interests of the Cambodian people to contribute to make this conference a success.

[Correspondent] In your view, what are the results of the adoption of the principle on Cambodia's permanent neutrality?

[Heng Samrin] Recently, our National Assembly solemnly declared that the State of Cambodia is a permanently neutral state whose aim is to coexist peacefully with all countries regardless of their political and social regimes, first of all with neighboring countries based on equality; respect for each others' independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; noninterference in other countries' internal affairs; nonaggression against other countries; solving problems through peaceful means; and respect for each others' interests. The State of Cambodia will not be part of any military alliance and will not be part of any treaty which is against Cambodia's neutrality. It will not allow the presence of foreign troops and military bases in the country. It will not allow the use of Cambodian territory to intervene in other countries' internal affairs.

We would like to appeal to parliamentary institutions and states the world over, and in the immediate future, I would like to appeal to the Paris conference on the Cambodian problem to recognize and provide a guarantee for the permanent neutrality of the State of Cambodia for the cause of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Comrade General Secretary.

Heng Samrin Departs Moscow After Vacation

LD1408185189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1543 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 14 Aug (TASS)—Today Heng Samrin, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party and chairman of the State Council of the state of Cambodia, who has been in the USSR on vacation at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, has left Moscow today.

Bovin Assesses Cambodian Peace Prospects

PM1508100589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion": "Cambodia Needs Peace"]

[Text] Following the general improvement in the international situation and the clear reduction in the threat of global military confrontation a real opportunity has finally appeared to find a political way out of chronic regional conflicts and to end them not with one side defeating the other, but by peaceful agreement, compromise, and reconciliation.

It was first intended to implement this approach in Afghanistan. This has not yet proved possible. The war continues. But the search for reconciliation continues too.

Now Cambodia has moved to the forefront. The situation is to a certain extent similar to that in Afghanistan. In both places the conflict is based on a clash between internal forces. In both places the conflict has acquired international status owing to armed outside interference. In one case Soviet, in the other case Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese Government has stated that the last Vietnamese soldier will leave Cambodia between 21 and 27 September. That is quite soon. This has galvanized the interested parties. And, after intensive diplomatic preparations, a representative conference on Cambodia was held in Paris 30 and 31 July. The conference set up

three working commissions and one special commission. Taking the conference participants' positions into account, they have been given 3 weeks to resolve the following tasks:

to define the conditions for a cease-fire and the principles for the creation and functioning of an effective international monitoring mechanism;

to elaborate a system of international guarantees for Cambodia's independence, territorial integrity, and neutrality; these guarantees should extend to the ending of foreign interference and weapons shipments from abroad and to preventing any return to the policy and practice of genocide;

to define conditions which will allow refugees and displaced persons to return home and to prepare the outlines of an international plan for Cambodian revival;

to examine issues linked with the implementation of national reconciliation and the creation of an interim four-sided government under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk; this commission is tasked with organizing free elections under international control.

It is not hard to realize that the effectiveness of the commissions and their success or failure will depend to a decisive extent on the "legacy" they receive from the conference and their initial springboard for bringing positions closer together. Let us look in this connection at the position of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, leader of the antigovernment coalition, and Hun Sen, chairman of the Cambodian Council of Ministers and Cambodian foreign minister.

But first a small digression. Working on this item, I decided to look through IZVESTIYA's files and see what and how we wrote about Cambodia at turning points in its modern history. I started reading items from April 1975. There were a few short reports on the last days of the Lon Nol regime and the victory of the "patriotic forces." On 19 April a greetings telegram was published from L. Brezhnev, N. Podgornyy, and A. Kosygin to Norodom Sihanouk (head of state and chairman of National United Front of Cambodia [FUNC]), Penn Nouth (chairman of the FUNC Central Committee Politburo and prime minister of the royal Cambodian national unity government), and Khieu Samphan (member of the FUNC Central Committee Politburo, deputy prime minister of the royal Cambodian national unity government, and commander in chief of the People's Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Cambodia).

Later, Cambodia to all intents and purposes disappeared from the newspapers. There was no analysis and the minimum of information. It was reported that, under the new constitution, Cambodia would be called Democratic Kampuchea as of 5 January 1976. It was reported that on 5 April that year Prince Sihanouk resigned as head of state; he was replaced by Khieu Samphan; Pol Pot became prime minister. Who were these people and the people around them, where had they come from, what did they profess? Not a word. A monstrous experiment, mass reprisals, and genocide were at their height. But on 17 April 1976 and 16 April 1977 IZVESTIYA noted the "glorious anniversary" and wrote that "all progressive mankind is on the side of Democratic Kampuchea's just cause."

The subject of clashes and armed skirmishes on the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border arose in 1978. The next "glorious anniversary"—17 April—was no longer marked with its own item, but with an extract from the Vietnamese newspaper NHAN DAN. A VNA report was published 28 June on the "fascist regime" in Kampuchea and on the fact that genocide had become the "prevailing policy."

On 4 December 1978 IZVESTIYA reported the creation of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation. The front was already close to victory by late December. On 10 January 1979 the newspaper reported the creation in Phnom Penh of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council headed by Heng Samrin. On 13 January, reporting on a UN Security Council session, the newspaper exposed "insinuations" about Vietnamese interference.

That was the way in which history was reported in the newspapers until quite recently. And it was not reported that way because people did not know the facts. They did know them. I recall talking with our Hanoi correspondent M. Ilinskiy. He was fully informed about matters. But he could not write the truth. He was not allowed to. On the basis, of course, of "higher considerations." Now this history has to be rewritten. Now we have glasnost. And yet I am by no means sure that we have overcome the "Kampuchean syndrome." As before, journalists are often forced to keep quiet about facts that our "friends" (or, rather, those whom we consider our "friends") find unpleasant and to substitute superficial sketches for political analysis. This path wins the favor of certain rulers. But it does not win the respect of the peoples, not least our own.

Now let us return to Cambodia.

Norodom Sihanouk's Position

There is no "civil war" in Cambodia. The war there is between Vietnamese aggressors and victims of aggression.

Vietnam should not only withdraw its troops but also recall all its advisers and return home the 1 million Vietnamese settlers who have moved to Cambodia since 1978.

Immediately after the signing of the agreement the present government will be replaced by a four-sided government of national unity which will prepare for elections.

The "Khmer Rouge" (apart from Pol Pot and two others) should be represented in the apparatus of power and administration. Otherwise they will continue the struggle and wreck national reconciliation. In order to prevent the Pol Pot-ites from establishing hegemony and seizing full power it will be necessary to cut the armed detachments of each of the four sides to 10,000 men and to eliminate all rear bases and secret arms dumps.

Incidentally, in order to stress his impartiality, Prince Sihanouk recalled that the "Khmer Rouge" had tortured and killed 5 of his children and 14 of his grandchildren.

The international monitoring mechanism and the international peacekeeping forces set up by the United Nations should remain in Cambodia for not less than 5 years.

Hun Sen's Position

He categorically opposes conceding any political and military power to the Pol Pot group within the framework of any government. In order to prevent a resumption of the civil war, it is necessary to immediately end all aid to the Pol Potists and to punish their ringleaders, who are guilty of the crime of genocide.

Until the elections are over it is necessary to maintain the political and military status quo (that is, the current government, the current state structure, and so forth). The elections should be prepared under international supervision by a special supreme leadership council drawn from the two Cambodian sides for this purpose.

The tasks of the international monitoring mechanism are restricted to observing the cease-fire, the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, and the ending of foreign aid to rival groupings.

As you can see, the gap is still quite wide. But it would have been far wider had the conference not limited the "Khmer Rouge" claims, had the delegations from the states of Cambodia and Vietnam not shown flexibility and farsightedness, and had it not been for the constructive and responsible approach of the Soviet, Chinese, and U.S. delegations. Nonetheless, stormy discussions were inevitable at the commission sessions. And yet, one would have hoped for better and for solutions to be found which would bring peace to Cambodia. Although the Afghan option of a withdrawal of forces without national reconciliation is not ruled out.

Strictly speaking, in this context the term "national reconciliation" is not entirely accurate. Essentially, it is a question of social reconciliation and of finding a compromise which will create the conditions for cooperation between different political forces, different social groups, and different classes, if they agree. This situation is not part of our usual theoretical scheme of things. But it is entirely part of the general direction of the changes sweeping the world in the late 20th century.

Prince Bismarck once said that the great questions of history are resolved by "iron and blood." That used to be the case. But now, in our increasingly integrated and interdependent world—a world where political problems are less and less easy to solve by using military force—Bismarck's formula has become obsolete. Armed conflicts and civil wars that have lasted for years and decades will not lead to "victory" in the classic sense of the word. They lead to deadlock. And the way out is to cease fire and engage in a quest for compromise and a mutually acceptable agreement between groups whose interests were previously seen as irreconcilable.

...It is thought that the results of the commissions' work will be generalized 21-24 August by the coordinating committee set up by the conference. The committee will draw up general documents and present them to foreign ministers. Paris is expecting the ministers by 28 August. Cambodia expects peace. We all expect common sense to prevail.

Near East & South Asia

Iran's Khamene'i Rejects Talks With U.S.

LD1508072489 Moscow TASS in Engish 0720 GMT 15 Aug 89

[Text] Tehran August 15 TASS—Iranian Leader Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i ruled out a possibility of dialogue with the United States unless Washington stops its support for Israel's Zionist leadership, radio Tehran said.

Khamene'i described U.S. conditions for negotiations with Iran as insulting.

The Iranian leader said that Tehran is ready for direct peace talks with Baghdad on condition that Iraq "withdraws its troops from Iranian territory."

Khamene'i said that his country insists on implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 and on an Iraqi troops withdrawal to the internationally-recognised borders.

Roundup of Events Surrounding Hostage Crisis

PM1408103189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Press roundup compiled by B. Ivanov: "Lebanon: 'Behind-the-Scenes' Diplomacy Set in Motion"]

[Text] The crisis over the U.S. hostages in Lebanon has entered the phase of active diplomatic efforts and mediation by parties interested in seeking a mutually acceptable compromise solution that would enable the prisoners to be

released. Foreign news agencies have reached this conclusion by analyzing reports coming in from the Near East, West European capitals, and the United States.

In the last 24 hours new salvos were fired in the "verbal exchanges" between Washington and Iran. Iran's IRNA and the TEHRAN TIMES, which is close to the government, carried reports about Iran's readiness "to use its influence" to help free the U.S. and West European hostages in Lebanon if Washington unfreezes Iranian deposits in U.S. banks.

The White House, which previously refused pointblank to comment on a similar report carried by NBC TV on Monday, was forced to issue an official statement on this subject in response. Stressing that the U.S. President categorically rejected such a proposal, White House Press Secretary M. Fitzwater reiterated: The United States does not want to link the "question of Iranian bank deposits abroad with the hostage problem. This accords with our policy of not exchanging money, weapons, or anything whatever and not paying a ransom for the hostages." Fitzwater also added that President Bush is nevertheless continuing "behind-the-scenes" diplomacy, including contacts with Iran, in an attempt to secure the release of the U.S. citizens.

Talking about sentiments within the U.S. Administration, CBS TV pointed out that despite the White House's "cautious optimism," the United States is continuing to prepare for possible military action. The battleship "Iowa," which is now near the shores of Lebanon, has fired practice shots from its main guns, and the aircraft carrier "America" is expected to move up to Iranian shores on Wednesday. According to press data, a total of 47 U.S. Navy warships are now concentrated in the Near East region.

Analyzing possible steps that the White House and President Bush personally may take in the near future, an NBC TV correspondent noted that the president's main task "is to not give 'Hizballah' any signal that could be construed as an indication of weakness or of readiness to free the hostages at any price. Bush is mainly gambling on diplomatic efforts in this game. According to ranking administration staffers, people in the White House hope that Israel will nonetheless be able to reach an agreement on the release of the hostages, but they have no intention of exerting any pressure on Israel on this question."

However, all indications are that Tel Aviv still has no intention of changing its position in the current crisis. In the course of talks between M. Goulding, UN deputy secretary general, and Israeli Defense Minister Y. Rabin, the Israeli side rejected the UN representative's request that the kidnapped Shaykh A. 'Ubayd to be released. In turn Rabin, appealing to Muslim extremist groupings, said that it is time for them to stop their threats and begin talks. According to him, they could use the appropriate channels—the International Red Cross.

The situation that has taken shape, whereby various Muslim groupings in Lebanon put forward numerous—occasionally clearly contradictory—demands as conditions for holding possible talks, is only placing additional difficulties in the way of freeing the hostages. That is why an important aspect of the efforts now being made to settle the crisis, French TF-1 TV indicates, is the quest for reliable intermediaries. Algeria, Syria, Iran, and the Soviet Union are primarily being described as such countries. However, in any case potential talks may prove quite protracted and difficult. According to THE WASHINGTON POST, their complexity also stems from the fact that "it is not just one organization that is responsible for kidnapping foreigners in Lebanon, although individual groupings are interlinked and have common patrons. The hostages have been kidnapped by approximately 10 groups. In certain cases different organizations have assumed responsibility for the same kidnapping. So the fact that the kidnappers were guided by different motives and are putting forward different ransom demands is complicating efforts to free the prisoners still further."

Iran's Velayati Arrives in Damascus for Talks

LD1508094689 Moscow TASS in English 0942 GMT 15 Aug 89

[Text] Damascus August 15 TASS—Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, who arrived in Damascus on Monday evening, will hold talks with the Syrian leadership concerning the latest developments in Lebanon.

Velayati said he intends to meet leaders of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon as well.

Velayati noted that the hostage problem will not be discussed during the current visit, stressing that Sheikh 'Ubayd, of the Shi'ite Hezbollah Organization, seized by the Israeli commandos at the end of last month, must be freed without any preliminary conditions.

PLO Official Discusses West Bank Elections

LD1408110789 Moscow TASS in English 1030 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] London August 14 TASS—"The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is ready for immediate elections in the occupied territories if it receives guarantees the elections are part of the process of ending Israeli occupation," Bassam Abu-Sharif, adviser to the PLO leader for information, told the British Broadcasting Corporation.

"I hereby announce that the PLO is ready for elections tomorrow if it is guaranteed freedom and democracy", he emphasised.

The idea of holding elections of Palestinian representatives in the West Bank of the Jordan and Gaza sector for participation in talks with the Israelis on the so-called interim self-rule is known to have been launched by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

The recently concluded fifth congress of the Palestinian organisation Fatah in Tunis categorically rejected the 'Shamir plan' and came out in favour of holding elections only after a withdrawal of Israeli occupation troops under international control.

Afghan War Described From Guard Post Near Kabul
PM1508082989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Aug 89 p 3

[APN and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA own correspondent A. Pravov "Reportage From Afghanistan": "Guard Post Near Kabul"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The war in Afghanistan continues. Now the Afghan Army performs all the difficult military work here.

"Will the government troops on their own be able to continue to resist all the opposition's ever-intensifying attempts to overthrow the Kabul government by military means?"

I put this question to Afghan Defense Minister Col Gen Shahnawaz Tanay, with whom I spoke a day before my present trip.

"Our troops are fully determined to resist the enemy offensives," the minister answered. "We shall not retreat...."

The colenel general spoke with confidence. He was just as sure of his soldiers' combat effectiveness in October last year—before the Soviet troop withdrawal. I also clearly remembered this phrase in April, when we met the second time.

It was during my meeting with the defense minister that we got the idea of going to one of the military posts surrounding Kabul. I wanted to see for myself the reliability of the capital's defenses, about which Col Gen Tanay spoke so confidently.

So, the command post was a building resembling a hilltop fortress. At the foot of the hill were several D-30 Howitzers. On the hill there was an observation post reached via an unusual staircase made of empty munitions boxes. These boxes, which are filled with stones, and sandbags serve as protection for the officers here.

"How far is the enemy from here?" I asked Lt Gen Anwar.

"It varies," he answered. Sometimes 15 km away, sometimes 2 km."

"Western radio stations report that a vigorous offensive against Kabul by the Mujahidin, a virtual storming of the city, is to start in August. What do you think, is this true?"

"Just let them try. We are ready to fight. But are they ready? As you see, it is still quiet here."

Indeed, there was silence all around. Of course, relative, frontline silence. A rocket projectile exploded unexpectedly on the top of the hill to the right of us. Occasionally bursts of Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machinegun fire were heard.

I looked through the optical device toward the frontline—the villages seemed to be ruined and quite desolate. But suddenly from behind a mud wall in the distance an old man in a turban on a donkey appeared.

"Are there people living in these villages?"

"Yes," Col Aminullah, chief of the artillery division, answered. "They know that we never fire at peaceful villages."

"What is your main combat task today?" I asked the colonel.

"The task of all the posts is to observe the enemy," he answered.

The posts and security detachments, where servicemen of the 8th infantry division fulfill their alert duty, are on the outer ring of Kabul's defenses—the number one zone of responsibility. Or rather it is not a ring, but a triangle. The army is entrusted with guarding its northern side, and the security and internal affairs forces are entrusted with guarding the other two—the southwest and southeast. The sector of the 8th infantry division stretches from the village of Dekh-Saps [name as transliterated] to the Paghman area. Detachments of Burhanuddin Rabbani's "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" [ISA] and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" [IPA] operate here.

As Colonel Aminullah said, recently the "diehards" have become bogged down in internal squabbles. IPA and ISA detachments are waging fierce battles in the region of the Dakuy Pain and Dakuy Bala [names as transliterated] villages, about 30 km from the command post where we were talking. So there is no question today of any kind of united offensive by them against Kabul, the colonel believes.

Meanwhile Lt Gen Anwar received officers' reports on the situation. An intelligence officer gave a report. He indicated on a map the disposition of the enemy detachments and their movements for the last 24 hours. The chief of the General Staff Operations Directorate frequently interrupted the report and asked for clarification.

"Were you satisfied with the report?" I asked him later before leaving.

"Yes, the situation is fine," he answered. "Kabul is being reliably defended...."

Afghanistan Described After Troop Withdrawal

LD1408164189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1115 GMT 14 Aug 89

["Afghanistan: 6 Months On" presented by Vladimir Pasko with correspondent Aleksandr Ivanovich Shkirando and Vsevolod Ivanovich Sovva, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry information department—live or recorded]

[Text] [Pasko] Hello, comrades. Tomorrow it is half a year since the Soviet Union completed the removal of its troops from Afghanistan, acting in strict accordance with the Geneva agreements. Not one Soviet soldier has remained in this country. When the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan signed the Geneva agreements they did so with the understanding that a strict implementation of the obligations in the agreements by all the sides participating in them would create a reliable basis for ending the long drawn out conflict between the opposing Afghan groupings and facilitate the restoration of peace on Afghan soil and the stabilization of the situation in the region as a whole. We are all carefully studying what is now happening in Afghanistan and are trying to perceive glimmers of an end to the fratricidal war. Alas, this is not visible. On the contrary, the conflict is becoming more and more fierce. Last week the UN general secretary even considered it necessary to direct the world's attention to the situation in this country.

What is in fact happening today in Afghanistan? To attempt to answer this question which troubles us all, I have invited to the studio today Aleksandr Ivanovich Shkirando, special correspondent of USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting in Kabul, well-known to you, who is at present on vacation, and Vsevolod Ivanovich Sovva, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry information department, who has recently been in Kabul on diplomatic service affairs and is also known to many of our listeners for his appearances on radio and television. So what is in fact happening today in Afghanistan?

[Shkirando] The main thing, it seems to me, consists in the fact that Afghanistan is alive and fighting. It seems to me this is a good deal. First I would like to return to the events 6 months ago. In those days when both in Afghanistan and abroad there were few who believed that the existing regime would remain standing. Western political scientists, for instance, considered that it was allotted a maximum of 2 days, that is, approximately until 17 February. I recall how hundreds of foreign correspondents hurried to Kabul to describe in detail the overthrow of the communist regime in Afghanistan. A number of Western countries closed their embassies until the fate of Afghanistan became clear. At this critical moment the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] was able, as it did 11 years ago, to act as the coordinating political force in defense of the fatherland.

On its initiative, military marches of party members took place in all the provincial centers. I must say that in those days it was indeed a major step. In the first place the party members themselves, each of which was armed at least with a Kalashnikov submachinegun, were convinced that the PDPA first of all constitutes a real force and, second, that the people are behind it. Immediately after the march the slogan, "My house is my fortress," began to be put into practice. One week passed, 1 month passed, and the regime was still in place. There were fewer Western correspondents in Kabul who had not ended up with a sensation after all. The fall of the regime in the near future was predicted less frequently.

[Sovva] What is happening in Afghanistan? I am judging from a month-old impression: a cloudless sky, peoples' friendly faces; in conversations with representatives of the government, the Foreign Ministry, and the press corps there was some kind of calm confidence and decisiveness in their actions. At the same time shells are landing in the streets, hitting mainly the civilian population. There is also some uncertainty about the future, because periodically, I would say, rumors spread, confirmed by information about regular assaults on the city and regular actions by the opposition.

One of the representatives of government circles told me: Each Kabul citizen is a politician on his own. From the radio and bazaar stories he recreates, as it were, for himself a picture of what is happening. Nevertheless, I want to say that from observation in the city some kind of optimism,—maybe it is even a national characteristic,—is prevalent. There is a prevailing confidence that tomorrow will be better than today.

[Pasko] Yes, but, nevertheless, the situation remains difficult. You see, Afghanistan is not only fighting a battle with internal counterrevolution, powerful pressure is being exerted on it from outside, in essence not only pressure, but direct intervention.

[Shkirando] At the same time the regime is still in place. But as far as the country's military-political situation is concerned, it remains complex primarily because there are two factors here on which it depends: First on the changed military-political and strategic plans of the counterrevolutionary forces, now concerning not simply partisan activity to destabilize the situation, as was the case during the presence of our troops, but the overthrow of the existing structure and the seizure of power in Afghanistan. For the sake of this aim the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are unlimiting in military and economic aid. Moreover, recently the U.S. military strategists who have arrived in Pakistan are themselves planning the military operations of the so-called Afghan Fighters for the Faith, in order for them, according to their plan, to wrest power in Kabul by 1 November. This

period up to 1 November has received the name in the secret documents of the Pentagon of fighting season [preceding two words in English] which in translation means a season of military actions.

Of course, in such a situation the Afghan Armed Forces must solve defense tasks which are more complex than before with a significant reduction in the armed forces confronting the counterrevolution. What I mean is that earlier the Afghan Armed Forces acted jointly with our Soviet troops. Nevertheless, I must remark that now, after the withdrawal of our troops, the situation in the country has nevertheless changed. You see earlier, as you remember, the counterrevolution justified the war with the slogan, "Jihad," that is, a holy war against infidels. But now the basis for this ideology has been removed, and so many field commanders of the armed opposition are refusing to pursue the pointless bloodshed.

[Pasko] Aleksandr Ivanovich, for a long time here the concept of a field commander has been current. What does it mean in practice;, what is a field commander; what do they command and what sort of people are they?

[Shkirando] We mean people who command groups directly within the territory of Afghanistan. For example, one such commander is Ahmad Shah Mas'ud. They simply do not see the sense of continuing this war. They control certain areas. In one of the decrees of President Najibullah, it is said that those persons who will not act against the government and agree to villages, roads, and towns remaining peaceful will have, let us say, the title of general or general-governor and will have the same privileges as they had before.

The question is that there must be some kind of cooperation with the central authority.

[Sovva] Last week there was a report about one grouping of 700 people, 700 armed men, controlling quite a large territory encompassing 150 settlements. This grouping signed an agreement with the central authority on the cessation of military actions.

[Shkirando] There have been quite a number of such examples. I was recently in the north of Afghanistan and there also such processes are taking place. I was able to observe a 1,500-strong group change over to the government side.

[Sovva] Vladimir Georgiyevich, your question could also be understood as this: Who is fighting whom in Afghanistan?

[Pasko] Quite right.

[Sovva] Evidently, the answer to this question is not straightforward. Why? Because the configuration of the opposition forces, which oppose the legal government of the republican regime, as they also now say, is very complex, in many cases even impenetrable. But now it has already been confirmed many times that the forces which are situated on the territory of Afghanistan are carrying out mercenary functions to a considerable degree, because the logistics and the rear services support is all developed on the territory of Pakistan with large military and technical back-up thanks to the deliveries U.S. weapons, moreover modern U.S. weapons which demand equivalent weapons from the other side, of course, and with significant financial involvement of Saudi Arabia.

If Tomsen, the U.S. special representative to the so-called provisional government has now loudly announced that he is convinced of the victory of the opposition after his visit to Peshawar, then it seems to me that the U.S. side does not completely realistically imagine the degree of unity of this opposition. To a considerable degree it is fiction.

The large argument which arose between Hikmatyar, Rabbani, and several others within the framework of what Aleksandr Ivanovich was talking about, the so-called Alliance of Seven, demonstrates that family clan interests play a significant part.

[Shkirando] Vsevolod Ivanovich, I would like to add the following to what you have said, that earlier, as you remember, there was such a slogan:

War to a victorious finish! And they believed in this victory. Now, however, this slogan, war to a victorious finish, or in other words war to the last Afghan, no longer attracts many of the leading members of bands nor field commanders. But the events of previous years, in particular the period when the policy of national reconciliation was being carried out in the country, showed that the leaders of the opposition and the leaders of the Alliance of Seven are not in the least interested in the destiny of the Afghan people. They are only concerned with their own selfish interests.

You take a look at such figures as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Yunus Khalis or Sayyaf. Recently they haven't even been able to get along within the framework of their so-called interim government, which, by the way, is still located on the territory of Pakistan. But in Afghanistan a real war is under way between their gangs for spheres of influence, and this is common knowledge.

[Sovva] The irreconcilables are irreconcilable even in their own environment, but there is another aspect here: What are the field commanders role? As I see it, and there are already several encouraging examples, a field commander is a man who possesses real power in an area of territory, has authority, has armed forces, and can convert this territory into a zone of peace, if he enters into an agreement with the central authorities. If you take a look at the map of Afghanistan you can find plenty of areas there where war is not being waged. We were saying, Aleksandr Ivanovich, your colleagues, with your participation, were on a trip to see Pir Mansur, the

Esmaili leader. This is quite a new feature in the Afghan situation. These are people who have their own sovereign territory, which is well cultivated, and peace and order reigns there. Well, the fact that Pir Mansur has the status of a very highly respected person, almost a saint on eternal soil, stems from their beliefs and the fact that his son is the commander of a brigade.

[Shkirando interrupting] Yes, a division.

[Sovva] A division, as it is called, yes. And he controls this territory and draws others into his sphere of influence. This shows the tendency toward a situation where the field commanders, with the passage of time, the reconcilables will come to an agreement. And the irreconcilables will remain beyond the pale, in emigration, it is true, retaining considerable capital and great influence, by the way, because of the money placed in their pockets from the aid.

[Shkirando]Clearly this is what forces them to be irreconcilables. Otherwise they would lose what they have now.

[Pasko] Does the present government of Afghanistan include representatives of other forces, that is, not just representatives of the PDPA?

[Shkirando] There are other representatives. There were more of them a few months ago. But again, this is connected with the critical factor in the situation, when, recently the PDPA in effect again took power into its hands, although, overall, the policy of national reconciliation, which implies a broad political dialogue and compromise, was retained.

[Sovva]At the same time, the leadership of the party, the president, even during these difficult months of the fighting season, is conducting a very active dialogue with the most diverse sections of the population which do not belong to the party. When I was there, there were very interesting speeches by Najibullah, to the professorial and teachers' staff, to the intelligentsia, where there was a animated conversation on the destiny of the homeland, and moreover, not on any purely party basis, as would have occurred previously. There was a very serious conversation with the military and representatives of the most diverse views and outlooks. That, is, the government has opened up the road for agreement in all directions, bearing in mind that it is precisely on this basis that reconciliation can be reached.

[Pasko] To what extent is the situation, that has been taking shape around the Afghan capital, currently dangerous?

[Shkirando] Indeed, life in Kabul has become dangerous recently. Following the conference in Peshawar, in mid-May this year, among the leaders of the opposition and U.S. and Pakistani representatives, the Afghan capital has found itself on the list of the five main centers on which the gang units have to inflict decisive blows to seize them. Concerning the seizure of Kabul, it seems to me that this won't be quite so easy for the opposition to carry out. The defense of the city consists of several well-fortified lines. I discovered this personally during visits to many observation points. But the shellings are really taking place practically every day. Every day totally innocent people are dying. Of course, these barbaric shellings of Kabul, combined with shortages in the most essential goods, cannot put its inhabitants in good humor.

[Sovva] Great danger lies in these barbaric, terrorist shellings. I have had occasion to see them, they are a sort of (?wasp-like) cigar, filled with 50 kg of explosive providing a great high-explosive shrapnel effect. Located at a great distance from the city, somewhere up to 30 km, they are launched anonymously. They are set up and widely dispersed in advance at night, and usuall incorporate a timing mechanism. These are in principle the weapons of bandits.

[Pasko] Vladimir Ivanovich Fadeyev, who has now gone to Kabul, in one of his first reports from there, observed that Kabul has changed a great deal, the people have changed under the effect of the shellings. When we read and hear information coming from there, we start to wonder if peace will come to the soil of Afghanistan. When can this occur?

[Shkirando] I think that, in the end, peace will come. Without this it will be simply impossible for the Afghans to continue to live, but when it will come, that is not, of course, easy to say with certainty. Primarily because now in this country we are seeing not just a complication of the internal situation, but the outbreak of a dangerous regional conflict. Originally, including at the time when the Geneva agreements were being signed, it was a matter of an Afghan settlement, but now the question has arisen of preventing an armed conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You actually mentioned this factor earlier, Vsevolod Ivanovich.

In the events outside Jalalabad, for example, and in other border regions, the Pakistani Army has been involved on the side of the armed opposition. In addition, 72 nongovernmental organizations and firms in Pakistan have been activated for centralizing material and technical supplies to the insurgent forces. As concerns the character of the current stage of the war, it was stated at the recent Grand Assembly by Afghan President Najibullah that this battle is being waged by the enemies of the people of Afghanistan with U.S. arms, funded by the money of Saudi Arabia, and under the leadership of the Pakistani generals. In connection with this, the Republic of Afghanistan reserves the right, at a certain time, to demand from Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, as the inciters and organizers of the undeclared war and aggression toward the people of Afghanistan, full compensation for the damage inflicted by this war. I would note that the signatures of

the United States and Pakistan are affixed to the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan. Unfortunately, their participation in the settlement of the Afghan question has been limited to this.

[Sovva] Yes, the role of the United States, as one of the guarantors of the Geneva agreements, is undergoing serious changes. Things are moving toward the situation in which the United States could become simply a participant in this regional conflict. I think the role of the international mechanism in resolving this question is now growing. For this eventuality, quite realistic proposals which were advanced earlier are even more valid in the current situation. I have in mind the joint Soviet-Afghan proposals to convene an international conference on Afghanistan, with the participation of the neighboring countries Pakistan, Iran, China, India, and the Soviet Union plus the United States as guarantors of the Geneva agreements. Of course, taking an active part in such a conference would be representatives of the United Nations, its secretary general, and of course, representatives of the Afghan forces party to the conflict.

The proposal for a regional conference, with the participation of the countries neighboring on Afghanistan, is becoming increasingly important. In addition, the participation of a plenipotentiary representative of the UN secretary general in preparing the ground for the start of an inter-Afghan dialogue would help to establish a mechanism for an Afghan political settlement.

[Pasko] We are all aware of the fact that we are rendering assistance, but to be a little more specific, what aid is currently going to Afghanistan?

[Sovva] Well, first of al we should talk about military assistance. It is all the more necessary to do that because there have been a number of reports, including reports in our press, alleging that there is some sort of equilibrium in the assistance rendered to both sides in the conflict. There is no such equilibrium. There arose a need to respond to the modern weapons which the opposition was and still is receiving, to respond with the very same modern weapons. Furthermore, what the regime in the republic obtains from us is defensive weapons, weapons to defend their own territory. These are not weapons of terror, as military specialists can very easily compare. Our position on the issue of weapons supplies to the combatant sides in Afghanistan has been repeatedly made public, and it remains immutable. The Soviet Union has already repeatedly proposed that such supplies should be stopped by all countries and to all combatant groups, in conjunction with a cease-fire.

[Pasko] That, in fact, is what the Geneva accords...

[Sovva, interrupting] Absolutely correct! That is an important provision of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan. However the military equipment and the most dreadful artillery of the opposition is continuing to have its effect. Both material incentives, aggression, and intervention are in evidence. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to this and will continue to render the Republic of Afghanistan military assistance, including modern weapons, in compliance with its obligations under bilateral treaties. In other words, legally our assistance in terms of military equipment does not contravene the Geneva accords, whereas supplies of weapons to the Afghan opposition by way of Pakistan or by Pakistan itself is a direct infringement of these accords. The Soviet Union, however, being firmly attached to settling the conflict by peaceful means, is ready at any time to cease all military supplies to Afghanistan, on a reciprocal basis.

[Shkirando] I should like to say a few words about the importance of economic assistance. What does this consist of? First and foremost, it is supplies of essentials for the life of the Afghan people: goods and food are what I mean. Take flour, for instance. Under conditions in which Kabul is still under a military and economic blockade, this is simply essential for normal life, normal in the understanding of the Afghan, so that he might have at least a day's supply of bread and tea. Such assistance is received with sincere gratitude.

[Sovva] One comment here: The word shorawi [Soviets] has already become international. Everything Soviet and indeed, Soviet man, is linked with this—specifically the Soviet man who served in Afghanistan. Never, in any glance or word, did I see or feel any reproach against our country after the withdrawal of our troops. For this was not an army of occupation, it was a contingent which had no political aims whatsoever. It departed, having carried out its strictly limited military tasks. After it withdrew, it became evident that the state exists in its own right, the government exists in its own right, and that tasks are being tackled there which have not been set from outside but which are dictated by the country's own internal development.

[Pasko] Well, comrades, our meetings must have an end. I shall try to draw a few generalizations from what you have said, bearing in mind the initial question we posed—what is happening in Afghanistan today. First of all, I think, we can state that the ruling republican order in that country has demonstrated convincingly to the whole world its viability and its military-political and spiritual and moral superiority over its opponents. We also say that the concept of national reconciliation and the withdrawal of Soviet troops has essentially led to a split in the opposition. This opposition today does not represent a homogenous mass: There are the irreconcilables, but there are also other forces which are prepared to cooperate with the central authorities.

At the same time, however, we must acknowledge that the situation in the country is still difficult. Bloodshed is continuing, and one of the main reasons for this is foreign interference which is essentially being carried over into intervention. All this cannot but give rise to

concern on the part of the world community, a concern which is becoming increasingly perceptible. To speak of the Soviet Union, we, as a guarantor of the Geneva accords, are continuing to work actively to promote a final political settlement of the Afghan problem. Interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs must cease. The Afghan people must be granted the right itself to resolve its own affairs.

[Sovva] I should like to remind you that on 19 August, Afghanistan will celebrate the day when national independence was established...

[Shkirando, interrupting] The 70th anniversary, in fact.

[Sovva] The 70th anniversary. And of course, our thoughts involuntarily return now to 1919 and to Lenin's evaluatons and conclusions about policy in regard to our ties with Afghanistan, Iran and our other neighbors to the south. These were wise and far sighted evaluations which were backed by subsequent leaders in Afghanistan. When we now speak about Afghanistan, therefore, we base ourselves upon these traditions and upon our experience. And, as if from the depths of the decades we look to the future. In this respect, of course, the Soviet Union has a leading role in putting forward for consideration by public political opinion a whole series of important proposals on Afghanistan, on resolving this issue, and first and foremost on setting in motion the international mechanism.

[Pasko] Comrades, I thank you for taking part in this conversation. The time allotted for our program is drawing to a close.

[Sovva] But I wanted to ask Aleksandr Ivanovich a question.

[Pasko] OK.

[Sovva] His even, calm voice does not, of course, reveal the essence of the man. I would not wish to boost his reputation any further—his courage and his personal and heroic conduct in many situations, I would say, are well known to his fellow international affairs journalists—but just one question: What happened to the television camera that was damaged by a bullet during a flight...

[Shkirando, interrupting] Around Jalalabad, you mean?

[Sovva] During a flight to Jalalabad by helicopter. Did you bring it back?

[Shkirando] The camera was brought to Moscow, unfortunately not in working order, and was handed in to the repair center. What happened to it after that I do not know at the moment, though I do know they were thinking of repairing it. Whether it will end up in some other hot spot or whether it might perhaps end up in a museum, I do not know yet.

[Pasko] Yes, a legendary camera indeed, but it would be better were there never any such hot spots again. Comrades, I thank you once again for taking part in this conversation. All the best.

Saddam Husayn Thanks USSR Leaders for Message

PM1408133589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Message of thanks from Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to Soviet leaders]

[Text]To His Excellency M.S. Gorbachev, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

To His Excellency N.I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers:

We received your congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the revolution—17 July—Iraq's national holiday, with deep gratitude.

Taking this opportunity, we are glad to reaffirm our desire through joint efforts to develop relations between our two countries on the basis of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation Between Iraq and the Soviet Union, in the interests of our peoples, and in the name of guaranteeing security and peace in our region and the whole world.

We wish you health and happiness, and we wish the friendly Soviet people further progress. [Signed] Saddam Husayn, president of the Republic of Iraq

Independence Day Message Sent to India

LD1408170789 Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS—The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR have sent cordial congratulations to President of the Republic of India Ramasvami Venkataraman, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and, in their person, the whole people of friendly India, on the occasion of the national independence day of the Republic of India.

The Soviet people welcome free India's impressive accomplishments in the development of its national economy, science and culture, the message says.

"The Soviet Union and India are old and good friends, united by the common goal—to rid the world of nuclear weapons and violence, to ensure peace and development to all members of the world community", it said.

The message expressed confidence that further consolidation of Soviet-Indian cooperation on the basis of the 1971 treaty and the Delhi 1986 declaration meets the interests of the peoples of both countries, universal peace and security.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Ambassador to Togo Presents Credentials

LD1408151989 Moscow in English to Africa 2000 GMT 13 Aug 89

[Text] In Togo, President Gnassingbe Eyadema declared, at the ceremony where the new Soviet ambassador to that country, Oleg Chernyy, presented his credentials, that the views of the Soviet Union and Togo on the vital issues of our time fully coincide. He also said that the Soviet Union's foreign policy asserts the entirely new principles of international relations, and that all that is done along those lines by the Soviet leadership corresponds to African interests as well.

East Europe

Wake of Criticism Follows Walesa Announcement

Walesa's Proposal for Coalition

LD1308123589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0530 GMT 13 Aug 89

[Text] The Internal political situation in Poland remains tense. It was further exacerbated when at the beginning of this week Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity trade union, proposed forming a new government without the participation of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]. Our Warsaw correspondent Vladimir Mikhailenko reports on what has followed this:

[Mikhailenko] I will remind you that Lech Walesa, quite officially, through the Polish Press Agency, made a proposal to the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party of Poland to enter a coalition to form a new government. Both of these, also through official channels, through their press spokesmen, politely refused. The Peasant party stated that, in its opinion, only the government of a grand coalition can be an active and effective government, capable of taking the country out of the severe crisis.

Walesa needs support, and needs allies to create a government without communists, without the Polish United Workers' Party, to which it is now customary to ascribe all ills. As is known, many of them the party does not deny. But it is also known that it was this party which invited the opposition to a roundtable to unite the efforts of the nation to wrench the country out of the crisis situation which had arisen.

Assessing the sociopolitical situation in the country and discussing the problems of forming a new government, the PZPR Central Committee Politburo underlined that the situation urgently demands accelerating the process of forming a well-selected, effective and competent cabinet of ministers, a government of people's consensus. Having rejected the concept of a grand coalition and refusing to put forward its representatives for the new council of Ministers, the opposition is hindering this work.

In the Politburo it was stressed that Walesa's announcement is evidence of his intention of breaking up the coalition of the PZPR and its longstanding allies or at least, of hindering their political interaction.

In an interview with Soviet Television Mieczyslaw Rakowski, first secretary of PZPR Central Committee, once more emphasized that Walesa in fact had struck a blow at the basis of the new political system worked out at the round table and cast doubt on its existence. He underlined that the move is an infringement of the accord and indicates the unwillingness of the opposition to share with us the responsibility for the fate of the country.

Kiszczak Statement

LD1408192789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports from Warsaw: Kiszczak, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, who was entrusted by the Sejm with forming the country's government, has issued a statement in which he assesses the results of talks that have been held and the political situation that has taken shape. He favors the formation of a new government by Malinowski, leader of the United Peasants' Party [ZSL]. This government could include representatives of all the forces represented in Parliament.

Over the past few days, the statement reads, I have had numerous talks in order to form a grand coalition government. I continue to be of the opinion that it is precisely the formation of such a government that would be in Poland's interests. In the course of the talks that have been held, there began to emerge certain opportunities for forming a government with the participation of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], the ZSL, the Democratic Party [SD], societies of lay Catholics and Christians, figures who do not belong to any party, including representatives of opposition political organizations.

Walesa's latest proposals concerning the creation of a coalition of Solidarity, the ZSL and the SD complicate and drag out the process of forming a government, the statement notes. Nonetheless, this means that Walesa has radically changed his attitude toward cooperating with these parties. Kiszczak recalled that Jaruzelski, Poland's president, prior to recommending him for the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers, had made such a proposal to Malinowski, chairman of the ZSL Supreme Committee.

At that time he had declined it, due to the position taken by the Solidarity leader. A new situation has emerged now, a situation which has opportunities for Malinowski forming a government with the participation of representatives of all the parliamentary forces.

Situation 'More Heated'

PM1408115089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 89 Second Edition p 6

[Report by TASS correspondent V. Volkov under the rubric "On the Spot": "Who Will Join the Government?"]

[Text] Warsaw—The traditional "cucumber season" in Poland, when life of every kind, including political life, comes to a standstill for the summer vacation, has not even begun this year. And not because of a failed cucumber harvest....

The situation in the country has become more heated in the past week. Waiting lines form outside meat and other stores from early morning. Irritable citizens, despite the abolition of ration cards, are having to pay three or four times more for meat products than in July, despite the far poorer range available. Prices have also risen for milk, butter, cheese, and flour. Difficulties are arising with bread products and sugar. In the population's eyes, the whole complex process of switching to a free food market amounts to galloping prices and empty shelves in the stores. The peasants, whose pressure led to the accelerated adoption of these measures, are still in no hurry to supply steers or hogs to the procurement points, but instead are waiting for rapid price rises. Hopes for meat imports and "gifts" from the EEC to markedly improve the situation have not proved justified.

All this is intensifying the social tension. Not a day goes by without strikes. There is just one demand: a wage increase, sometimes by 100 percent at once. There is now a worrying situation on the railroads and at communications enterprises and metallurgical plants. On the initiative of Solidarity, whose leadership, for the first time since the "roundtable," has in effect called on the labor collectives to consider the question of protest actions, a mass warning strike took place in the Gdansk region.

Against the background of all these complex and painful processes that accompany the measures to improve the economy and normalize the market, particular significance is attached to the formation of a government that enjoys authority in society. After the opposition rejected the idea of a "grand coalition" with the participation of all the political forces represented in the Sejm, which was put forward by Polish President W. Jaruzelski and supported by the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and the allied parties, a difficult task fell to Czeslaw Kiszczak, who was appointed head of government by the Sejm. His consultations on the composition of the future Council of Ministers with partners in the former coalition, representatives of the opposition parliamentary Citizens' Club, and certain well-known independent figures, including figures close to church circles, proved a very difficult task.

An unexpected and quite "unparliamentary" blow was struck by Lech Walesa on 7 August, making these negotiations even more difficult. The Solidarity chairman not only gave the directive to refuse support to Kiszczak's possible cabinet, but also invited the United Peasants' Party [ZSL] and the Democratic Party [SD] to form a government with Solidarity, but without the participation of the PZPR. As was rightly noted at a session of the PZPR deputies' club, Walesa's statement, made before Kiszczak had finished forming a new government in accordance with the Sejm's instructions, is contrary to the generally accepted principles of parliamentary democracy.

In the opinion of the PZPR deputies, Walesa's action and his open calls for a "government without communists" indicates that the opposition has changed its strategy and set a course toward the immediate seizure of power. An element in its tactics is to try to break up the present coalition. Many people are now asking: What is this—a departure from the "roundtable" accords, or another attempt to make political capital by taking advantage of the complex situation in the country?

The Solidarity leader's action met with some response among ZSL and SD parliamentarians, as is indicated by the heated debates at sessions of these parties' deputies' clubs. The ZSL and SD leadership made contact with "L. Walesa's agents" and members of the parliamentary Citizens' Club to "clarify the circumstances," without, however, breaking off talks with Kiszczak.

None of this does anything to facilitate the already difficult mission of the new chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, nor does it help to alleviate the political tension in Poland, an intensification of which could adversely affect all-European processes too. In the opinion of local observers the Solidarity leader's actions, which were condemned even by some of that trade union's own activists, could lead to a prolonged government crisis in the country. And this at a time when the formation of a representative and effective government with wide support within the country and in the international arena is a truly urgent task.

Poland Faces 'Political Paralysis'

PM1408123989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by Leszek Wyrwicz, observer for Poland's INTERPRESS agency, under the "Panorama of International Events" rubric: "Poland: Trying Time. Czeslaw Kiszczak and the Quest for a 'Grand Coalition'"]

[Text] Poland is experiencing very difficult days today. Possibly the most difficult in its postwar history. Political and economic perestroyka is being accompanied by an increase in tension within the country, which is causing and intensifying a political crisis and disorganizing the economy.

The new premier of the Polish Government, General Czeslaw Kiszczak, has been holding consultations for several days now with representatives of all political and social forces, including the Sejm and Senate opposition, Polish Primate Cardinal J. Glemp, the leaders of political parties and mass organizations, and prominent scientists. They have all been called upon to take part in creating a "grand coalition" government which is to include representatives of all political and social forces (it has been proposed to entrust the post of deputy prime minister to an opposition representative). Most Poles believe that only a government which wins the support of various groupings can extricate the country from the crisis and really halt further economic disintegration.

Lech Walesa's statement on Monday was a blow to these hopes. He openly accused the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] of monopolism in the government, where it has ruled supreme for 45 years. It is this party, the "Solidarity" leader believes, which has brought the country to the current crisis, and the decision to appoint Kiszczak to the post of head of government confirms that nothing has changed in the government's practical actions. Walesa concluded by saying the following: Only a "Solidarity" government in coalition with the United Peasant Party [ZSL] and the Peasant Party [SD] can extricate Poland from the crisis, and that is the government he is going to seek to ensure. The ZSL and the SD pointed out that this proposal merits discussion "but we will only examine it when it is proved to be to the benefit of the people and the country." They expressed surprise that this statement was made so late.

Walesa is proposing to create a government without the involvement of the communists. He has that right. However, one must state categorically: Can one cast doubt on the role and significance of the communist party, which began the process of renewal in the country, and its adoption of unprecedented decisions at the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum which opened the way to political pluralism and legalized "Solidarity." The party made it possible to hold the "roundtable" and promoted the further development of democracy and economic reform. Can you not see all that? The following question is natural: Who is destroying the program for consensus between the ruling forces and the opposition—the consensus whose premise was and is to enable the perestroyka of political relations along the road of further democratizing and gradually extricating the country from the economic crisis—and why?

Many Poles thinking about the future today feel ever-increasing concern at the policy of the section of the opposition which has decided to wreck Czeslaw Kiszczak's mission or, more accurately, to create a serious threat of a government crisis. Poland's interests are pushed into the background as a result of these attempts and maneuvers, and the danger of creating a government whose efforts are foredoomed is becoming a real one. Such a government would be deprived of the requisite political power to take urgent steps in the economy. The current alignment of forces in the parliament, and particularly in the Senate, makes it possible to block all government decisions and it may reduce the government to a state of "political paralysis."

The PZPR's opportunities for maneuver are limited as a result of the lost elections but the opposition too will be unable to govern the country alone without the participation of the PZPR-ZSL-SD coalition. This frank breach of the rules necessitates an objective and rapid solution to the problem in the interests of the Poles themselves.

In connection with the situation that has taken shape these days you can hear a section of the party aktiv saying that the PZPR must go into opposition. Is such a step possible? Formally, yes. The party needs time to consolidate its forces, but, freed from responsibility for the results of the government's actions, it could indeed monitor an opposition government. But that is not the point. Even in these lost elections the party obtained the backing to participate in government. In taking up the challenge of creating a "grand coalition" government under such difficult conditions, it is guided above all by supreme historical responsibility for Poland's future development as a rule-of-law state and for its economic revival. It has a full right to take part with other forces in this process. In his speech after his election to this lofty post M. Rakowski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, said, in particular: "...We do not want a dispute with the opposition. We will be forced to accept a fight if we are compelled to do so. We are really interested in fruitful and constructive cooperation. Nothing for the sake of convenience and peace and quiet, everything for the good of the country alone."

Poland has entered August 1989—it is a country in which society is utterly tired of the current situation: galloping inflation, price rises, shortages of goods, and a wave of persisting strikes and protests. Life is hard in the country today. Hence the demands for wage increases making it possible to cover expenditure in connection with the introduction of the principles of a market economy as of 1 August, which increased prices by a factor of 3-4. More and more Poles are asking the question: Is it really only fresh radical solutions to the problems of prices and wages and belt-tightening that will free the country from the shackles of economic illusions, which, according to Professor Wilczynski, "brought about the price conundrum, atrophied economic transactions, and living beyond our means."

Poland today needs constructive cooperation between all political and social forces rather than unanimity. It needs a strong government involving representatives of all political groupings. A government that, possessing the support of patriotic forces among the population, is capable of resolutely countering economic disintegration and enforcing unpopular but necessary measures to rescue the market and the economy despite the possible risk of a new wave of protests, strikes, and political demagoguery.

Human Rights Allegations 'Insulting' to Yugoslavia
PM1508080889 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov report: "Who Is Fanning the Glowing Flames of Conflict"]

[Text] Belgrade—The SFRY Assembly has approved in general a government-proposed draft all-Yugoslavia program for the development of the autonomous province of Kosovo, the stabilization of the sociopolitical situation there, and the restoration of the economy, damaged by separatist and nationalist clashes.

There was great approval in the country for the planned measures to stop the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and promote the return home of those who left their homes under threats from the nationalists. Today, as a result of the improvement in the political situation in the province, many refugees would like to go home, but the question is: Where to live? The abandoned apartments and houses are filled.... The Federal Executive Coucnil proposes the construction in the near future, at the federation's expense, of 2,000 apartments in Kosovo for returning inhabitants, as well as the allocation of more than 700 plots for individual construction. Measures are also being adopted to reduce unemployment and train specialists from among all the nationalities living in the province.

However, as the Yugoslav press notes, these positive decisions, the long-awaited lessening of tension in Kosovo, and the normal pace of work at the majority of enterprises here are at present upsetting some people outside Yugoslavia.

It seems that American congressmen have taken the lead in misinforming the world public. A month ago deputies from both houses of the U.S. Congress, in discussing a draft law on American aid to foreign countries, were particularly critical of the SFRY Government, which is allegedly violating human rights in the autonomous province of Kosovo.

As IZVESTIYA has already reported, this one-sided and unexpected act by the U.S. Congress was unanimously assessed by the SFRY public as "anti-Yugoslav" and damaging to the many years of good relations between the two countries. The Federal Executive Council made a special statement in connection with the U.S. Congress resolution. B. Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, summoned the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade and expressed his government's concern. The ambassador then said, first, the American government is not directly involved in the adoption of the resolution, and, second, the processes of ratifying it are not yet complete. In July J. Drnovsek, president of the SRFY Presidency, met with U.S. President G. Bush in Paris during the celebrations of the bicentennial of the French Revolution. "Bush expressed satisfaction over the improvement in the situation in Kosovo," Drnovsek said at a press conference on his return to Belgrade.

But subsequent events showed that it still suits some people in the United States to continue to play the "Kosovo card." Apart from the House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee also approved the anti-Yugoslav resolution.

It appears that Yugoslav affairs are high on the U.S. Congress list of priorities. The Senate has just adopted hastily, an hour before breaking up for the summer recess, a resolution on human rights violations in Yugoslavia that is insulting to the SFRY.

The Yugoslav press also notes the surprisingly offensive tone fo the resolution. After everything that has been done in Yugoslavia to develop the democratization of society, extend human rights and freedoms, and rectify the errors of the past, a resolution like this amounts to breaking down an open door. Furthermore, such documents can do nothing but harm. Subjectively and objectively, the U.S. Congress, leading political observers conclude, is spurring on the separatist forces in Yugoslavia, which are today continuing to threaten its internal unity.

Yugoslavia Experiments With 'Market Relations'
18070729 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul Morning Edition p 6

[Dispatch by Ye. Vostrukhov, staff correspondent in Belgrade: "Yugoslavia: The Cabinet Shows Its Character"]

[Text] **The press reports from the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] have recently become alarming: The country is hardly experiencing the best of times; for a number of reasons, Yugoslav society is in a deep crisis. In the pages of the local papers, this is the weekly subject the discourse of politicians, economists, and public figures, and each one of them has his own point of view on the events taking place, as well as his own recipe for getting out of the dead end.**

Incidentally, the outsider's glance will not perceive the tragedy of the crisis. A well-dressed, lively crowd splashes into the Belgrade streets in the evening; it floats past store windows filled with a variety of goods. And I do not agree with my colleagues who assert in their correspondence that the Yugoslavs are by-passing the store because of the crisis. No, the stores are not empty of customers, even though inflation imposes its own order on them. The demand for many goods, including essential consumer items such as bread and meat, has fallen. With the arrival of summer, many streets have been turned into restaurants and cafes; innumerable tables are set out right on the sidewalks, and, as a rule,

they are occupied. On the other hand, the city itself empties out on weekends and holidays, as the residents travel as far away as possible from the asphalt, to nature and fresh air.

In a word, on the surface, the crisis has not broken the Yugoslavs, even though the burden has fallen literally on every family. Today, no one hides this, no one tries to shade the statistics by their silence. On the contrary, the Belgrade newspapers regularly print official reports on price increases and the growth in the inflation rate, which has long since exceeded 500 percent. In June, for example, the statistically average Yugoslav family consisting of four members spent about 3.5 million dinars, that is, almost two average salaries, on breakfast, lunch, and dinner.

In the two-story house next to the IZVESTIYA bureau, electric lights are not turned on in the evening. The owners turn on the television infrequently, and allow a table lamp only in the room of their daughter, who is a student. Pensioners have found using increasingly expensive electricity to be quite unaffordable. Prices for goods, products, and communal services grow almost weekly. Not only electricity, but gasoline and fares in public transportation are getting more expensive. For the time being, not a single republic of the Yugoslav federation has managed for now to slow down inflation and life's rapidly increasing cost.

At the conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] in May of last year, a program of reforms was approved which must encompass the economy and society's political sphere, and promote the development of the process of democratization of the party's internal activities. However, the decisions, which were faithful to the essence of the reforms, were not brought into life in a consistant manner. The material state of the working people continued to deteriorate rapidly. Toward the year's end, society's critical situation had become so acute that the federation's government was forced to resign.

Since mid-March, the Federal Executive Council [FEC] has been headed by Ante Markovic, an experienced economist and industrialist, an advocate of market relations under socialism. He feels that profitability can be separated from loss, and labor from idleness only under conditions of real market relations, and that on such a basis, the economy can be modernized and its structure changed. The government assigns great significance to the creation of small enterprises, public and private, and the repeal of those laws which do not take the role of the market in to account. The government is against state interference in economic activity. Markovic did not threaten a "belt-tightening" policy, asserting that wages must increase in accordance with the market assessment of the results of labor and the growth of its productivity. That, in brief, is the new government's program.

It set about fulfilling its promises without wasting any time. First and foremost, it was decided to change and improve the fundamental documents which had recently been adopted by the SFRY Assembly; they hold important meaning for the implementation of radical economic reform, introduction of a market in the production sphere, and strengthening economic ties with the outside world. These are laws which are now well-known in the country—on banks and financial-credit institutions—and all the changes emphasized their market trend.

For example, the new law on enterprises removes all limitations on their activities, depending upon the nature of the property. All forms of property—public, private, and mixed—received equal rights and opportunities for financing, product marketing, etc. The government is in favor of the enterprises' complete independence in their activities against any sort of interference from anyone: The command method, economic accountability, and instructions are not compatible with the market.

Collaboration of banks and enterprises is planned to be mutually advantageous. Not only locally, but foreign banks are attracted to collaboration. Private enterprises are allowed to enter the international hard currency market. Concrete steps have been undertaken to expand economic contacts abroad. At first, preference is being shown to joint foreign capital investments in the Yugoslav economy. Likewise, limitations in the importation of equipment and materials needed by private enterprises were lifted.

In order to reduce the high inflation level, the new government considers necessary a set of measures particularly geared toward changing the economic system and the national economy. It has not promised any special anti-inflation programs, although Markovic does not exclude the possibility that inflation may jump to 1,000 percent in the current year.

This is what Yugoslavia's new government had to begin with.

"What have you managed to accomplish in these first months?" we asked Ante Markovic at a recent meeting with foreign correspondents in Belgrade.

"The main thing is that we have not deviated from the March course, nor from our intentions. There is unanimity in the government on this count. Despite the fact that the basic laws which we have proposed are not yet in full effect, we remain convinced that only a system of measures can improve property relations, introduce mixed-economy relations, and change the economic situation sharply for the better. Otherwise, just as before, we will concern ourselves simply with distribution of the production of the printing press. And the first concrete results of our policy are already making themselves known, modest though they are."

They have finally managed to halt the long-term decline of industrial production. The country's 6-month volume of industrial production showed a 3 percent increase when compared with the same period last year, with the highest indices in Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia. The country's reserves of convertible hard currency have increased from $1.5 billion to $3.2 million since May of last year. They managed to reduce short-term state credit debt by half. This created conditions favorable to negotiations for discussions with the International Monetary Fund. Markovic emphasizes that such negotiations are necessary because the SFRY needs the support of other state and international organization for successful realization of economic reform.

There are enough opportunities for investment of foreign capital. For example, June saw the creation of Yugoslavia's first stock society, the founders of which were several major Yugoslav construction firms, and the American company, "Hyatt International Corporation" of Chicago. They are jointly financing and constructing a large hotel in Belgrade; it will open in August. TANJUG agency emphasizes that similar joint enterprises are the most effective means to invest foreign capital in the country's economy. This is the first example of a joint firm in which a portion of the assets belongs to foreigners. The cost of this luxury hotel is $50 million. However, the initial capital of the stock society is $20 million. The difference, in hard currency and equipment, is being provided by the "First National Bank of Chicago" in the form of credit to the stockholders. The initiated creation of the "customs-free zone" in Europe will open outstanding opportunities for international division of labor in the area of the Belgrade river port. Many countries are now showing an interest in it; they are prepared to make the necessary capital and equipment investments.

In April, the government abolished the effective limitations for private enterprises. The national economy literally came to life before one's very eyes over 3 months, granting, in addition to everything else, a certain sector of the unemployed the opportunity for reliable earnings (there are still over 1 million unemployed people in Yugoslavia). Some of these enterprises, for example, a factory that produces fishing paraphernalia in Split, headed by M. Borovic, have established mutually advantageous business contacts with partners in the USSR. Just what the "small business enterprises" (as they are respectfully called here) can do was recently on display at the Belgrade fair. They produce everything, from trinkets to computers. They offer goods and products on the market, or work in conjunction with state enterprises.

A program most favorable to representatives of the "small businesses" has now been opened in all the republics (incidentally, there are already thousands of small businesses; in Serbia alone, over 700 have appeared in the last few months). The latest news: Some 30 kilometers from Belgrade, in the village of Ripanj, the country's first private supermarket has opened for business with an area of 500 square meters. It holds a wide selection of goods, including imports, and there is gourmet self-service area.... In a word, the initiative of the enterprising is not longer running up against the former bureaucratic obstacles. An information and consulting center has just opened in Belgrade for the "private owners," and POLITIKA EKSPRES publishes special supplements once a week.

The changes in the economy are obvious, while at the same time, the situation of working people, especially those in low-paying areas, is continuing to worsen, as has already been mentioned. The government is being reproached from all sides. It is time to take special measures against inflation, against high prices and the decline in the standard of living. Even the Yugoslav trade unions recently expressed their official dissatisfaction with the Federal Executive Council's economic policy, since it is anticipated that the government measures will yield positive results only next year. The trade unions demanded that "immediate measures" be taken in order to extinguish the flame of inflation more quickly.

Well, for the time being, the government is holding fast. Debates were recently held in the SFRY Assembly on the economic reform program. Here, too, voices cried out for "extraordinary measures." Markovic announced that until the end of the year, the FEC is determined to hold the previously developed course, which provides for the elimination of the administrative regulation of the economy. On the whole, his Government's policy is anti-inflationary, and only this policy, and not quick fixes, will stop the growth of prices in the long run. The Belgrade press emphasizes that whatever happened there, the government has shown once again that it intends to continue to struggle for the country's transfer to the rails of market relations.

Incidentally, the government just gave its critics an object lesson. In June, the prices of bread, sugar, vegetable oil and other products needed on a daily basis were sharply increased. What did the government do? It could have issued a decree on price limits, as has been done in the past. But the Government decided otherwise, in the spirit of its program: It would deflate the high prices with the economic maneuver of supplying the market with 600,000 metric tons of wheat, 60,000 metric tons of sugar, 20,000 metric tons of wheat flour, etc., all from the state reserves. It was an effective maneuver, but not a panacea: State reserves are, of course, limited.

In the SFRY, they understand full well that the restructuring of the economy must proceed hand in hand with reforms in other spheres of public life, first and foremost, in the LCY. As was noted at one of the most recent party plenums, the lack of firm ideological and organizational unity in the LCY is the main cause of the retardation of the process of stabilizing the country's situation. This cause is letting itself be known today as well. The press

gives information on the facts of the decline of the party's authority, the workers' mass exodus from its ranks, the functionaries' violations of moral norms, and their unearned privileges.

At a Central Committee plenum in May, it was decided to convene the 14th (Extraordinary) Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in December of this year. It will simultaneously execute the functions of the regular congress as stipulated by the LCY Statute. The working organs which will prepare the forum were chosen at the plenum. Not one of the post-war party congresses has been planned in such a short time frame. Its main goal is to plan the concrete paths of society's reform. The pre-congress draft, "Basic Directions of the Transformation of the LCY" was recently published in the press for discussion by communists. The TANJUG agency feels that the highest forum of Yugoslav communists must necessarily become a turning point.

In late July, a Central Committee plenum was held on the problem of inter-ethnic relations, which in recent months have become sharply exacerbated in the SFRY. True, a number of party organizations proposed postponing the plenum until a later date, since relations among the political leadership of individual republics, as well as the overall sociopolitical and inter-ethnic situation of the Federation are now quite aggravated. Thus, the speeches at the plenum may run as an auxiliary generator of undesirable tendencies.

The situation in Kosovo remains as complicated as before. Nevertheless, the SFRY Presidency considered it possible in July to lift a portion of the special measures in effect in Kosovo since 27 February. Only the ban on conducting demonstrations remains in force. Recent strikes, provoked by nationalists and separatists, undermined the economy of this autonomous province, and caused losses of tens of billions of dinars. Over the half-year period, production volume was reduced by 2.5 percent compared with the same period last year. Wherever they arise, inter-ethnic conflicts undermine first and foremost the incipient restructuring of the economy.

In light of this, BORBA wrote that the numerous political and national clashes have moved to the background the previously planned LCY Central committee plenum on the issue of the implementation of economic reform. Now there is hardly any chance that it will take place earlier than the end of September.

West Europe

Reportage on Austrian Desire for EEC Membership

Chancellor Cited on USSR Memorandum

PM1408110589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent S. Tosunyan: "Chancellor Vranitzky: Austria Will Not Deviate From Neutrality"]

[Text] Vienna—G.S. Shikin, USSR ambassador to Austria, has visited Austrian Federal Chancellor F. Vranitzky and presented him with a Soviet Government memorandum on Austria's relations with the EEC. As is well known, on 17 July this year Austria officially applied to the EEC for membership of that community.

In this connection the memorandum points out that the Soviet side has on many occasions expressed its understanding of the importance to Austria of the problems which could arise in relations with the EEC in connection with the forthcoming creation of a "single internal market." But, while considering the fact that the EEC together with economic integration is setting itself the task of creating an alliance which would have a common foreign policy and security policy, Austria's entry into the EEC could prevent it from pursuing its policy of neutrality.

At the same time the Soviet side has drawn attention to the fact that the Austrian Government, in submitting its application, confirmed Austria's adherence to permanent neutrality and a policy of neutrality. The Soviet Government proceeds also from the premise that Austria will unswervingly adhere to its commitments stemming from the 1955 state treaty.

Chancellor Vranitzky told journalists that in its talks on entry to the EEC Austria "will not deviate one millimeter from its proclaimed policy of permanent neutrality." The memorandum, he said, confirms yet again that while being concerned for Austria's interests and defending these interests we must consider think about giving our friends a clear idea of our stance.

As is well known, by a majority the Austrian parliament instructed the government to begin talks with the EEC on Austria's entry into this community while fully observing a policy of permanent neutrality. Austria, Foreign Minister A. Mock stated, has the opportunity to continue its traditional foreign policy line of active participation in Europe's integration processes, as was the case at the creation of the European Free Trade Association and the conclusion of agreements between the association and the EEC.

Concern over whether Austria's entry into the EEC is compatible with its neutrality is also being expressed by other countries. In particular, Belgian Foreign Relations Minister Mark Eyskens immediately after Austria's letter to the EEC, stated directly that the aims which the community sets itself in no way comply with Austria's policy of neutrality. The Swiss, Swedish, and Finnish press has also been expressing the same opinion recently.

Soviet Foreign Ministry Comments

AU1408082289 Vienna Domestic Service in German 0600 GMT 12 Aug 89

[Text] The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, referring to the issue concerning Austria and the EC, has pointed out that there is an organic link between Austria's status of neutrality and its state treaty. As a result of the Moscow memorandum issued in April 1955,

the state treaty is most closely linked to neutrality, the spokesman stressed. Moscow expressed satisfaction at Chancellor Vrantizky's statement that Austria will not deviate a single millimeter from its neutrality. Austria's membership in the EC, however, is not only an economic question because the EC has set for itself the goal of forming a unity that will adopt a common security policy, the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated.

Soviet Aide-Memoire on Membership

AU1108203589 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 11 Aug 89 p 2

[Text of Soviet aide-memoire on Austria's application for EC membership submitted by USSR Ambassador Gennadiy Shikin to Chancellor Franz Vranitzky on 10 August]

[Text] On 17 July this year the Austrian side submitted an application for EC membership. In this context, the Soviet Government wants to draw the Austrian Government's attention to the following points:

—The Soviet side repeatedly expressed its understanding for Austria's need to solve the problems that could arise in its relations with the EC because of the forthcoming creation of the European single market. This position remains unchanged.

—The Austrian Government will obviously agree that the EC membership question is not exclusively an economic one. This is a serious political question because, in addition to economic integration, the EC, as is well known, assigns to itself the task of creating a union that will pursue a joint foreign and security policy.

—Therefore, the Soviet Government is convinced that a permanently neutral state's membership in such an organization as the EC would result in the loss of its concrete opportunities to implement its neutrality policy. Starting from this fact, it was concerned about the news of Austria's intention to start negotiations on EC membership.

—At the same time, the Soviet side has, of course, noted that the Austrian Government affirmed Austria's commitment to permanent neutrality and a neutrality policy when it submitted the application. Appropriate tribute was also paid to the statements by leading Austrian politicians who said that Austria will not strive for membership if it is unable to adequately preserve its neutral status in the course of negotiations with the EC.

—The Soviet Government expresses the hope that this approach will not be changed and that full-scale preservation of permanent neutrality from the legal and political points of view will continue to have priority with the Austrian side over all other considerations.

—The Soviet Government proceeds on the assumption that Austria will strictly adhere to the commitments arising from the State Treaty of 1955. For its part, the Soviet Union, as a signatory state to this document ... is, of course, interested in reliably fulfilling its historical vocation—the preservation of the Republic of Austria's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity—also in the future.

—Permanent neutrality is not only the most valuable political asset of the Republic of Austria. [sentences as published] In the past few years the situation on our continent has started to change for the better by efforts of the participants in the pan-European process. The neutral and nonaligned states, among them Austria, have made and are still making a considerable contribution to this successful development. There is every reason to believe that the European Continent's further progress on the road toward strengthening security and cooperation, toward building a joint European home, will considerably depend on the goodwill ... of neutral and nonaligned states.

—The Soviet Union has always shown sincere understanding toward neutral Austria and has appreciated the good-neighborly relations with it. It intends to pursue this line in the future. The Soviet Government is convinced that the consistent extent of overall cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Austria, which is based on complete adherence to the State Treaty and the law on Austria's permanent neutrality, will continue to serve the interests of our peoples, as well as the wider interests of peace and security in Europe.

Soviet Diplomat Expelled for Espionage in Sweden

LD1108180189 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1600 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Excerpt] [Announcer] We begin, of course, with the expulsion. A short while ago it was disclosed that an official at the Soviet Consulate-General in Goteborg has been expelled on suspicion of industrial espionage. (Thommy Fredriksson):

[(Fredriksson)] Well, according to a very terse message from the Foreign Ministry, the official has, among other things, tried to obtain information about Swedish and foreign technology and industrial conditions. The man's activities are not deemed to have damaged Sweden's interests, but risked doing so if he had been allowed to continue, the Foreign Ministry bulletin stated. Nothing is said as to when he was expelled or what companies had been the object of his unwarranted interest. In other words, as is usual with such cases, the secrecy is great. But it is a case of industrial espionage, which nowadays is thought to be the commonest form of espionage, and the hardest to protect against. The motive force for industrial espionage is the cost aspect: To develop new technical products is terribly expensive today, and those

who can get the information can save themselves the costly development work—information and skills most often associated today with key personnel in companies. [passage omitted]

Sought Fighter Radar Information

LD1308103289 Stockholm International Service in Swedish 0930 GMT 13 Aug 89

[Text] The Soviet diplomat who was recently expelled on suspicion of industrial espionage was very interested in the radar system of the JAS fighter aircraft. According to the newspaper SVENSKA DAGBLADET, the man has for several years been cultivating employees of the Ericsson radar factory at Moelndal to get them to supply information. On Friday the Foreign Ministry disclosed that the vice consul of the Consulate General in Goteborg had been expelled.

Yazov Comments on Treaty With Finland

LD1308093989 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 0500 GMT 13 Aug 89

[Text] According to Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov, there is no need to change the military articles in the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, despite the favorable development of detente in Europe. Defense Minister Yazov says in an interview with the newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT that on the one hand he believes that the Federal Republic of Germany no longer threatens either the Soviet Union or Finland; and on the other hand he stresses that the Western military alliance NATO is still practising power politics, so that there is still much work to do to build a peaceful Europe. Defense Minister Yazov will be visiting Finland this week for the first time.

Yazov To Begin Finland Visit 16 Aug

LD1008124089 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1200 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] USSR Defense Minister Army General Dmitriy Yazov will visit Finland next week and meet with President Mauno Koivisto. Apart from discussions, Koivisto will host a luncheon in the Presidential Palace. Defense Minister Yazov's visit will begin on Wednesday [16 August] next week. Defense Minister Ole Norrback is the host of the visit during which Yazov will also acquaint himself with the armored brigade and watch an action display at Parolannummi. He will also tour the Satakunta wing in Pirkkala.

Turkish Naval Training Ship Visits Odessa

PM1508081489 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Visit Ends"]

[Text] Odessa, 13 Aug—Captain 1st Rank E. Kheper [as transliterated], under whose flag the Turkish Navy training ship "Sokullu Mahmet Pasa" spent 3 days here, assessed highly the meetings with Soviet naval seamen and citizens of the hero city on the Black Sea. The official friendly visit ended today, and the ship set course for home.

Commission To Investigate Coal Mine Deaths

LD1408151489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1423 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 14 Aug (TASS)—It has been reported here today that a state commission to investigate the causes of the explosion at the Barentsburg coal mine is being set up. It will fly to Spitsbergen on 16 August. As has already been reported, five Soviet miners died as a result of a serious accident that occurred at the Soviet mines on the Spitsbergen archipelago.

N. Gnilorybov, general director of the "Arktikugol" Association told a TASS correspondent that the families and relatives of the dead have been informed of the tragedy. A Soviet vessel has set out for Spitsbergen from Murmansk to return the bodies of those who died to the mainland. The matter of providing their families with material assistance has been resolved.

Tension in FRG-GDR Relations Over Emigration

PM1408101989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

["IZVESTIYA Press Service" report: "Disputes Surrounding Emigration Problem"]

[Text] Serious tension has emerged in relations between the FRG and the GDR, according to West German television. The reason is that at present in the FRG diplomatic missions in Berlin, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw there are around 200 GDR citizens who want to emigrate to the FRG, including, according to DPA, 130 in the FRG permanent mission in Berlin.

A statement published by the GDR Foreign Ministry speaks of gross interference by the FRG authorities in the republic's internal affairs. The only possible way to emigrate from the GDR is to apply to the republic's appropriate institutions, where the question will be resolved in the legally prescribed way.

The GDR, the statement recalls, legislatively adopted a resolution on travel abroad 30 November 1988. Since the beginning of 1989 3.5 million GDR citizens have traveled to nonsocialist countries, most of them to the FRG and West Berlin. And Bonn must know how humanely the GDR resolves the question of reuniting families in accordance with its laws, the statement stresses. According to international law, FRG embassies cannot deal with GDR citizens' visa problems.

In the meantime, the FRG permanent mission in Berlin remains closed to visitors for an unspecified period of time. W. Priesnitz, secretary of state at the FRG Ministry for Inner-German Relations, has arrived in the

GDR capital for talks. According to DPA reports, the GDR authorities are giving guarantees to the citizens in FRG permanent missions that their presence there will not entail any consequences if they leave the building voluntarily. In his turn W. Priesnitz gave assurances that GDR citizens can stay in the mission building until the problem has been resolved.

Two Soviet Defectors Request Asylum in FRG
TA1008161789 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1520 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Ankara (A.A.)—Two Soviet defectors who landed at Bafra on the Black Sea coast by boat have told Turkish authorities they want to seek asylum in West Germany.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman told A.A. on Thursday that the defectors were Ivanovic Deneji (30) and Anatol Lyevic (35).

An investigation into the incident is continuing, the spokesman added.

West German Embassy officials in the capital said that no application for asylum had yet been received and added that any application had to be made via the UN High Commission for Refugees to be taken into consideration.

The two Soviets arrived at Bafra beach in the Black Sea province of Samsun in a plastic dinghy early Wednesday morning and asked for asylum at a nearby gendarmerie station, security officials said earlier on Thursday.

Paris Russian Language Press Viewed
18300764 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Nikita Struve, head of YMCA Press, by V. Malukhin (Paris): "A Time to Gather Stones"]

[Text] The recent NOVYY MIR publication of Yu. Doibrovskiy's novel "Faculty of Unnecessary Things" was accompanied by a little-noticed footnote announcing that the publisher's rights to the book belong to YMCA Press. This abbreviation is not likely to say anything to anyone who is just becoming acquainted with our newly returned literature. It will probably not awaken in their memories the old articles in which any emigre activity, including the field of culture, was branded as subversive and inspired by the CIA. But those who found an opportunity 10 or 20 years ago to read the banned books of Akhmatova, Bulgakov, Platonov, Solzhenitsyn, Nadezhda Mandelstam, or the Russian religious philosophers Berdyayev, Fedotov, Florenskiy, or Sergey Bulgakov, whose names signify the glory and pain of domestic culture, will recall something else. This high and dangerous literature was, to use Tolstoy's well-known comparison, that unique unattainable point that could be held on to when crossing the river in order not to be swept away by the current.

Now that the previously underground books have openly returned to the homeland, the time has probably come to meet the leader of the Russian publishing house located in the heart of the Latin Quarter on Montagne-Sainte-Genevieve Street. Nikita Alekseyevich Struve is a professor at the Sorbonne and the author of profound works on Akhmatova and Mandelstam. The Russian bookstore occupies two small premises with walls covered with bookshelves. While waiting for the professor to arrive I managed to exchange a few words with the salesman about the new literary works in the Moscow journals and the Russian emigre work. A steep stairway leads to the basement where the most excellent kind of storage room is located for books. Here Nikita Struve gave his first interview to a Soviet journalist.

[Struve] The publishing house appeared during the twenties on the initiative of John Mott, who was subsequently a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. At first it was subsidized by the American social organization Young Men's Christian Association, which is reflected in its name, although this connection was later lost. The first publishing activity of the YMCA Press was the publication of a book by B. Zaytsev, "The Venerable Sergiy Radonezhskiy," and so it happened that this turned out to be our major area. The seat of Russian culture in France, which the publishing house is, appeared because of the activity of a whole pleiad of Russian religious philosophers exiled from Russia in 1922. Above all one should mention the names of Nikolay Berdyayev and Sergiy Bulgakov, whose portraits appear at the beginning of the catalog of YMCA Press publications. They are the ones who imparted to Russian philosophical thought that intransient dimension which is based on eternal truths. The next period is associated with the "thaw" of the Khrushchev period and opens with the name of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Published in December 1973, "GULAG Archipelago" appears to have been the first to draw general attention to the small Russian publishing house in Paris. During this period it began to publish authors from Soviet Russia—from Platonov to Dombrovskiy. We published relatively little: Unlike other Russian publishing houses of official or semiofficial Soviet writers, our criterion was the religious-philosophical content of the creative work, which cannot be denied with respect to the authors we have discussed.

[Malukhin] Today books by Russian philosophers are coming out in Moscow publishing houses, and Zaytsev's "Sergiy Radonezhskiy" was just published in Tula...

[Struve] It would be interesting to imagine what our authors would say if they could see the current success of their books that were created a half century ago. For these books are just beginning to live. I think their authors would take their return just as calmly as they took the fact when they were living that it was impossible to publish them out of material considerations or because of the lack of readers. Akhmatova and Mandelstam also created culture, even if sometimes they were afraid to commit their lines to paper. The books that are

being published with an eye to the reader of the next generation are like a message placed in a bottle and cast into the sea. And this message cannot but reach its mark because it includes something people need. During the thirties an emigre book was circulated in 300 copies while today these 300 have grown into tens and even hundreds of thousands of copies, greatly magnifying the initial weak response for the new reader. But without it there would have been nothing. And therefore our publishing house has set for itself the goal of bearing witness to Russian spirituality and serving it. I was recently asked: "How did you manage to foresee that your activity for preserving Russian culture, which spanned many years and apparently had no special perspective, one fine day would turn out to be needed by Russia?" Believe me, it involved neither strategy nor tactics nor calculation. It was a recognition of my debt to Russian spiritual values and service to them.

[Malukhin] A publishing house, even one inspired by the noblest of ideals, must be concerned about its financial position—if only to expand its work and meet the demands of the readers more fully, is this not so?

[Struve] I would call our publishing house neither commercial nor philanthropic but a selfless enterprise. Its activity is based either on minimum wage or on volunteer work on the part of the authors and associates. We shall not speak about sacrifice. If we were able to take the baton from the most eminent representatives of Russian thought who are at the sources of publishing and worthily carry it up to our day, it is only because, like they, we were convinced: A great deal of difficulty lies at the basis of culture. And everything else in our work is what we might call, using your term, economic accountability [khozraschet].

We have always been wary of mediocre books and avoided bad ones. Each year we publish more and more, and today we have practically reached the limit of our creative capabilities. The number of titles is approaching 20 a year and we are trying to make these the cream of the crop: The editions are from 1,000 to 3,000 copies, but we frequently reprint books that have already been published such, for example, as the work of Berdyayev, in whom new interest has sprung up in both the East and the West. The YMCA Press does not even have a dozen employees. Our books, like the books of other Russian publishing houses, can be bought in all Western countries.

[Malukhin] Now, fortunately, it is not only there...

[Struve] Yes, I know. They can also be bought in the Moscow store Raritet.

[Malukhin] Do you take an interest in one Russian author or another?

[Struve] This process is interconnected. Moreover, during the years of stagnation interest in Russia was at a standstill throughout the world, and now we are witnesses to its revival and strengthening.

[Malukhin] The American Russian publishing house Ardis has already participated in the Moscow International Trade Fair. Do you intend to come to Moscow?

[Struve] We have not received any official invitations, although we are ready to consider any plan that has the goal of disseminating books. I think that sooner or later these contacts will be made. We are seeing possibilities of cooperation in the publication of Russian philosophy from the beginning of the century. But, of course, financial problems must be worked out. Since we have never gone out for profit, it is possible to have such an anachronistic form of cooperation as exchange of editions of books. As long as the products with our trademark are available to the reader and are not turned into a prestigious item that is in short supply.

[Malukhin] How do you obtain the Soviet publications I saw in the store?

[Struve] Through "Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga." We adhere to quite a pluralistic principle: We offer the buyer of Russian publications books from all publishing houses, including in Soviet Russia. A Russian book sometimes sells just as rapidly in the West as it does in your country, but Soviet publishing houses, unfortunately for us, do not do additional printings.

[Malukhin] Do buyers from Russia visit your store frequently?

[Struve] Three years ago there were none, but now there are more and more of them. Initially, judging from everything, they thought they would stumble across a camouflaged microphone, but then that passed. I see a range of feelings on their faces: surprise, rapture, and, finally, despair. Because although we try to sell the books at the most affordable prices, these are still the prices charged in France.

[Malukhin] How did the seat of Russian spirituality come to be established in the very heart of Gallic culture?

[Struve] We have not experienced any specific attitude toward us. But only in brief periods has emigre culture been evaluated according to its merits, and the rest of the time we have spent our days in selfless labor completely unnoticed. The first exception was when Bunin was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1933, and then came Solzhenitsyn's exile. But in the eyes of the French intelligentsia the Russian emigres remained basically a footnote of the past, lacking any historical future. In 1966 at a symposium on problems of Russian religious

philosophy, one French scholar even stated that all this is wonderful, but the trump has been played. Only today is this attitude beginning to change.

[Malukhin] What new books have come out from your publishing house and what do you intend to print?

[Struve] We are printing and shall continue to print collections of essays by Russian writers and thinkers, books on the history of the church and the emigration, materials on recent Russian history, an anthology of Russian poetry, and a memoir series. In conjunction with the Institute of Slavic Studies we published the "Akhmatova Collection" from materials of the international colloquium at the University of Paris where researchers from the Western countries and Soviet Russia met. Akhmatova is a phenomenon so absolute, beautiful, and necessary to all Russian people that it was very easy to find in her a basis for mutual understanding...

Latin America and Caribbean

U.S.-Panama Situation Seen as Threat to Peace

PY1408142489 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Spanish 0000 GMT 13 Aug 89

[Text] Panama has complained to the UN Security Council that the United States is a threat to its security. This is the subject of our colleague Igor Vasilyev's commentary.

Panama's case is rather old he says. Panama has long been on the list of politicians and sociologists ever since the canal was opened as a case that has produced not only good profits, but also a good deal of friction between Panamanians and Americans. Both parties want to be the master and owner of the interoceanic waterway. In 1964, a bloody clash took place between unarmed Panamanians citizens and armed gringo Marines. Late in the 1970's, Yankeelandia [as heard] had to recognize Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone. The Torrijos-Carter Treaty provides for the transfer of this ocean passage to Panama in the year 2000. Nevertheless, Washington continues to do all it can to transform that treaty into a wet paper. In recent years, taking advantage of internal conflicts in Panama, the gringos have been attempting to topple the nationalist regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega and to replace it with a government that will yield to their wishes.

The gringos' calculation is simple: The new authorities should acquiesce to continuing U.S. dominion over the canal. Currently the Panamanian situation is heating up, and there have been clashes between Panamanian and U.S. troops. The Pentagon has increased the number of troops in the zone to more than 12,000. A real threat of internvention now exists, and Washington openly talks about it. Together with Lebanon, Panama has in recent days turned into a hot spot where blood might be spilled. Soviet public opinion is concerned over this threat, as can be gathered from the tone in which this matter is being discussed in the media and social entities, such as the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Latin America. In fact we believe that the U.S. attitude toward Panama is plainly illegal because it is intended to trample the right of people to choose their destiny. How else can one interpret the Yankee demand that Gen Noriega, chief of the Panamanian forces, step down? This is just as illogical a demand as a Panamanian demand for the U.S. Defense Secretary to leave his post would be.

As for the international implications of the Panamanian conflict, we must say that U.S. intervention in Panama would only complicate the world's situation. It would only rekindle suspicions among nations, and the arms race would be given a new impetus. Therefore, all kinds of extremist organizations would have a new opportunity to resort to their terrorist methods to keep international conflicts going.

This means that, in case of armed actions in Panama, the ongoing process of an international relaxation of tensions would be seriously affected. In fact, not everybody in our country decidedly supports the government's idea of peace. Doubts are being expressed about our unilateral steps toward arms reduction and the transfer of resources to nonmilitary production. This calls for an adequate response from Western powers. I believe that not only in our country can the pendulum of social reaction swing away from the present peaceful and accomodating trend. Then, invariably, the image of an enemy will begin to be revived—an image that has been fading lately.

Therefore, a political solution to the Panamanian conflict will be in line with the interests of mankind.

Honduran Minister Contreras Discusses Contras

LD1508084689 Moscow TASS in English 0835 GMT 15 Aug 89

[Text] Mexico City August 15 TASS—If an international commission for control over the disbandment of Contra forces to make the anti-Sandinistas leave Honduran Territory, the Honduran government will have to apply to the United Nations in a request to assign the accomplishment of this task to a contingent of international peace keeping forces, stated Honduran Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras.

Speaking at a news conference in Tegucigalpa, he said that the international commission, the setting up of which is provided for by the agreements signed recently by the presidents of five Central American countries, will begin its work before September 7.

The Mexican news agency NOTIMEX reports that Contreras pointed out that one of the urgent tasks facing the commission would be to look for sources to finance the Contra forces disbandment plan.

There are now about 10,000 Contras and 30,000 to 35,000 members of their families in Honduras, he said.

Anticipating a refusal of the Contras to leave Honduran territory, the government applied to the United Nations and the Organisation of American States in a request to promote an end to the use of the country's territory by Contra forces, Contreras emphasized.

Political & Social

Strikes, Other Events Reported in Estonia

Estonian First Secretary Interviewed

LD1408200189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Valjas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, gave an interview to Estonian Television this evening [14 August].

Describing the political situation in the republic, he said that the economic, political, and also sociopsychological situation in Estonia is currently very complex. A great many problems have accumulated, but one must look at processes in Estonia within the context of the development of perestroyka and glasnost throughout our country as a whole.

We have to say, Comrade Valjas continued, that we have not always been as active and consistent as we should have been, and we have made mistakes. When such situations as the present one arise, we must always find the causes. Let us all think about these causes together.

Replying to a question as to whether it is not time for the numerous public movements of Estonia to sit down at the negotiating table, Comrade Valjas said: Only by means of dialogue and consensus can we achieve success. Today, the problem of the minority in the republic has become very acute. We must take the minority into account; there must be a mechanism for taking this view into account, something that was correctly brought up by Russian-speaking deputies of the Estonian Supreme Soviet. This is our mistake and it must be corrected. For this reason, a commission is being set up in the Supreme Soviet today which will thoroughly examine all the minority proposals.

There should be a guaranteed mechanism for ensuring that people truly take part in the formulation of draft laws. Here, too, we are at fault. Many draft laws are being handed around which have nothing whatsoever in common with official documents. They are transforming public consciousness. At the same time, hastiness and failure to think things through properly have been evident. Everything really must be discussed with the people because often the lack of knowledge and the insufficient discussion of issues cause misunderstandings. If we fail one time to reach a common denominator, let us meet a second and a third time, but there must be a consensus.

Referring to social guarantees, Comrade Valjas pointed out that when we adopted the language law, we did not guarantee its implementation because the mechanism had not been set up properly. For decades, we have failed to make efforts to ensure that people can learn Estonian, although much here depends on the individual. It therefore has been decided that the Supreme Soviet Presidium should prepare a detailed analysis of how the language law is being implemented and the Council of Ministers should present data on the guarantees and opportunities that exist for its implementation. Help also is needed in organizing the study of Estonian. The law also stipulates that where there are no opportunities for studying Estonian, enforcement of the law can be deferred.

Touching on the strikes, Comrade Valjas said: We have already met with representatives of the strike committees, and they have declared that the results of the meeting did not satisfy them. Well, if that is the case, let us continue the talks. A commission will be set up in the Supreme Soviet to study and take into consideration the views of the minority. Of course, it is not possible to find a resolution that will satisfy everyone. However, it is possible and essential to reach a consensus. For this reason, on behalf of the Central Committee and the government, I appeal to the workers and intelligentsia: Let us try to find a way out at the negotiating table.

Further on First Secretary Interview

LD1408183189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1728 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Tallinn, 14 Aug (TASS)—The strike which began last Wednesday [9 August] in Estonia is continuing. Today in Tallinn alone, about 20 enterprises were not operating. In Kokhtla-Yarve, the center of the slate basin in the northeast of this Baltic republic, it was about 10.

The cause of the strike was the adoption at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet of a law on elections to local soviets which envisages the introduction of a residence qualification [tsenz osedlosti] for voters and deputies.

This evening, Vaino Valjas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee spoke on Estonian televison. He said that the economic, political, and sociopsychological situation in Estonia at present is very complex. Only by way of dialogue and consensus, he noted, is it possible to succeed. We can not allow the view of the minority to not be taken into account, or for there being no mechanism to take into account this view. This is our mistake, and it has to be corrected.

Today, a commission is being formed by the Supreme Soviet which will carefully consider all the proposals of the minority, he said. A mechanism to ensure that people really participate in the elaboration of bills should be guaranteed. Ignorance and insufficient discussion of the issues is causing misunderstandings.

Touching upon the strikes, Valjas said: "We have already held a meeting with representatives of the strike committees, and they have stated that the results of the meeting had not satisfied them. Well then, if that is the case, let us continue the talks. Of course, it is impossible to find solutions which would satisfy everybody. However, it is possible and necessary to achieve consensus." On behalf of the Estonian Communist Party Central

Committee and the government he appealed to the workers and the intelligentsia to sit at the negotiating table and to find a solution.

So far as the priority of the indigenous nation is concerned, Valjas continued, then we have two basic Leninist postulates: The self-determination of nations is firmly and unambiguously guaranteed, and general humanist human rights should be observed. For this reason there can be no priority of nations in the sense of social, political, and other advantages.

Strikes Continue

LD1408110689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1025 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Excerpt] Tallin, Estonia August 14 (ETA-TASS)—The situation in Tallin, where a number of enterprises are on strike, continues to be complex. The decision of the presidium of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet on ending the strike has not taken effect. Meetings are taking place today at enterprises which took part in the strike last week. (Viktor Tsyunya), chairman of the Strike Committee of the Tallin Ship Repair Works, told a TASS correspondent that where meetings have already finished, the strike is continuing. [passage omitted]

Estonian Presidium Resolution Cited

LD1408120889 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Today the Bureau of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee discussed [words indistinct] a resolution of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium was brought into the editorial board: "On Measures To Ensure Lawfulness and Law and Order in the Republic" [words indistinct].

In connection with the fact that some citizens' associations which operate on the territory of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] have organized work stoppage in several enterprises and that this has caused disruption in the functioning of the republican national economy, in the contractual fulfillment of duties, and in services to the population, and that they have appealed to set up alternative organs of power, thus destablizing the political situation, and this being accompanied [passage indistinct] the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has resolved:

1. According to the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 2 August 1989 in respect of a draft law which deals with the procedure for settling collective work disputes (?it has been resolved) to stop strikes in enterprises, establishments, and organizations which are located on the territory of the Estonian SSR, starting from the day of publishing this resolution.

2. To consider whatever action of citizens' associations and individuals, with the purpose of creating a situation in an enterprise, establishment, or organization which would disturb the normal work rhythm of the enterprise or establishment, as well as attempts to force workers to stop working using threats or any other infringement of the law, as being actions directed against the Estonian SSR Constitution and against law and order, with resulting responsibility for this being set down by law.

3. To address the Estonian SSR procurator with a proposal to strengthen the monitoring of law abidance within work collectives as well as in those citizens' associations which with their activity exacerbate interethnic relations or which appeal to set up alternative organs of power. Both administrative and criminal responsibility is to be applied in the event of inciting to actions against organs of power or in any other cases directed against law and order.

4. The Estonian SSR Council of Ministers is to ensure that the republican national economy and services to the population function without any trouble.

5. The Estonian SSR Trade Unions Council, the Estonian SSR Procurator's Office, the Estonian SSR Supreme Court, the Estonian SSR Ministry of Justice, the Estonian SSR State Committee for Labour and Social Problems are to provide the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with their opinions in respect of the draft law presented by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers on the procedure for settling collective work disputes and on avoiding strikes.

[Signed] Arnold Ruyutel, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;
Arno Almann, secretary of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Baltic Nationalist 'Extremism' Highlighted

PM1408162589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "To Stop Negative Processes and Defend Perestroyka"]

[Text] The PRAVDA editorial office is receiving many letters from working people in the Baltic republics and other regions of the country expressing sincere concern and anxiety at the sociopolitical situation prevailing in the Baltic republics. As the facts show, there are some grounds for such concern.

The situation in each of these republics has its own peculiarities, but there are also certain common trends. Lately, under the influence of extremist elements, the deviation of the people's fronts, which arose thanks to the renewal processes in the country since April 1985, from their original beneficial goals of perestroyka toward narrowly nationalist positions has intensified. The statements of certain figures in them and even the documents

adopted by these movements' leading organs contain demands for absolute economic autonomy and "state independence" for the republics and proclaim the most important task of perestroyka to be "the peoples' struggle for national liberation." With a view to winning popularity among the population, the leadership of the people's fronts does not shrink from wholesale criticism of and attacks on the republics' Communist Parties and from accusing them of ignoring the interests of the indigenous nations. At the same time, this leadership makes great play of its own irresponsible promises to lead the republic rapidly onto the path of economic prosperity.

The links between republican trade union, Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League], creative, and children's organizations and their elected union organs are being deliberately broken. Frankly anti-Soviet groupings have become more active. An atmosphere of nationalist hysteria is being fueled. Certain forces are vigorously agitating for the republics' secession from the Soviet Union. The bourgeois sociopolitical structures that existed before 1940, including the former political parties, are being restored. The leaders of opposition forces are putting forward ambitious, rigid demands for a redistribution of power in the republics in their own favor. Moreover, via numerous emissaries traveling throughout the country, they are foisting their own "experience of perestroyka" on other regions of the country. Foreign links are being utilized increasingly often and increasingly actively for the same destructive purposes.

The adoption of discriminatory legal acts contravening both all-union legislation and international legal norms is exerting an extremely destabilizing influence on the political situation. Moreover, this is happening at a time when the democratization of all aspects of life and the strengthening of legal institutions and the principles of justice and humanity are under way more widely than ever before in Soviet society as a whole.

Many letters from the Baltic republics speak of the negative reaction to the processes taking place there displayed by the nonindigenous population, which is really running up against restrictions of its political and social rights. All this cannot fail to aggrieve and alarm the population of the Baltic republics and the whole country. For their part, the International Fronts that have emerged as a reaction to the actions of right-wingers among the leadership of the people's fronts are calling for a resolute rebuff to the "national bureaucracy" and for the defense of working people's rights, not shrinking even from employing a means of struggle like strikes, extreme and disastrous for the country's economy and for perestroyka though this is.

On 8 August the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session adopted a Law on Local Soviet Elections that envisages the introduction of a residence qualification. In response to this, the very next day the labor collectives of a number of enterprises resumed the strike that had first took place in July. At that time, as readers will recall, the strikers had been demanding the abolition of the residence qualification envisaged by the draft Law on Local Soviet Elections, a qualification whereby a considerable proportion of the Russian-speaking population rightly saw an infringement of their civil rights. [Sentence as published] Such restrictions violate a fundamental human right—to take part in elections and to run for election. They contravene the provisions of Article 96 and other articles of the USSR Constitution and also contravene international pacts and agreements.

Soviet citizens' rights are guaranteed by the fundamental law—the USSR Constitution. They must be strictly observed. Nothing else is possible in a rule-of-law state.

The only possible way out of the existing situation is through political dialogue, by democratic means, through strict compliance with constitutional norms, and not by the methods of diktat and strong-arm tactics. In these conditions it is extremely important for the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Communist Party Central Committees to draw up a realistic program of action taking into account, on the one hand, the requirements of political, socioeconomic, and national development, and on the other hand containing clear positions on the fundamental questions of strengthening the USSR as a federal socialist state and the leading, integrating role of the Communist Party within it, and of ensuring the equality of rights of all citizens living in the republics, regardless of their nationality. However, at the moment these Communist Parties do not have such programs. There is a good deal of evidence that certain party organizations have basically abandoned the political struggle and fail to take account of the decisions of higher party organs. Some Communists show confusion, a tendency to appeasement, and an inability and sometimes unwillingness to resolutely to rebuff extremist elements and to head the perestroyka processes.

Serious and justified concern is also caused among working people by the division of Communists along national lines and the overt or covert shift by certain party committees to the positions of social movements whose platforms are far removed from the principles of internationalism and in some cases are patently contrary to the true goals of perestroyka and the vital interests of all Soviet people. Calls for the CPSU's transformation into an alliance of independent parties and for the weakening of party discipline cannot but cause concern. All these are extremely dangerous and destructive trends, especially in such crucial periods in our country's history as today.

It should be obvious that in the course of perestroyka, at the CPSU's initiative, major and consistent practical steps have already been adopted to renew our society, including steps to improve interethnic relations. In essence the whole range of radical socioeconomic transformations in the country is working toward this. All of

these transformations, whether they concern the boosting of the role of the soviets, a certain decentralization of the economy, the strengthening of the rule of law, or the expansion of the powers of enterprises and labor collectives, have a direct effect, in the conditions of our multinational state, on the system of union and interregional relations and relations between individuals. As a result of such transformations, these relations should become more flexible, more just, more effective, and in a sense more humane.

In this respect a powerful beneficial boost was given by the first Congress of Soviets and the USSR Supreme Soviet session that ended recently, and in particular the decision adopted on granting economic autonomy, based on the principles of economic accountability, to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The very concept of the sovereignty of a union republic, in both economic and political terms, is becoming more real and meaningful. This decision, which goes beyond the bounds of the purely economic, provides the preconditions for significant progress in all spheres of life and for increasing the prosperity of the republic's population.

Ideas that are fundamentally new, large-scale, and in accordance with the burning needs of today as well as the long term are also incorporated in the draft party platform on nationalities policy in present-day conditions that was examined recently by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

But all these positive decisions, constructive ideas, and practical steps, in their overwhelming majority, are still mainly emanating from the center. The success of the common cause also requires constructive movement from the other direction. A party committee, whatever its rank, every Communist, and any citizen who cares about the fate of his people and the peoples of the whole country cannot be satisfied and has no right to be satisfied, in this extremely delicate and exceptionally important work, with the position of an observer or a "penetrating critic." What is needed is practical deeds, coordinated joint actions, dictated by an understanding both of the urgency of the situation and of the historic responsibility that is our common lot, and aimed ultimately at improving life, stabilizing the situation in the country, and strengthening ethnic concord among the peoples of the USSR, which is in accordance with the vital aspirations of every Soviet family.

History teaches: Confrontation, political unprincipledness—that path leads nowhere. It is the path to major disaster.

The complicated situation requires the mobilization of all healthy forces, their consolidation upon the platform of perestroyka, and precise programs of action to overcome negative tendencies. Today, more than ever, one can feel the acute need for vigorous action aimed at strenthening the organizational and ideological unity of the party organizations and of all healthy forces of society.

The situation demands that each Communist adopt a principled stance in the struggle to strengthen the party's authority, in the matter of the renewal of socialism and the firm establishment of internationalism, and that he resolutely dissociate himself from those who, taking cover behind democratization and glasnost, have essentially launched a struggle against the socialist, humanitarian principles of national accord of the Soviet peoples, and who are destabilizing the situation. It is essential to enhance in every way the responsibility of CPSU members for the rigorous pursuit of the party line in the mass media, in unsponsored organizations, and in public movements.

When developing glasnost, criticism, and self-criticism, it is necessary to display initiative, and oppose any attempts to use the errors committed in the past and the present-day difficulties for the purpose of undermining the party's authority, for the demoralization of its ranks, and for the creation of instability in society. The solution of all problems, including nationalities problems, is only possible on the path of perestroyka, of expanding democracy, creating the rule-of-law state, and of consolidating genuine internationalism.

True democracy is incompatible with destructive actions aimed at achieving the narrow egotistical, ambitious aims of individual groups and persons. While developing a dialogue with the constructively minded majority in the mass public movements, it is necessary to deal a decisive rebuff to antisocialist and nationalist elements and to step up the struggle against extremism in interethnic relations. And where it is a question of violations of public order and of security, the full force of the law must be brought to bear.

In the context of the overall situation, the public's sharpened interest in the complicated facts of history—particularly as regards the assessment of the events of 1939-1940—is perfectly understandable. Steps have now been taken to investigate everything objectively, in a well-weighed fashion, and in the light of glasnost, relying on authentic historical facts and documentary data of the prewar and postwar periods. In the course of perestroyka, the acts of lawlessness committed by the Stalinist leadership both against Baltic peoples and against others have already been unequivocally condemned. At the same time a principled party assessment should be made of the deliberate distortion of history and the premeditated stirring up of passions to suit the nationalist aspirations and claims of various groupings and persons. A knowledge of history, of our past, must unite and not disunite the peoples.

The solution of the problems that now exist and the stabilization of the situation undoubledly lie in the sphere of the further democratization of our society and of the development and strengthening of the USSR, via the expansion of the sovereignty of the union republics

and the fleshing out of this sovereignty with real economic, social, legal, and political content which accords with the spirit of the CPSU's nationalities policy which is undergoing renewal.

As is known, beginning in 1990, the Baltic republics are transferring to the principles of economic accountability and self-management, which presuppose a considerable expansion of their powers in financial and credit activity, taxation, price formation, and the use of earned income. This is a major step both in the development of the economic reform and on the political plane, and in the further development of democracy. Very broad opportunities are also opening up for the republics to autonomously resolve issues of the development of culture, literature and the arts, taking into account progressive national and internationalist traditions and spiritual valuies. All this must be combined with concern for the satisfaction of the cultural needs of the representatives of all peoples residing in the territory of the republics, and for the creation of conditions for them to master the language of the indigenous population, and for their fuller communion with the national culture.

It is always important to remember that in the implementation of a nationalities policy, and when devising laws on citizenship and the state language and the rights and duties of citizens, there is no other way than to be guided by the cornerstone principle professed thoughout the civilized, democratic world—the equality of nations and peoples must be inseparably linked with the equality of people regardless of nationality, language, and religious belief. The true well-being of the indigenous nationality can never be achieved at the expense of the infringement of the rights and freedoms of people of other nationalities.

In the context of the consolidation of the sovereignty of the republics, a broad discussion is under way of the issues connected with granting greater independence to the communist parties of the union republics. The constructive solution of these in the framework of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism will help to more fully unfetter the initiative of all organizational structures of the party and to find new methods of solving problems of its internal life, while rigorously safeguading the unity and integrity of the CPSU.

Social Unrest, Strikes Continue in Azerbaijan

Nagorno-Karabakh Casualties Increase

PM1508091689 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 89 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "On Events in Nagorno-Karabakh"]

[Text] The strike in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region [NKAO] is in its fourth month. It seriously complicates the political analysis of the Karabakh question in the USSR Supreme Soviet, hampers the achievement of decisive changes in the socio-economic development of Nagorno-Karabakh, and has an extremely adverse effect on the state of interethnic relations in the region. Measures planned by the USSR Government for the introduction of regional cost-accounting, improvement of the population's living standards, and alleviation of refugees' plight are being blocked.

Hundreds of people of the Armenian and Azerbaijanian nationalities turn to the special administration committee every day. The committee receives many letters with requests for aid, with complaints at officials' rudeness, lack of attention, and shirking the solution of matters. There are unconstitutional attempts to create an alternative structure of government bodies, calls for civil disobedience actions, for outright armed struggle. In these conditions the special administration committee, the military commandant's office of the special region are called upon to assume the main concern for maintaining public safety and ensuring normal activity.

The USSR Council of Ministers, all-union ministries and agencies give vast assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh. There was deferral on payments for credits of tens of millions of rubles to collective and state farms of Nagorno-Karabakh. Seeds and combined fodder come from Russia, the Ukraine, and Moldavia. Hay-and-straw making is in progress in the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories.

Specialists of the USSR State Planning Committee and the USSR Ministry of Water-Management Development study on the spot the possibility of building new reservoirs and overhauling the existing ones. Drillers from Saratov and the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic are searching for additional sources of drinking water. A bakery is being overhauled. There are plans for the modernization of a meat-packing factory and fruit canning enterprises.

The USSR Ministry of Trade and the Central Union of Consumer Societies [Tsentrosoyuz] have allocated additional funds for foodstuffs and consumer goods.

The delivery of milk, vegetables, and fruit to cities and settlements of the region has been organized over the past month with the assistance of troops. Troops are unloading flour and supplying hard-of-access settlements with food and fuel.

All this is being done in conditions when extremist elements from both sides are trying to destabilize the situation. The region is virtually under a blockade, and its transport communications have been cut more than once. Clashes on an interethnic basis with the use of arms, of home-made explosive devices have become more frequent. Loss of life and the number of casualties among the Armenian and Azerbaijanian population and servicemen is growing. Incendiary statements with recrimination appear in the mass media of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and are heard at meetings.

At the same time, many people in Nagorno-Karabakh come to realize that ordinary people of the other nationality should not be blamed for all the ills. The most sober-minded people address the special administration committee, the military commandant's office with demands that law and order be ensured on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and that those who push the two peoples beyond the brink of interethnic strife should be brought to account.

'Tense Situation' in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD1408143789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] The Armenian public continues to be disturbed by the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. According to Major General Kupreyev, a member of the committee for the special administration of the NKAO, it has not yet been fully possible to prevent various types of provocative activity by irresponsible people. Over the past week, more than 700 vehicles carrying national economic freight and food have been escorted along particularly troubled roads with the help of military personnel. An accord has been reached with the leadership of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic on safeguarding the security of passenger buses from the autonomous oblast to Yerevan. However, in many areas there are still roadblocks in the oblast and this is also making it difficult to bring the agricultural harvest out into Armenia.

The third month of the strike in the oblast center has come to an end. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh link the reasons for the lengthy refusal to go to work with the delaying of a political solution on the NKAO. At the same time, people are fully aware that the strike is doing considerable damage to the economic well-being of the area. Since the start of the year, R40 million worth of industrial output has not been produced and R5 million worth of capital investments has not been assimilated.

Work in the agrarian sector is continuing for the most part. But the tense situation in the oblast as well as unfavorable weather conditions are already effecting the output produced by the rural workers.

Accounts of Azerbaijan Strike Differ

AU1408125289 Paris AFP in English 1137 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, Aug 14 (AFP)—Conflicting reports emerged Monday from Azerbaijan about the response to a general strike call in the ethnically troubled Soviet republic.

Local journalist Navim Raguimov, close to the Initiative Group for a Popular Front which called the strike Saturday [12 August], said between 16,000 and 20,000 people in Baku had stayed away from work. But this was denied by an official spokesman who said nobody was on strike.

Mr. Raguimov said four of Baku's main enterprises, each employing 4,000 to 5,000 workers, were on strike.

He said: "Shops are open and public transport is running normally. The town is calm. The organisers have not called for public gatherings during the day. People have simply stayed at home".

But Ismail Azaiev, a local government official, told AFP: "Everything is running, nobody is on strike."

The strike was called Saturday when 80,000 demonstrators demanded fresh elections for deputies from Azerbaijan, claiming that the March vote had been undemocratic.

They also called for the lifting of a curfew imposed after ethnic clashes between Azeris and Armenians, the dropping of charges against some 20 jailed Azeri nationalists, and stepped up economic and political autonomy for the largely Moslem republic.

Clashes between Armenians and Azeris have occurred frequently over the past 18 months. Two Armenians and two Azeris were killed in clashes this month.

Focus of much of the inter-communal violence is the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Its Christian Armenian majority wants the region to be attached to neighbouring Armenia, a move fiercely opposed by the Azeris.

Attempts Made To 'Paralyze' Traffic

PM1408162389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Asim Dzhalilov report under the "Direct Link" rubric: "Rally in Baku"]

[Text] Several thousand people took part in an unsanctioned rally in Baku last Saturday [12 August] called by the Azerbaijan People's Front board, our Baku correspondent Asim Dzhalilov reports.

On Monday, 14 August attempts were made to picket certain main roads in the city in order to paralyze traffic. Measures were taken that ensured the normal running of all means of transport. The overwhelming majority of enterprises are functioning normally.

Internal Affairs Ministry Updates Abkhaziya Events

LD1408141489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 14 Aug 89

[Text] The temporary press center of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry in Abkhaziya reports: On Sunday [13 August] the situation in the autonomous republic remained tense. Two crimes were committed and both were investigated. The Internal Affairs Ministry bodies together with internal troop subunits are continuing to confiscate arms. A total of more than 2,000 weapons as well as more than 1,200 explosives have been confiscated

since the beginning of the events. In Abkhaziya most labor collectives were in operation. Normal traffic was ensured on motor roads. In Sukhumi, public, railway, water, and air transport was in operation. The situation in the autonomous republic is being monitored by party, local soviet, and law enforcement bodies.

A group of residents from Illori village in Ochamchirskiy Rayon have finished their hunger strike.

During these difficult days in all areas of Abkhaziya, law enforcement bodies continue to hold meetings in labor collectives and at places of residence of the population. Representatives of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry troops are taking an active part. Daily contacts with people, and objective briefing of citizens on the situation helps to expose false rumors, strengthen trust between people of different nationalities, and foster reduction in tension. Meetings and conversations with representatives of various layers of society show that the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the youth condemn the conflicts on interethnic grounds, and are in favor of stabilizing the situation.

Soldiers' Death in Abkhaziya Described

PM0808130189 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 89 p 8

[Special correspondent O. Shapovalov report under the rubric "Courage": 'Died in the Line of Duty'"]

[Text] Sukhumi—Reports containing these chilling words still arrive at peaceful homes in our peaceful times. This time the sender's address is Abkhaziya....

"Two soldiers have been brought here," came the telephone message from the Ochamchir hospital. Major Mukhin, who received the report at the headquarters, was on the spot 10 minutes later. Whose? Where from? He turned back the sheet. Just a kid, a cadet. His face covered in blood. He recognized the second one right away. Senior Lieutenant Novikov wore glasses, and it was odd to see Viktor without them....

The Leningrad Higher Political School. People were sent here to Ochamchir not for exercises, not to summer camps. But to see for themselves that there would be losses....

Later I managed to meet those who were nearby during those seconds and who saw everything with their own eyes. I wanted to write that these young guys—Vladimir Akopov, an 18-year-old Armenian from Baku, and Viktor Novikov, a Russian from Smolensk Oblast—had died in action for the sake of peace and calm in the Abkhazian land. That the extremists would not be able to provoke the soldiers into tougher actions. About cool and calculating killers shooting people in the back.... But a few days later a local peasant admitted to the investigator: "I did it.... I made a mistake!" And he lowered his eyes.

War is a state contrary to human nature, humanists contend. Whether it is war on a large scale or a minor one is irrelevant. Even with a next door neighbor. The soldiers had confiscated from the local population hundreds of pistols and hunting rifles In general, the first-year cadets from the Leningrad Higher Political School had set off with their officers on a raid which did not promise anything particularly unexpected. In the region of the Androu settlement the bus of which V. Novikov was in charge got left behind by the leading vehicle.

"We saw a man with a rifle running across the road," Sergeant Igor Kosarenko said. "Novikov jumped out of the bus first, followed by Kukushkin, myself, Mikhaylov, Shits, and Akopov. The fugitive seemed to have vanished into thin air. We found only a rifle and a cartridge belt in an empty shed. We wanted to go back, but at that point a white 'Zhiguli' car started coming toward us along the dirt road. The vehicle suddenly reversed. The driver, who apparently also had a gun, jumped out and ran into the bushes. We fired a warning shot into the air and rushed after him...."

Novikov and Akopov were ahead of the others. In the settlement on whose outskirts everything was going on there was panic. Men with guns ran out of the houses and fired shots into the air. Someone shouted that he had seen extremists who were going to attack the village. A wake was in progress, and a lot of wine had been consumed....

When Kosarenko came out into the open, Novikov and Akopov had disarmed the owner of the shotgun. Igor approached, and helped to unfasten the cartridge belt. Suddenly he realized that they were being shot at.

"The sound was loud and long and drawn out, like two shots merging into one. And then I heard a dull thud against metal."

He must have heard it. Akopov was protected only by a flak jacket and the bullet entered his skull and, penetrating the back of his head, struck his helmet. Novikov was wearing only a short-sleeved shirt. "Experienced hunters shoot a boar in its left side," an expert said later. "That's where the heart and lungs are." Both died almost instantly. The shots were fired from a distance, professionally.

Cadet Dmitriy Mikhaylov:
"I did not find my own people right away.... But I saw an unknown man crawling away toward the bushes and dragging a rifle and an assault rifle (it was Akopov's weapon) after him. I ordered him to stop, and disarmed him."

In theory all five could have lain low with their commander in that tiny area surrounded by bushes. Each of them had the idea clearly fixed in their minds: "Weapons must not be used. Shots must be fired in the air." None of them had any experience of what to do when people

are trying to kill you. Sergeant Kukushkin had only three cartridges left in his gun clip. The others did not have many more. But not a single bullet was fired in the direction of the village. The village somehow suddenly began to sober up. When the local inhabitants realized with horror what had happened, they themselves brought the corpses to the road. And later they built a kind of monument in the spot where the officer and the cadet had died: An awning with food and drink under it. I saw people crying as, perhaps, they had not cried about their own dead. What is happening to us? How did we get ourselves into such an absurd situation? A lavish, rich area which has everything—sun, sea, fruit, apparently enough for everyone and to spare. Is this how Abkhaziya would have welcomed and seen off these two likeable guys if times were different? They did not shoot at it. They were under orders to fire into the air.

...I got a letter from my younger brother. The photos show an unfamiliar guy in a flak jacket and helmet. He chose this himself. Why, little brother? Why do your comrades get up when the alarm sounds so transport aircraft carrying people who are half asleep can take you thousands of kilometers to a place where a new trouble spot has flared up? You stand between those who are ready to kill each other in a fit of hatred, and you make yourselves a target—a double target. But you are probably right: Somebody has to separate people fighting when they take each other on. No one anywhere has yet thought up another way to stop a crowd which is blind with hatred. I ask of you only one thing, little brother: Come home alive....

USSR in 'Danger Zone' Because of Social Unrest

PM1408113189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Aug 89 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Viktor Shirokov article under the rubric "Topical Subject": "Hot Summer"]

[Text] So summer is almost over.... It has been a hot one not so much in terms of degrees centigrade as in terms of the temperature of political and social heat, with the "thermometer" of social life rising to danger point.

Let us not shut our eyes to the truth: The country is in a danger zone, an alert zone, with deep-seated processes constantly bursting to the surface like molten lava, threatening to scorch each one of us. Indeed: Each and every one of us, because the perestroyka revolution has moved from the upper spheres downwards, to the people's masses, and there it has affected the direct interests of people in the millions. For example, when a miner does not have even a slice of the most ordinary sausage in his lunch pail, etiquette is no longer a consideration....

Shall we recall what this summer has brought us? The main point is that we literally experienced a "congress shock," which stirred and shook the decorous and ingrained grandeur of the country's supreme forums during the times of stagnation. It proved possible to speak honestly and humanely about the most pressing matters from high rostrums. The USSR Supreme Soviet session picked up this initiative and ensured a strong pulse of social life. The initial results are already to be seen: A number of urgent decisions have been made, and substantial groundwork for the future has been created.

Let us also recall that, alongside and in parallel with these extraordinary events, there occurred others which were equally extraordinary but tragic. The country was shaken by the explosion in Bashkiria. It saw the depths of national fanaticism, cruelty, and violence some of its regions could reach unless a lesson is learned from the Fergana clashes. At that time the editorial office was swamped by a flood of letters and telegrams. Here is just one of them: "We are entitled to hope and expect the Supreme Soviet to take the most resolute action regarding the extremists who have thrown entire peoples into the cauldron of fratricide. We are entitled to expect an end to be put to the disgraceful phenomenon of interethnic enmity. On instructions from members of the 'Put Kommunizma' Collective Farm [kolkhoz], Bykovskiy Rayon, Volgograd Oblast—kolkhoz Chairman Shmarov, Russian; machine operator Yurchuk, Belorussian; Party Committee Secretary Zakupov, Kazakh; machine operator Magomedov, Lak; fitter Azizyan, Armenian; milkmaid Chetayeva, Mari."

The head of state spoke on Central Television. "As chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet," M.S. Gorbachev said, "I deem it my duty to warn of the growing danger of exacerbation of interethnic relations and the ensuing consequences for society, for every family, for every person."

By that time the country had already experienced the Alma-Ata, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tbilisi, Fergana, and Novyy Uzen events. Shots were soon afterwards fired in Abkhaziya.

No matter how "individual" the image of various conflicts might have been, they all had a common basis as a rule. Social tension develops wherever the law is trampled, wherever there is flourishing bureaucratism, administrative nagging, and a scornful attitude toward working people, people of other nationalities, and their needs.

This bitter and tragic experience is a grim warning to us all. It was probably no accident that one of the speakers from the USSR Supreme Soviet session's rostrum made a proposal concerning the need to set up a "rapid reaction" group of people's deputies which could immediately travel to hot spots and help to put out the conflagration of conflicts. There is obviously good sense in this—a trip by such a "team" to the border between Kirghizia and Tajikistan helped to defuse an explosive collision.

But why have the nationalities question and labor conflicts suddenly loomed before us in so threatening a manner? Answers to these complex questions are now

being sought by politicians and political scientists, sociologists and philosophers, jurists and psychologists. Sooner or later, the answers will emerge and will gel into a clear-cut and businesslike action program. But this work, which is vitally important for the state's existence, cannot be delayed. This is where acceleration is needed—otherwise this vacuum will be filled by homegrown nationalist-careerists.

And they, incidentally—unlike our other ideologists—have already embarked on frenzied activity, pursuing a targeted offensive against young people's world outlook without stinting on pessimistic prophecies about the future of socialism in the Soviet Union.

The right to self-determination is a constitutional right which nobody has repealed, but today's objective historical reality is such that, as a result of the economic ties prevailing between union republics and the integration processes over the decades, we have been linked together firmly and durably.

We absorbed the socialist ideals almost at our mothers' breasts and today, even when reassessing the country's historical path in many respects and seeking the highway of renewal, the overwhelming majority of Soviet people still opt for the vector of socialism.

The argument that is going on today, including at the summit of power—in the USSR Supreme Soviet—is not about the dominant principles in our society but about the ways, means, and pace of their implementation.

The concept of regional economic accountability is moving at a headlong pace from the theoretical to the practical sphere. Let us look at the key issue in the striking miners' demands—was it just a matter of meager lunch pails? Of course not. Their primary demand concerned the autonomy and economic accountability of their mines. They need neither charity nor handouts, they are capable of earning a good living for themselves provided the ministries' edict economy releases them from its snares. They declared: The mines must belong to the miners.

The transfer of ownership directly to labor collectives is by no means easy, but it is inevitable. The chain of strikes, either those that are still continuing in some places or those that are brewing up, can be broken only if the workers get hold of a real lever to influence decision-making. But not with the help of strikes that are pernicious for the country, which is already making tremendous efforts. Just pause and imagine for a second: Blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces, and electric furnaces shut down and cold. Railroad stations brought to a standstill by trains acting like immovable blood clots. Machine tools standing idle in shops. Even if each detachment of the working class were right in its own way, one could imagine what would lie in store for the country. Total paralysis of the national economy.

This real threat literally hurt people to the quick: The editorial office started receiving letters and telegrams addressed to the miners. G. Volkov from Taganrog: "No, comrade miners, your strike is of no help to the Soviet people in the swifter implementation of perestroyka and consequently the radical improvement of economic and social conditions in the country and in your regions in particular, it is a painful scald on perestroyka." Actually, there were also quite a few messages of unconditional support for the coal workers' dramatic step. Some people went even further. Ya. Vitchenko from the city of Valki in Kharkov Oblast demanded: "I believe that it is necessary to take to task also the party, economic, and soviet leaders of cities and rayons where strikes are taking place as being directly guilty of retarding perestroyka."

Which is the way leading to our society's stability, how are we to get through an unprecedentedly complex stage of the country's development with minimum losses? It was for the sake of finding answers to these difficult questions that such intense work was done at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. It was for the same reason that the Council of Ministers apportioned and reapportioned the scant "pie" of our revenues.

Are we in difficulties today? To say the least.... There is just one factor that offers comfort and hope: The country's intellectual potential is involved in the quest for radical solutions, the working class has boldly, exactingly, and unambiguously declared its existence, the peasantry is having its own say from the rostrums. Genuine party democracy is on the way to being established. The pooling of these forces is a guarantee that we will get through the present and possibly most important stage of perestroyka.

Yes, it is difficult to identify the middle way [ravnodeystvuyushchaya] of social accord. This is understandable—after the decades of unanimity by decree, after the unanimous approbation by "applauding groups," some people have found the freedom of individual self-expression so intoxicating that they are unwilling to listen to even slightly differing views. There is no need to suspect only something reprehensible in the actions of people who are unconventional in their quest. Ultimately, the multitude of views and multitude of options will produce a richer palette of fresh ideas, we will get rid of uniformity of thinking sooner, and our approach toward the solution of our problems will be all the more comprehensive. The guarantee of success lies in the consolidation of all healthy forces struggling for perestroyka's success.

This year's summer has proved to be eventful, dynamic, and full of alarms. Yes, it did bring us quite a few worries, fears, and dangers, it demanded bold and risky decisions in critical situations, but it also revived hope and showed the still timid glimmer of "light at the end of the tunnel." The country has acquired a new government and, just before the start of the parliamentary recess, the USSR Supreme Soviet session finally embarked on a

discussion of most urgent and vitally important documents. A package of draft laws which will give a new meaning to our policy and our economy is being prepared for the fall session. In short, this summer will go down in the state's life and history as a sign of changes for the better.

Council of Ministers Holds Session 14 Aug

PM1508091889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Today [14 August] the USSR Council of Ministers met in session; it considered the drafts of the state plan for the economic and social development of the USSR and of the USSR state budget for 1990. The drafts which were presented are based on the fundamental directives of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the decisions made by the session of the country's Supreme Soviet. They have been formulated on the basis of proposals from enterprises, associations, organizations, and USSR ministries and departments and the councils of ministers of the union republics.

At the session, a detailed analysis was given of the economic situation in the current 5-year plan, especially during this year, and the main paths for emerging from the situation which has taken shape were defined. Despite the universal transition to economic methods of administration and their democratization, the major structural changes which have begun in the national economy and which are aimed at resolving the most acute socioeconomic problems, a number of negative tendencies which have recently become apparent in the country's economy have seriously complicated the situation. The shortage of many consumer goods, first and foremost of foodstuffs, has increased perceptibly, inflationary processes have intensified, the state budget deficit is being reduced too slowly, social tension has increased, and production and labor discipline have decreased markedly. In order to halt a further deterioration in the economic situation and to ensure the fulfillment of the decisions that have been adopted to raise the standard of living of various groups of the population with low incomes and a growth in welfare of the whole of the people, the USSR Council of Ministers is planning special measures in the draft plan and budget for 1990. They are aimed at a significant improvement of the consumer market and the circulation of money and at the creation of the preconditions for the further development of the national economy in the coming 13th 5-Year Plan. In order to attain what has been planned, the USSR Government has determined unconditional priorities for the next year. These are: foodstuffs, consumer goods, and the material base of the social sphere. In connection with this, the necessity arises for maneuvering resources in favor of the branches which are directly linked with an improvement in the living conditions of Soviet people.

The session examined carefully the issue of providing the population with food products. Some union republics, particularly the Ukrainian, Kazakh, Latvian, and Estonian union republics, have proposed plans that include a lag in the production of foodstuffs in comparison with the volumes determined by the decisions of the March 1989 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The USSR Government did not agree with this position of the councils of ministers and instructed it to carry out additional work on this issue, bearing in mind that today it is precisely the republics that bear responsibility, first and foremost, for providing the population with foodstuffs, as well as for resolving all other social problems.

In conditions of the transition to principles of financial autonomy and self-financing and with the new economic machinery not having been sufficiently worked out, there has been an uneven growth of monetary income in certain sections of the national economy and in certain groups of the population without a corresponding increase in the supply of goods. As a result the imbalance of the consumer market has intensified. Noting the persistent work that was begun in April of this year to increase the output of non-foodstuffs goods in 1990, the participants in the session sharply criticized the ministries of the chemicals and forestry, machine building and defense complexes, as well as the governments of Kazakhstan, Belorussia, Georgia, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, and the Russian Federation, which had proposed in their plans obviously lowered volumes for the production of goods and for the provision of services to the population. The attention of the defense branches was drawn to the need to accelerate conversion, which should make a significant contribution to replenishing the commodities market.

During the discussion of the draft plan and budget, great concern was displayed at the fact that in many regions of the country, including in the Azerbaijani, Georgian, Latvian, and Kirghiz union republics, construction of installations in the social and cultural sphere was being carried out unsatisfactorily and with a significant lag. The USSR Government committed the councils of ministers of the union republics as well as ministries and departments to impose order in this matter and to make up for what has been lost by the end of the year. As for the draft plan for next year, a significant increase is planned in the proportion of the non-production sphere in the overall volume of state capital investments.

The problem of the financial improvement of the economy was subjected to in-depth analysis. A strategic task is that of leading the country's finances from a state of crisis and of reducing considerably the deficit in the state budget in 1990. Among the plans mapped out to this end are a reduction by nearly one-third in state centralized capital investments in the production sphere, a substantial reduction in expenditure on defense and on the maintenance of the management apparatus, and also in imported purchases of equipment and materials for the heavy industry. These and other measures will provide for a rapid increase in state revenue over its expenditure in 1990.

At the same time, a number of the union republics are again planning an emission of finance next year, while failing to ensure an increase in consumer goods production and in rendering paid services to the population. The USSR Government has drawn attention to the impermissibility of such an approach and has demanded that such a projection be reviewed.

Those who took the floor at the session of the USSR Council of Ministers spoke of the fact that the intensive tasks, especially in the social sphere, require a reliable material balance. Meanwhile, at the present time there has been a clear tendency in many enterprise collectives, favoring their own group interests, for them not to conclude treaties with subcontractors, not to fulfill commitments, and to violate cooperative relations which have become developed. The USSR Government has condemned such practices which lead to a disruption in the normal rhythm of work throughout the national economy, and has demanded that the USSR ministries and the chairmen of the councils of ministers of the union republics nip such phenomena in the bud.

The USSR Council of Ministers has emphasized that the all-around deepening and comprehensive realization of the economic reform and the transition of republics to self-management and self-financing is that lever, the utilization of which, even in the short term, will provide for growth in the effectiveness of social production.

At the same time, the USSR Government has pointed out to the councils of ministers of the Belorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian union republics, which are switching to the new methods of economic management from 1 January 1990, the slow nature of their preparation for such a measures, and has instructed them, as well as the USSR State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance, to complete this important stage in the formation of the new economic mechanism in as short a time as possible.

Once the finishing touches are applied to the draft plans and budget for 1990, the USSR Council of Ministers will present them at the established time for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Taking part in the work of the session of the USSR Council of Ministers were Comrades Biryukova, Vlasov, and Maslyukov, candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Comrade Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, conducted the session and spoke at it.

Comparison of 4 Aug Supreme Soviet Session
LD0508142189

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1400 GMT on 4 August broadcasts a recorded relay of the USSR Supreme Soviet morning session held in the Kremlin on 4 August. Gorbachev's opening remarks at the session have been compared with those included in the Moscow Domestic Service in Russian version broadcast at 0830 GMT on 4 August and published on pages 28-29 of the 4 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT and have been found to be identical with the following exception:

page 28, column one, paragraph two, last sentence reads: ...should be guaranteed. In this regard I think—this is my feeling, and I would like to convey it to you, and I have imparted this to my Politburo comrades and they are of the same view—we simply cannot go our separate ways for the recess without expressing ourselves on this issue.

The fact that... (supplying additional sentence).

Latsis Comment on Lessons of Miners' Strike Cited
LD1508093289 Moscow TASS in English 0911 GMT 15 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—"During the heated debates at the first Congress of People's Deputies and the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, one question was not explicitly formulated: How long are people prepared to endure disorder, how much time have the new legislature and executive got? The miners' strikes gave a clear-cut answer—none. Substantial improvements are needed immediately," Otto Latsis says in the latest issue of the KOMMUNIST journal.

The workers actually went on strike after the Congress of People's Deputies, which for the first time granted the entire nation the opportunity to stand up for their interests in a normal, democratic and legitimate way. "This means that the huge unprecedented step toward consolidating the power of the people undoubtedly made by the congress is nevertheless regarded as insufficient. The workers demanded more, and it is vitally important to try and understand why it happened."

The commentary headlined "Time Trouble" says it is not the first signal of the kind. The author considers the common desire to at least be told when and what improvements Soviet people can expect and what guarantees there are on this score quite justified. However, the author points out, guarantees were hard to come by in the numerous speeches made by the ministers responsible for consumer goods production and distribution at the Supreme Soviet session. The author criticizes wasteful state programs that further aggravate the budget deficit and points out that wastefulness by the state, represented by its departments, encourages lack of thrift at individual enterprises. An end must be put to such practices.

"The miners reminded: You can no longer rest content with routine measures that sufficed ten or twenty years ago. The twenty years of stagnation expired, leaving perestroyka with a time trouble situation on its hands, so action is urgently needed—resolute, precise and free from new major errors," the commentary says. A "hope-inspiring signal" was given, according to the author, by

the government's intention to press for the normalization of the country's finance system by more decisive means, as attested to by the address of Chairman of the State Planning Committee Yuriy Maslyukov at the closing session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Obkom Examines Causes of Karaganda Miners' Strike
18220182 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 29 Jul 89 p 4

[Article by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA correspondent G. Belotserkovskiy: "Who Is in the Vanguard?"]

[Text] A meeting of the expanded buro of the Karaganda Obkom [oblast committee] of the party proceeded as a heated debate. The reasons that prompted the 110,000-strong collective of the "Karagandaugol" Association to strike were examined. Ways out of the situation that had emerged were sought. Members of the buro were in the presidium. Members of the oblast workers' committee, who as recently as several days ago led the strike, were in the first row of the hall, which had fallen silent. The young men were present for the first time in a party headquarters at the oblast level. However, they were not spectators; they entered into a dialogue with the presidium every now and then. Their statements influenced greatly not only the course of discussion, but also the development of resolutions, and not only because the power of the anxious mass impatiently waiting for a resolution of the issues raised was behind them. It is just that there was a lot in their words that was businesslike and fresh; that is necessary right now.

A report on the events delivered by Obkom Second Secretary A. Ibzhanov added little to the understanding of events that had already emerged in these hot days. The low degree of accountability of communists-managers for solving acute social problems was noted, as well as the fact that many party committees, including the oblast committee, looked undisturbed at the accumulating problems. The strike has confirmed the errors of party committees in cadre policy; it has been based on questionnaire particulars and has not necessarily reflected public opinion. Social problems have been accumulating for years. The drama could have been avoided had the resolutions of the obkom itself been complied with.

Member of the obkom buro, and by now former general director of the "Karagandaugol" Association, N. Drizhd, was on the speaker's stand. I have long known him as a most honest person who gives his all to work. As early as the years of stagnation, he received many hard knocks for urging the right to have an auxiliary farm at the mine he headed. He became an enthusiast of this endeavor at the rank of mining "general" as well. The amount of housing built by the miners themselves also increased abruptly. Just a little bit more, and it may have become possible to eliminate social tension. However, time may have run out. Most likely, some things did not depend on this mortally tired person who essentially was a hostage of his ministry. It was precisely the ministry that did not abandon the old, already denounced policy where virtually all power and resources are marshaled into the development of new capacity. In the oblast as well they began to produce coal rapidly at the new Shubarkol open pit mine. All of this was done at the expense of stripping social "rear services."

So Drizhd had to drink the cup for everyone, and the miners demanded his resignation. Indeed, said Nikolay Aleksandrovich, I am guilty of not raising these issues sharply enough over there at the top. I had to shout! We did it the old way: gave promises to people and did nothing. Supposedly the people would bear everything...

"I am convinced that the administrative-command style of work of the USSR Minugleprom [Ministry of Coal Industry] is primarily to blame for what has happened. This is barbarity: The director of a major mine cannot spend more than R100 on his own. What kind of independence is it?" said first secretary of the Shakhtinsk Gorkom [city committee] of the party M. Alekseyenko.

"Last year SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA carried a series of materials on the life of Donbass miners. They clearly referred to all the troubles, including ours in Karaganda," said Chairman of the Territorial Committee of the Trade Union of Coal Industry Workers D. Abdramanov. "Why didn't the party obkom consider these publications then and take preventive measures? One more point. Why should our territorial committee feed a tremendous superstructure, transfer to the oblsovprof [oblast trade union council] 24 percent and to the AUCCTU 17 percent of the funds collected? We do not receive any special aid from them. Instead, they give us a full measure of paper pushing and meetings."

First Secretary of the Obkom V. Lokotunin did not have it easy at strike meetings. This has been the case in our country: The party is responsible for everything, even for trifles, and the party and its first persons in the regions are held accountable for everything. Valeriy Ivanovich has been the head of the obkom for a short time only, but this did not become a weighty argument for the angry mass. It did not accept his explanations, which may have seemed convincing in the quiet office atmosphere. Perhaps, some other words were needed, less official ones, so to speak.

At the buro meeting, V. Lokotunin rebuked the heads of party committees:

"Where were your propagandists, your ideological aktiv? Why did they not embark on a discussion with the speakers; why did they sit it out?"

The auditorium listened to this rebuke in silence. Only the secretary of the Shakhtinsk City Workers' Committee, S. Ibkeyev, responded:

"No matter how many times you say 'honey, honey,' it will not get any sweeter in your mouth. Given the store shelves that we have here, a discussion would not have come out. People no longer believe in words."

V. Lokotunin confidently upbraided the "mayors" of satellite cities: Supposedly the latter have failed to provide for the people. They denied being at fault and talked about the terrifying lack of rights, the impoverishment of local soviets, and their complete dependence on union ministries. However, the arguments did not come across. I thought: Here they are, the scapegoats. However, I was mistaken: Members of the oblast workers' committee... rose up to defend their "mayors":

"They can only do so much. Why deal so harshly with them? As far as some frantic shouts at the meetings are concerned, we can rebuke the obkom: Why didn't you take charge of holding the meetings?"

"I agree with the strikers: Mines should be given economic independence," said Deputy Minister of the Coal Industry A. Belikov. "If you work well you live better; if you work poorly you go bankrupt. To be sure, some enterprises will perish in the process. They must be leased. Incidentally, leasing will be a great antidote for strikes. When the entire Kuzbass was on strike, the Prokopyevsk mine automatic devices plant operated as if nothing had happened. They did not go along with the persuasion of the strike committee: They said they could not inflict losses on themselves, as they are in control there..."

The chairman of the Audit Commission of the party obkom, M. Imashev, said: "We have lost the initiative. In anticipation of the events, we should have gathered at the obkom and worked out a political line for the period of a possible strike. We should not have been on different sides of the barricades. After all, we are the vanguard of the working class, so we had to say a resolute 'no' to the policy of the ministry, which had had enough warning. I call on the obkom to demand the elimination of the USSR Ministry of Coal Industry."

Due to the persistence of men from the workers' committee, the buro resolution, whose draft boded ill for those summoned to appear before the meeting, was moderated. They believe that now is not the time to look for and punish those guilty. The main point is different: Mutual understanding and joint work are needed. After all, all of it lies ahead.

Stepan Shalayev Views 'Right to Strike'

AU2507162289 Sofia POGGLED in Bulgarian No 30, 24 Jul 89 p 7

[Interview with Stepan Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, by NOVOSTI representative Yuriy Katsnelson; "The Right To Strike"; date, place of interview not given]

[Text] "A number of Scandinavian dailies have published reports, mentioning your name, on 'the changing attitude toward strikes in the USSR.' More precisely, this news appeared in Danish newspapers, while the Finnish daily KANSAN UUTISET plainly stated that 'the right to strike will be introduced in the USSR.' Is this really so?" This was the first question put by NOVOSTI representative Yuriy Katsnelson in his interview with the chairman of the Central Council of Soviet trade unions.

[Shalayev] It is true that I spoke to Finnish journalists in Murmansk and Saariselka (Finland) during the regular Soviet-Finnish trade union meeting. Reports on this appeared in the press, with each newspaper presenting what occurred in its own way. Although our conversation with them covered a very wide range of issues connected with the restructuring under way in the USSR, the issue of the attitude to strikes being only one among many, it was this issue that captured the attention of the press and was reflected in the headlines. I think that there is some sense in commenting on the question, all the more because far from everything that I said on this issue was faithfully interpreted.

Let us begin by stating that Soviet legislation has never banned strikes, neither previously nor at the present, and is not doing so now.

[Katsnelson] What is the trade unions' attitude to strikes?

[Shalayev] First, we do not regard strikes as a normal phenomenon, despite the fact that, as I mentioned, the law does not ban them. In the conditions of the socialist system, where the enterprises belong to the state, to the entire people, such a form of "clarifying relations" causes economic damage not to private capital, but to the whole of society, including the collective that resorts to such a form of protest. This is especially true now, when the enterprises have changed over or are changing over to economic accountability and self-financing, and the losses from production stoppages form a burden that weighs down the entire labor collective.

I mentioned to the Finnish journalists the example of the incident in Kishinev, the capital of Moldavia, when the city bus drivers unexpectedly refused to go to work, and demanded that their wages be increased to 500 rubles a month (from 340 rubles, that is, 1.6 times the average wage in the country). In the morning the people waiting at the bus stops could not understand what was happening. They were in a hurry to make their way not only to the factories and offices, but also to the hospital, railway station, or the airport, but there were no buses. Moreover, the drivers went on strike without saying anything to their trade union committee, without taking into consideration the fact that in 1988 a labor contract approved by all came into force, under which the terms for labor remuneration were defined. I would add that the administration had not breached these terms.

I could mention a number of similar conflicts besides this. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and our trade unions are against such spontaneous strikes. We consider that a state legal procedure should be drafted that clearly defines when it is possible to resort to a work stoppage, that is, precisely what violations of labor agreements might occasion such a stoppage, and after what preliminary examination procedure. In my view, in a law-governed state conflicts of such a kind should also be regulated by law. This is the second point.

[Katsnelson] In other words, it is a matter of drafting legislative acts?

[Shalayev] Yes, precisely. We might say that the legislation on labor disputes should include clauses covering not only the examination of disputes between workers and the administration, but also an appropriate procedure for resolving collective labor disputes, that is, disputes that might cause a strike. Incidentally, here we are not inventing the wheel, so to speak, for surely established procedures for this exist not only in the capitalist countries, but also in a number of socialist ones. In our view, the chief thing is that such a procedure should show that it is only possible to resort to a strike when all the other means available to the administration and the trade unions for a "peaceful" settlement of the dispute have been exhausted. This is the most important point.

[Katsnelson] You mentioned "means." Do the trade unions possess such levers, and how effective are they?

[Shalayev] In our enterprises labor dispute commissions exist in which the trade union committees and the administration are equally represented. If a worker is not satisfied with the commission's decision, he hands over the dispute to the trade union committee for settlement, and in such cases the trade union committee's decision is binding on the administration. As regards the effectiveness of this procedure for protecting trade union rights and workers' interests, the figures speak best for themselves: Last year the commissions and trade union committees examined 504,796 labor disputes, of which 496,302 (i.e. more than 98 percent) were decided in favor of the workers.

[Katsnelson] Surely this is not the only means available?

[Shalayev] Of course not. A very important and powerful means for protecting workers' interests is the right of our trade union organs to express lack of confidence in an administrator of any rank, when they consider that he is disregarding the demands of the trade union organization and the interests of the labor collective. This power also applies to matters of pay and labor conditions, that is the very issues that, as shown by practical experience, can lead to a spontaneous explosion of emotion. In these cases, such economic leaders are relieved from their posts.

[Katsnelson] Do the trade unions make active use of this right?

[Shalayev] In 1987 10,500 representatives of the administration were relieved from their posts at the request of the trade unions. There also exists a further important possibility for preventing conflicts, namely the rights of the labor collectives themselves and the recently created organs of workers' self-management to examine any labor disputes and adopt decisions on them, which are also binding upon the administration.

Communist Party's Role in Economy Stressed

PM0808133989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 89 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The Party and the Economy"]

[Text] A discussion recently took place with Mikhail Fedorovich Podkolzin, secretary of the USSR Ministry of Railways party committee. He had just returned from the ministry collegium hall, where a conference was being held with representatives of all the network's railroads. The discussion was difficult. People from all over the country raised questions that had never before been discussed with the leaders of the sector and the ministry's party committee.

Why, for instance, is the useful Belorussian method of boosting labor productivity by releasing superfluous people distorted at the local level? Why are switchmen and trackmen being dismissed while bureaucrats are left in their offices? Why do railroad workers receive one-half or one-third of the requisite number of rails, sleepers, and track connectors year after year? When will locomotive reliability reach the norm? Train drivers and railroad workers must be held to account for train derailments, but what real steps are the sector leadership and the ministry party committee taking?

"Our letters, appeals to related plants, and numerous telephone conferences," the party committee secretary acknowledged, "are not heeded now. Is that right? People need a real end result from management efforts."

The miners' strikes highlighted many corners of party work that are thick with dust. Corners that the cleansing broom has not yet touched. When, for instance, a journalist asked one city party committee secretary whether the party committee had foreseen these events and was prepared for them, he received the following answer: "No one thought that matters would take such a turn..."

So did they hope that people would accept the situation, as had happened for decades, and that everything would blow over, as it had before? But it did not. The miners, having lost faith in the strength of their party leaders at the local level and ministerial officials at the center, took extreme measures. Grave measures both for them and for the entire country. Let us be blunt: Two-edged measures for everyone, including those who disrupted

the labor rhythm. Suffice it to say that losses of worktime in the first half-year as a result of mass failures to turn up at work exceeded 2 million man-days, which meant a major shortfall in output.

The economic and social position in the country is difficult now. For the first time in many years negative "growth" figures have appeared in the USSR State Committee for Statistics half-year report. Fewer apartment blocks and apartments were commissioned than planned. We did not succeed in maintaining the high rates of economic development achieved in the first years of perestroyka. Machine-builders are, as a rule, fulfilling the plan by crash work, meeting the lion's share of targets in the last week of the month.

What about party committees at local level? They seem to have renounced the justly condemned methods of direct interference in economic managers' affairs. But having let go of the managerial reins, they have failed to propose anything new in exchange. To put it bluntly, they have clambered off the "wagon" and let production matters drift, and sometimes they outline retrospective "measures to overcome the lag." But what about political methods of economic leadership? What about work to renew cadres and the quest for new Starodubtsevs, Fedorovs, and Veprevs? Why are many party committee officials not giving up deskbound methods of activity and not going to workplaces to conduct an in-depth investigation of matters, expose the sore points and trouble spots in a timely fashion, and take prompt steps?

Are party members, including those working in central economic organs, quite unperturbed by the acute shortages and the absence of many goods and products at sales outlets? Is it not time for them to ponder why wages are rising excessively rapidly under these conditions and why this growth is not backed up by the even more rapid production of high-quality goods? Look what has happened to wages at research, design, and planning-design organizations. In the last 6 months people's wages there have risen 30 percent! Meanwhile, the increase in labor productivity was much lower. I would like to call leaders to account for such "actions," which fuel inflation.

At the recent meeting at the CPSU Central Committee it was said with particular trenchancy that the party's prestige cannot be affirmed by even the most powerful decrees or decisions. Prestige can only be won today by resolute and consistent implementation of the perestroyka policy. Every plant and rural party organization will have to strengthen its prestige by actions and win at least small victories every day together with labor collectives.

A top-priority concern for party committees—both central economic departments and at local level—is to smash bureaucratic obstacles to economic reform and the development of leasing relations and the cooperative movement. Remember one of the demands of the striking collectives: "Give Us Independence in Production Development!" Leaders who sabotage reform for the sake of their personal tranquility and well-being and who try to preserve the foundations of the outmoded administrative-edict system of economic management and plan the manufacture of every nail at central level must be called strictly to account.

The revival of political activeness in production aims by its positive nature to eliminate working people's former indifference to the results of economic activity and to liberate the creative forces inherent in workers, specialists, and managers. This process must not be stifled but supported. At the same time we must firmly remember that no one has abolished discipline and order in production during the development of democracy and glasnost. Problems of the highly organized implementation of practical actions now worry all healthy forces in society, for groups and groupings that deliberately or otherwise disrupt the rhythm of work, endeavor to exploit the nationwide movement for perestroyka for their own selfish aims, and want to heap the blame for the current difficulties on the party alone are floating to the surface.

This idea was voiced on several occasions at the recent conference at the CPSU Central Committee. In order to ensure that truth always triumphs, party members must go to people, hold honest and open discussions with the masses, and convince them of the rightness and correctness of the course of perestroyka. It is important for every party committee and all Communists to master the tactic of pre-emptive actions. Perestroyka processes are now developing so rapidly that the idea of these processes also needs to be amended in a timely fashion and the ideological, economic, and social aims of the transformations need to be clarified in light of practice and the period of renewal. This will impart confidence in the work of the party committees and mobilize their forces.

The future of perestroyka, economic successes, and practical changes for the better at workplaces and in the social sphere are in the hands of our entire people. The leading role of Communists in every collective must now be proven as never before by daily honest labor, supreme responsibility for the cause, and the active practical affirmation of perestroyka.

Leningrad People's Deputy Denisov on CPSU Role

PM2607093089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Professor A. Denisov by correspondent N. Volynskiy in Leningrad, under the rubric "Platform for a People's Deputy": "From Positions of Common Sense"; date of interview not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] "The party's prestige has declined—perestroyka is to blame!"... And on the other flank you hear: "The dominance of the partocracy goes on!... The communists should leave the political arena!"... That is the range of critical arrows aimed at the CPSU today from "right"

and "left." There is no shortage of them at the various "informal" rallies and meetings in Leningrad. Often these are "salvoes" in which emotions provide most of the gunpowder. Today, however, what is needed is a businesslike, rigorous analysis of the situation in the CPSU and the role of the party itself in society. The long discussion on this topic at the conference held at the CPSU Central Committee reaffirmed its topicality with new force.

This topic is the subject of a conversation between PRAVDA's correspondent and USSR People's Deputy Professor A. Denisov.

[Volynskiy] So, Anatoliy Alekseyevich, over to you.

[Denisov] As for the party's position, this is not a new question for me. Since I am engaged in the systematic analysis of socioeconomic and other complex systems, I have had occasion to study this problem, too.

Of course, anyone can find as many reasons as he likes to reproach the CPSU, if he so wishes. But I would not panic over these reproaches, I would regard them calmly. It is very popular today to talk about a decline in prestige, because this suits many people: on the one hand, those who dream of taking the CPSU's place in the power system; and on the other, those party officials who were dealt a heavy blow by perestroyka, who lost their personal prestige among people.

The position of any party in any society is defined by democratic elections. What do the results of our elections tell us? Judge for yourself. In the "good" old days some 60 percent of USSR people's deputies were party members. Even that percentage was ensured by a strict quota system. Now the quota system has been removed. And what happens? More than 80 percent of those who received deputies' seats are party members! Few political parties in the world can boast an election result like that. So the problem lies elsewhere.

[Volynskiy] Does the problem not lie in the fact that within the party itself, which initiated perestroyka, the process of democratic changes is patently lagging?

[Denisov] It is all much more serious than that. This is not a case of laggardness, it is a crisis.

[Volynskiy] Rather a "heretical" word!

[Denisov] Let us agree to not get emotional. We are not talking about religion. let us use neutral terminology—regardless of whether some people may consider it "heresy" or "orthodoxy."

So, we are talking about a crisis as a transitional state on the way to a new, necessarily higher, healthy state. How did this crisis arise? The main accusation against the CPSU is that it depressed the sphere of material production and brought society to a state of economic stagnation. But I think it is the other way round: Production "crushed" or depressed the party.

[Volynskiy] But Anatoliy Alekseyevich, let us take a little look at history. Is it not true that the Bolsheviks at one time usurped, so to speak, the right to run the economy?

[Denisov] It is not as simple as that. The old saying goes: First the princes rule the moneylenders, then the moneylenders rule the princes. That is the case here. In our history, we had war communism—an ideology that was forced on us, from the viewpoint of material production. The country was moving toward disaster. And life itself, reality, made the party become involved in the economy. Even under V.I. Lenin there was the hope of bringing the best intellectual forces into the production sphere, so that they would help pull the economic cart out of the mud, and after that, supposedly, matters would proceed of their own accord. But since the cart turned out to have no "horse"—no real businessman (he was gradually exterminated), the party is dragging this load itself, to this day... I am not talking about the other factors—Stalinism, the repressions. I am singling out the main point.

[Volynskiy] But this factor has already been identified, and there has long been talk of delimiting party and state functions and the impermissibility of interference by party committees in economic affairs.

[Denisov] There is talk, but there is not much action. Because people are not bold enough to think this problem through to the end—to define, once and for all, what the party is, what material production is, and what the state is, and what their relationships should be.

In our country—clearly this is traditional in Russian history—there is much confusion; everything is upside down, so you cannot make heads or tails of it. And not many people even try to, because in order to do so you have to discard the many hoary old dogmas that hang around our necks and stifle us. And in order to discard these, you have to be brave enough to be a bit of a "heretic."

Let me make a little theoretical digression at this point. From the viewpoint of large-scale social structures, an organized society—anyone, I emphasize, not only ours!—can be broken down into three systems: politics (ideology), power, and material production. They are relatively autonomous, and each has its own function.

You would think the simplest thing of all is the system of material production. It provides our daily bread, and should develop absolutely freely. That is the basic principle. But soon you will realize that this "absolute" freedom can only be ensured if it is... carefully limited. That is the dialectic.

Businessmen make their plans; that is their affair! Let them produce and manufacture whatever they like. No one should interfere in this—neither the rayon party committee [raykom] secretary, nor the executive committee [ispolkom] chairman, nor the minister. They should not interfere directly, of course. Any free businessman is, of course, subject to the system of economic incentives formulated by the state, and goes with the stream of the policy developed by the party. In this respect I agree with P. Bunich: We need a free market, and let the businessmen conduct business on their own responsibility. And the state is concerned with the competent and cautious regulation of this system.

But when P. Bunich says "the state is not social security," I cannot agree with him. The humanitarian state we want to create is indeed "social security" in the widest sense of the term. In the context of a free market, it is the noble mission of the state to "trim" taxes from the businessman, giving him incentives and at the same time protecting citizens against his excessive appetites and safeguarding social and other rights.

The state uses the funds obtained in the form of taxes in accordance with the policy formulated by the highest system of all—the party. In this context party resolutions on, for instance, extending sowing of sunflowers, alfalfa, or rape are quite unnecessary and appear laughable. The party should be at the very top of the social hierarchy, it should be the captain steering the ship into its port of destination, but instead it has found its way into the hold, into the engine room. And because of this it has largely lost its intellectual, humanitarian, and philosophical power.

What of today? At the Congress of People's Deputies, M.S. Gorbachev said that we have a concept of perestroyka. But he did not expound it. And naturally, many people decided that it does not exist in a complete, finalized form. And who should formulate it? The party, its best minds, because this is nothing less than the concept of modern socialism. But in the present state of affairs the party has no time for this. It is busy with the fulfillment of economic plans. How can you find the time for politics, for ideology, if everything is in a state of turmoil and you have to keep stopping the gaps everywhere?

[Volynskiy] There is a kind of vicious circle here, Anatoliy Alekseyevich. A major reorganization of the party apparatus was carried out recently. Departments were amalgamated, some were abolished, the number of workers was reduced by approximately one-third, so that those remaining would concern themselves not with trivia, but with the study of major problems. But take the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee [obkom]. Here many sector departments have disappeared, but the agricultural one still exists, though, true, it was renamed the agrarian department. Why did they keep it? The motive is, they say, that agricultural affairs are in such a grave state that there is no alternative at present, they cannot be left to their own devices. Once we rectify the situation then we will give the countryside complete freedom.

To be frank, I do not understand this thesis. You would think that this department and the obkom as a whole should formulate some real program for the transformation of the oblast's agriculture. But no: Exclusive reliance is still placed on large farms and enormous livestock complexes that poison the water and the soil. Why should the agrarian department not concern itself with formulating at regional level a policy that would induce farms to produce ecologically clean products? And is there any shortage of general questions that must be resolved before a single particular question can be tackled?

But I understand very well those party workers who adhere with all their might to purely production affairs. First, they lack the strength to break away. Second... one raykom secretary said to me: "If I give a state farm [sovkhoz] director freedom, tomorrow he will be selling flowers instead of milk!" Could it be true that if people are given a free hand today things will become much worse and everything will collapse?

[Denisov] Don't worry. Nothing will collapse. That director will not abandon milk production, unless he makes a loss from milk—as long as no one nudges him or stifles him with tariffs or trade discounts. There will be milk, and there will be flowers too.

But I would like to cover the problem more widely. When the leader of the party and country says that our ship—as I understand it, the economic ship—is on the rocks, one envisages that the crew will harmoniously, coordinatedly, and without panic pull the ship off the rocks and sail on. In the same ship! But today the picture is different. No coordination here! They have introduced rationing for soap; we drink tea on coupons. Our economic ship is about to go to the bottom at any moment. Is it worth clinging to the wreckage? Let us build a shiny new ship. But it is the party that should give us the "blueprints" and show political will. Unfortunately, at the congress we did not sense this firm political will. We need resolve. Instead, we have cosmetic exercises with the same old ministries—instead of 70 there will be 56. That does not change anything radically.

[Volynskiy] What is needed to reveal this political will?

[Denisov] A new impetus, to further accelerate democratization in the party itself; the recognition of the official right of communists to wide pluralism of opinions, differences of views, the right to propose alternative ways of resolving problems.

[Volynskiy] Certainly under a one-party system the party itself should be as unfettered as possible. Moreover, differences of views and pluralism have always existed in the party; they were crushed, shot, imprisoned, they kept

quiet for a time, and then they sprang to life again. But if you develop this thought further, you can arrive at the need for the existence of factions. And then the problem of the party's unity arises. After all, factionalism is a possible route to a split, isn't it?

[Denisov] The two things should not be confused. When I speak of deepening pluralism and the normal manifestation of differences in views, I am not referring to the organizational side of the matter, only the intellectual side! That is, while submitting to the decision adopted, a communist should have the right to disagree with the opinion of the majority and openly propagandize his own views because tomorrow his view could turn out to be the most reasonable. That is fundamental. All the rest follows from this, in order to overcome the crisis in the party. I am not inventing anything new here. Remember V.I. Lenin: freedom of opinion, unity of action. Every communist should have this guarantee: If he disagrees with the majority opinion, no one will accuse him of "political errors" or consign him to ostracism.

[Volynskiy] Clearly, the rejection of the old ways by communists and nonparty people played a part in the elections in Leningrad. In my view, people largely voted not against specific individuals, but against the ossified, obsolete dogmas and methods of work that are associated with those party leaders.

[Denisov] There is another factor, too: The Leningrad party leadership failed to propose revolutionary new ideas, was unable to make the intellectual breakthrough, and did not formulate a radical policy. Look at the Balts: Regional economic accountability is in the near future for them. And us? "A great city with a provincial destiny." That situation humiliates and insults the Leningraders. Nothing is proposed by way of compensation.

[Volynskiy] And a heavy burden of past mistakes remains; for instance, the construction of the dam. And now there is the fuss over the proposed construction, in conjunction with foreign firms, of a leisure complex—opposed by the vast majority of the population—at Lisiy Nos.

[Denisov] I do not entirely agree with you there. There were mistakes. But not so much on the technological plane, so to speak, as on the ideological plane. My opinion is: The dam does not harm the city! It is the lack of purification facilities that harms the city. And the Lisiy Nos situation is not quite so clear. The idea itself is extremely tempting. But no one has explained things properly to people: What kind of a complex is it; how will the city benefit? Forceful ideological preparation should have been carried out. There should have been opposition to both projects. And construction work should only have begun later, after the debates. But what happens with us is this: If the leadership want it, then the people will want it, however much fuss they make! They will be made to want it! Whether it is the dam, the Tyumen petrochemical complexes, the Katun Hydroelectric Power Station... But the people no longer want such "gifts." They want to be persuaded, to be offered a choice.

Incidentally, about the leisure complex, it looks as if Leningrad will be made to look a fool over Lisiy Nos. As soon as the American businessman who wanted to invest money in the complex heard that some of our activists had managed to turn the people of the city against the project, he wrote to N.I. Ryzhkov. He is offering to invest $10 billion in other enterprises. I have the letter. This is a real opportunity that the Leningrad leaders could make use of to demonstrate their political competence. For instance, they could think about the idea of creating a free economic zone in the region...

[Volynskiy] Our attitude to the dam and Lisiy Nos is, I admit, rather dismaying. You are coming out against the opinion of the majority of Leningraders! Are you not afraid that the voters will recall you?

[Denisov] Well, so you think I'm a dissenter. But I have never concealed my views from the voters.

[Volynskiy] Since we are talking about the majority, here are two more problems. According to sociologists' data, the majority of communists and nonparty people in our city consider it unacceptable for the posts of general secretary and Supreme Soviet chairman to be combined. Furthermore, they believe that the CPSU should categorically abandon the pursuit of its cadre policy.

[Denisov] Such proposals are a real Trojan horse. Any party, on coming to power, recommends its leader for the highest post. And if the leader is not worthy of it, what kind of a leader is he? Who else should pursue the CPSU's line in the highest organ of power?

I will say more: I am also categorically opposed to the election of the head of state by a direct ballot of the people. In this case a person receives monstrous, absolutely uncontrolled power and—given the worst possible turn of events—can do terrible things to the masses. For instance, to begin with he could dissolve the Congress of People's Deputies. But today the Congress, which elected the Supreme Soviet chairman, can also, in the event of unforgivable errors or a decline in prestige, vote him out. This is one guarantee of stability and the preservation of democracy, although Academician A. Sakharov might not like my position. In this respect, with all due respect for his opinion, I think that perhaps Andrey Dmitriyevich himself does not fully realize that in this case he holds less democratic views.

As for the party's cadre policy... abandoning it is ridiculous, nonsensical. Party cadres are a very powerful, if not the most important, instrument for implementing policy. It would be better to disband than to give up this instrument.

I am opposed, however, to the nomenklatura in its present form, which is a different matter. At the moment it is a clique, or, even worse, a kind of "dump" for the unsuccessful and the ignorant. Today you make a mess of party work, tomorrow they make you director of a major library... Of course, a cadre reserve must exist. The question is how to form it. Imagine: The bureau proposes to the party committee that it consider someone's candidacy for the post of, say, well, director of an institute or minister, it doesn't matter. And then the "dissidents" raise their voices. Who is he? Where is he from? But we have our own candidate! Rivalry springs up, there is a choice...

Movement, development—that is the only condition of the party's renewal, and it is inconceivable without a struggle between opposite extremes.

[Volynskiy] You have expressed so many surprising views today that I cannot decide: Are you "left" or "right"?

[Denisov] I have never thought about it. I am simply a communist who tries to adhere to positions of common sense.

Current Political, Economic Situation Viewed
18001432 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Jul 89 p 12

[Discussion between Yu. Polyakov—not further identified—and N. Shmelev, section chief of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, prepared and transcribed by E. Shugayeva—not further identified: "Common Sense"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Polyakov: Perhaps I am mistaken, but I cannot avoid the feeling that during the time of the Congress of People's Deputies our leaders were concerned mainly about the stability of their political power, and only after that with the reasonableness of the way of life and the well-being of the people. This instinct for self-protection of power has become keener over the seven decades of our system's existence. Remember: "Let the people be happy, happy throughout the ages; the power of Soviet authority is great!" Thus our human well-being is made dependent on the durability of political power, and yet logically it should be the other way around! Throughout the world politics is an extension of economics, but in our country economics is an extension of politics.

Shmelev: Perhaps, yes, it is possible to say that the instinct for self-protection of power prevails over everything else. But the conditions for self-protection themselves have changed. For example, there is not a single problem having to do with our national future that can be solved by force—neither international problems having to with our security nor the problem of technical progress nor social problems. It is possible to lower the standard of living to a certain level, but that is all for the time being. We do not live on a desert island, and the comparative effect, the natural looking around at our neighbors, and the awareness of how poorly we are living cannot be suppressed by force. Today human life, democratic life has become a condition for self-protection of power. And in this connection I would single out three groups of the largest problems: political reform, interethnic relations, and our economic condition.

I see obvious progress in the political area. Although it may not be complete, a process of democratization has begun—right down to the lowest level, throughout the entire political structure. The apparatus was not ready for such a turn of events as occurred in the spring in the elections, and our bureaucracy was not ready either. And to be honest, I was afraid that they would find some way to halt the democratization. Fortunately, this did not happen. I consider it a concession to the forces of the apparatus that the lower-level elections, to other soviets—from republic right down to village—were put off for half a year. But, on the other hand, half a year is not much. Of course, it seems to me, this is the result of some kind of compromise, but an acceptable compromise if we are not to be extremists.

The second largest problem has to do with our interethnic relations. Perhaps I shall seem to be a bit too much of an optimist, but I would be more likely to count the explosion of the Fergana events not in the area of ethnic relations, but in the area of the fight, using the new policy, against organized crime and the mafia. I do not have all the figures, but I have the feeling that the explosion in Fergana was organized by the mafia, which had been offended and was really showing its teeth for the first time: This is what will happen if you continue to provoke us.

Perhaps this is only my own personal viewpoint, but still, since the congress there has been a strengthening of the positions of common sense in ethnic relations, compromise, and a search for a combination of the interests of the majority and the minority. For while our authorities turned their backs on such problems as the problem of the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars, and the Kurds, Turks, and other peoples, still the congress insisted that these problems must be solved. And those working proposals toward which the congress responded very favorably—concerning maximum expansion of the autonomy of the republics, the fact that small and medium-sized ethnic groups must also be given autonomy, just as the republics are—this was all a constructive working process, and I think the plenum on ethnic issues will move forward rather than backward because there simply can be no backward movement.

Polyakov: Now the plenum will begin and the plenum will judge us! The plenum will see for itself that we have a mass of problems in interethnic relations...

Shmelev: But we must think up a strategy somewhere and there must be some kind of general staff that generates and develops the concept... The name does not matter. It does not have to be the plenum, it could be—I do not know—the council of elders of the Soviet Union, if you wish, with the enlistment of young people in the role of experts.

So I would be cautious about the ethnic relations issue, but I would say there has been progress. But I am frightened by the third problem—our economic condition.

Polyakov: Here I honestly admit my lack of professionalism... I am among those rank-and-file consumers who, when considering problems of the economy, use not scientific terminology, but rather the strong word of the people. My view is—philistine...

Shmelev: I wish to note that for me the philistine view is the healthiest view, and I think that we shall develop this subject...

Polyakov: From the abundance of words about visions of our country's future that have been expressed recently, including at the congress, I have tried to squeeze out the essence for myself: What should change in our economy and how can these changes even partially deliver us from our total deficit, which is at risk of becoming as much of a national attribute as the Kremlin, the Siberian cold, Caucasian hospitality, and so forth? Perhaps I have a sluggish imagination, but I do not see anything new about the current moment. And more and more frequently I think about the deficit as a concealed instrument for controlling the society. The promise of the command-administrative system to deal with the deficit sounds approximately the same as the promise of the policeman to reinforce public order by handing out personal weapons. This is why, incidentally, people have been so cautious about your ideas...

Shmelev: Well, I would probably reject the title of a creator of ideas. And this is not coquetry; this is the result of long reflections on my own capabilities, on what I can and cannot do. I consider myself to be a person with deeply conservative convictions, and in my entire life I do not recall a single new idea that has sprung into my head. If my judgments have an element of innovation, it is only according to the principle that what is new is always something old that has been well forgotten.

And nothing I have managed to reflect in my literary works and my articles on economics goes beyond ordinary everyday common sense or contains any especially complicated theories. Perhaps I am even lowering the heights of the human spirit because I am more interested in that which can be useful and reliable in everyday life. I am very much afraid of "great ideas," for in the history of mankind nothing has ever come of them but blood and misfortune. And certain positive results have been derived from the garden variety of common sense. At least it is easier for people to live with common sense and so-called middle-class morality—it is a shame that it has not taken root in our country—than with "great and inspiring" ideas.

I wrote somewhere and I wish to repeat that people cannot wear chains for long; this is not their duty. All the great ideas are for people who like to play those games. It is important to have an ordinary human life and an ordinary human world.

I fully agree with Academician Moiseyev who thinks that there is no longer any point in thinking more than 20 years into the future, that human brains are too weak to guess where life may take us. But the next 20 years are the horizon about which we must think, and we can at least figure out how to get by.

And here, perhaps, I should add to what I managed to say at the congress—nothing. This is perhaps the only thing in my defense: People complain that I am not interested in long-range prospects and concepts. But the fact is that there is one general concept of where we should be going; it was developed as early as the twenties; it was discussed in the fifties and sixties; and now we are saying approximately the same thing. This is the concept of society that Lenin sensed at the very beginning, after the sobering up period began in 1921. He discarded several ideas that lay at the basis of the NEP [New Economic Plan], he did not manage to develop them, and after that, life, unfortunately, turned in a different direction, but they were the same ideas and methods through which social compromise can be achieved and the forces of society, instead of being suppressed, can be allowed to work creatively. I do not believe in our national suicide and I know that your generation, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, and perhaps ours, too, will find something acceptable. We are not a damned nation. What are we: God's most unhappy, most unfortunate people or something? This is also wrong.

But our immediate future frightens me very much. I am afraid that in the economy we shall have to go through an agonizing crisis that will impede our forward movement, above all in the area of economics and inevitably in other areas as well, including politics. I do not believe in turning around and going backward; even as a farce and not a tragedy history will not be likely to repeat itself. But we shall come to a halt, fall down, and lie in a dead faint for a certain amount of time before we begin to move on. This is what I fear.

At this point it seems to me that we are in a condition where the best moral medicine is a full shelf in a store. People are so exhausted by the struggle for existence, the struggle for everything they need, by poverty, by the wall around them within which excessive efforts must be made on all that is elementary in life, that this cannot but generate malice, disorderliness, dishonesty, and hostility

toward one's neighbor. Of course, full shelves in the stores will not cure all of our country's diseases, but they will cure the most critical, the ugliest ones.

And here I agree with you: I have the same kind of dissatisfaction with the economic decisions of the congress that you have. That is, I would say this: Everyone sees and understands the problems now—both the leadership and the congress as a whole, and also a considerable part of the population understands. But still they must choose: Should we undertake resolute attempts to cope with these problems or continue to mark time for a little while longer and be satisfied with palliative measures? But life is developing so rapidly that I will not be surprised, for instance, if in the fall session the government again proposes a budget with a deficit and the congress suddenly says: "No. Enough." This would have been impossible a year ago. But here again I am speaking about hopes, although I am a realist.

Polyakov: Democratization that is not reinforced by positive changes in the economy is a very insidious tactic: By opposing physical bread to spiritual bread, they have deprived the people of both. Of course, under Brezhnev academician Sakharov was in exile, but still there were no ration cards for sugar. So, friends, you can see for yourself which is better...

Shmelev: So do you support my idea that the main medicine now, in this stage, both of morality and our social condition, is full shelves in the stores?

Polyakov: Of course I can attribute this idea to you, but believe me, any normal person thinks about this and you are simply gathering these attitudes together. But, to be honest, I am bothered by the way today's leaders dismiss plans that are proposed for improving the society.

I shall try to explain using examples from history. In my view, blind faith in the Chosen People contributed largely to the fall of the house of Romanov. You see, they could not raise their hands against the anointed sovereign... The heart stops beating from its own audacity, but does it not seem to you, Nikolay Petrovich, that belief in the Chosen Party keeps some people from taking a sober look at reality today? For all this has already happened... Stolypin, whose tomb in the Kiev-Pecherskaya Monastery was leveled to the ground, came with a powerful idea of economic renewal of the state and was destroyed by the combined efforts of the extreme right and the extreme left. The former did not want to let go of a single one of their privileges and as a result lost everything along with their heads. The latter saw in economic stability a threat to their social models... And as a result, at that same Congress of People's Deputies one constantly heard formulated by different speakers the favorite idea of Petr Arkadyevich about the greatness of the shock and the great power....

Shmelev: I feel very positive toward Stolypin. A historian would probably tell you that you are oversimplifying, but your judgments are quite acceptable to me. Stolypin was the country's hope, and he began a fruitful process. The situation now is similar to a certain degree. Forgive me for extreme statements, but I have been saying for a long time, although this is nothing new, that serfdom returned after 1929. It has continued for three generations. We are now just beginning to let go of the reins, but is it so terrible that the peasant remains? This is a very painful issue. Kolkhoz chairmen, and among them are the wisest leaders, have essentially the psychology of advocates of serfdom as well. Even in the remarkable appeal from the agrarian workers to the congress one could see that the land would not be given to the peasants if they wanted it as a holding [na otruba]. From a cynical point of view, one must listen to them, but in many places it is probably not worth distributing the land, and the people would not accept it for various reasons. But as concerns our long-suffering Central Russia where the kolkhoz peasant idea has already been compromised so much, here I do not see any way out—and I have written about this—other than to return the land to the peasants (there should be a right of holding [otruba]) and to organize small production cooperatives and a production cooperative movement in general.

How many people will accept the land is a topic for another discussion, but if one out of 10 families in a village accepted the land, then in terms of productivity this would mean maintaining the level of current production, and if two families accepted the land this would be a large leap forward. Here again the analogy with Stolypin is very much to the point.

Since foreign economics is my specialty, I always compare. I recently visited China. In economics they are smarter and more successful than we are. And they are also more flexible than we are. In any case, they launched the reform much more successfully. Perhaps their first advantage over us is that they did not begin to make excessively complicated predictions about what kind of society awaited them; they simply began with the rural areas, with the elementary task of feeding the people and filling the domestic market. And then when there is already—excuse my shop talk—a balance of supply and demand, and perhaps the supply is even a little greater than the demand, then they will go on.

Polyakov: A desire on the part of one of the political forces to monopolize the renewal of the society is nothing new. At one time this led to a conflict between the socialist parties, the civil war, and all that followed. As a result, they began to construct the new society in a peasant country under the leadership of the party of the working class. You know, I myself write on questionnaires that I am "from workers," but no one has ever explained to me precisely why it is the proletariat that is the leading class. Let us say that in the times of Marx and Lenin a proletarian stood at a machine or some kind of

motorized steam hammer that was supposed to embody scientific and technical progress. But if one follows this logic, today the vanguard of society should be atomic energy engineers, but somehow we do not want to... And in general the very argument about which class is the "leading" one is all the same camouflaged argument about power over the people. A good deal was said at the congress about the monopoly of the producer, and less was said about the monopoly of the authorities....

Shmelev: I have not so much an objection as a comment. Theoretically, of course, the multiparty system is better than the single-party system. History has proved this irrefutably: For a balance of interests, compromise, accounting for various segments and various interests, of course, it is better to have more than one party. But our life has developed the way it is. And, to be honest, at this time I do not see any real alternative. None has grown up out of social life yet. The entire spectrum of alternatives lies within the same framework in which our single party exists. I cannot consider the alternative of the boys from the Democratic Union, the meaning of whose speeches can essentially be reduced to the demand: "Give us the Winter Palace back!" But if we give it back, who will take it?

I do not rule out the possibility that some time in the future there could be more than one party, but they would be on a minor basis and would not have grown organically out of what we have now. If someone could anticipate, sniff out, feel out what would happen and where this would lead, some realistic structure according to which the country could proceed... I do not rule out the possibility that this could appear. But now I do not see it. This is also probably a sign of my conservatism, but it is also both being realistic and having common sense...

Polyakov: I agree, but it seems to me that we must be prepared for the fact that with the appearance of new groups of population such as cooperators and farmers, there will also appear political organizations to protect their interests. Organizations might even appear that will express the interests of the higher nomenklatura—the present-day gentry...

Shmelev: That is possible in principle, but it is also possible to have a variant where the ruling party manifests more and more flexibility and absorbs and imbibes the interests of all, and there will be one wing to protect the interests of the cooperators and peasants and another to protect the interests of those same bureaucrats whom we all dislike.

I should also like to ask you this, Yuriy Mikhaylovich. For example, I do not like the very statement of the question of the need for a special law on youth. What kind of special problem does youth have?

Polyakov: A little about the history of the problem. The Komsomol, using communists as an example, during the first years after the revolution dealt decisively with the alternative youth movement and became the ruling youth party. Then, in keeping with the Stalinization of society, it was transformed into the Ministry of Youth Affairs and served in this capacity for many years as a stable link in the command-administrative system. This is not a denunciation: It would be ridiculous to think that in a totalitarian society there could be an independent youth organization. Such things do not happen. To reproach the Komsomol for the past would be just as absurd as to blame a person from the Stone Age for not using iron weapons. Naturally, with the crisis of the command-administrative system, the authority of the Komsomol was undermined as well. And there is nothing bad about the fact that now the Komsomol wants to regain its lost authority among youth. But how? There is the tried method borrowed from our glorious past: We must again show concern for that part of the society in whose support we are interested. The law on youth became the banner for this special concern. But if a society with a deficit adopts a law on youth that gives it certain special benefits and rights, a chain reaction begins: Laws will be adopted for disabled people, housewives, and single mothers... And these laws will begin to compete with one another because there still will not be enough to go around, and instead of an abundance for everyone we will have merely an abundance of benefits that are not backed up by material goods.

And another longstanding tendency bothers me very much: Supposedly in order for everyone to live better, some people will have to make do with less. And the number of those who had to make do with less steadily increased, and there were fewer and fewer of those who could live well in Rus. They cut back the landowners and the capitalists, and it did not help; the kulaks and the middle-class peasants, and things got much worse; they tried to cut back everyone all at once, and they suddenly remembered... And now again in the statements of certain deputies at the congress we have begun to hear about this same "cutting back" with respect to those same cooperators, scientists, or "the Moscow delegation"....

Shmelev: As for the cooperators—this is really some kind of self-destruction and it makes me very angry. Everyone shouts all at once: Things are bad, something must be done! Well do it! No, they want to change everything and not change anything! This is the self-destructive approach: "I shall cut off my nose to spite my face." But only children can say this. They have pestered us: scum, scum. But there is already enough scum in the state stores as it is! But this is scum we are used to, legitimate scum.

Of coure there is scum. Of course, in the front ranks go those who are most despairing and most enterprising. They include the scoundrels who do not care what they

grab on to, where they get theirs, but the decent person has also begun to move along this same path; but no, there is indiscriminate hatred for him.

I do not know what ordeals, unhappiness, and failures we still have to go through. No one can guess this. The way out of the serious situation—moral, social, economic, and political—into which we have driven ourselves cannot be easy. And it will not be easy. And it cannot be quick. It will be a project for generations.

I could express a few simple ideas; they are banal, but nonetheless they lie at the basis of any healthy human communal living situation.

Of these simple ideas I would single out the first: God save us from any bloodshed. Not a single problem on earth was ever resolved by bloodshed; bloodshed has always generated many more problems than it has solved. It does not matter why the blood was shed.

In the outbursts of nationalism one can see looming large not only the legal clarification of relations among them, but also, say, the desire of certain people with extreme views to emerge and separate themselves. I do not see any possibility without wild excesses of solving this problem, say, in the Baltic republics of Latvia and Estonia where half or almost half of the population speak a different language. If one takes into account the interests of this half, which has no desire to pull up its roots, will there be bloodshed? And my appeal to both sides is to find a compromise; it will ultimately be more useful to everyone than an attempt to straighten out relations by force. When it is necessary to protect oneself from a hostile foreign attack, it is a sacred cause. I insist on my right not to believe in the death penalty, but I also understand the 80 percent of the people in our country who think that we should keep the death penalty. But this is an individual case. I fear the roots that lie beneath such a pretext. And in this sense I am a compromiser; I am willing to concede any positions as long as there is no bloodshed. Although, to be honest, I would not like to concede any of the positions we have gained recently.

The second point: What is socioeconomic life based on? There is little mystery here if one relies on ordinary common sense and considers viable only that which is useful and effective, regardless of ideological nuances. Nowadays it is not very fashionable to quote such a serious person as Deng Xiaoping, for instance, but was he not right when he referred us to the ancient wisdom: "It does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice"?

The same is true with respect to moral problems: We are all looking for something and we are all complicating the matter. No matter how long the human race continues, there has never been anything stronger than the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, at least in the history of industrialized nations. It is possible to develop and interpret these, but no one has ever thought of anything stronger. Of course, this is an ideal that is only partially attainable, but in daily life it is a useful human ethic that is very precisely formulated. And it will be enough if the generations following us will take advantage of it in their moral orientation.

Roy Medvedev Discusses Outlook for Gorbachev

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[Interview with historian Roy Medvedev by Giulietto Chiesa in Moscow; date of interview not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[passage omitted]

[Chiesa] First, a question to the historian of Stalinism just a few days before the 50th anniversary of a sad date. Are the "secret protocols" attached to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which have been found authentic? I am referring to the one dated 23 August 1939 which assigned Latvia and Estonia to the Soviet sphere of influence and Lithuania to the German sphere of influence; and the subsequent one dated 28 September which, after the German conquest of Poland, also transferred Lithuania to the Soviet sphere.

[Medvedev] I have always considered that the secret protocols were indeed signed. I also wrote about them in my book on Stalin. Despite the fact that the originals were never found there is much indirect evidence which confirms their existence. The whole behavior of the Soviet and German governments was consistent with their content. The German troops halted at a certain line, the Soviets troops advanced into Polish territory to another line, and the USSR suddenly exerted pressure on the Baltic countries to sign friendship and mutual assistance agreements. In short, it was "exporting the revolution." Eventually, the war against Finland began. Germany watched all that completely calmly. This proves that secret agreements existed.

[Chiesa] The German originals were destroyed on Ribbentrop's orders, but Karl Von Loesch, who was responsible for the operation, microfilmed them. The microfilm was found on 14 May 1945 in Thuringia. But the Soviet side ought also to have originals. What happened to them?

[Medvedev] I am sure that they were destroyed on Stalin's orders without anybody copying them. Nobody would have dared to do such a thing. Control in the USSR was much stricter than in Germany. Hitler had an internal opposition, Stalin did not.

[Chiesa] Might there not be eye-witnesses?

[Medvedev] No. The negotiations were top secret. Only Stalin and Molotov took part in them. The other Politburo members were kept in the dark about this and other essential facts. An exception may have been made for Beriya for what we might call official reasons. But Stalin

was perfectly well aware that information was the key to power and even Molotov was often kept in the dark about essential information.

[Chiesa] The USSR's Congress has set up a special commission to establish the truth about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Gorbachev revealed that he has asked Chancellor Kohl to allow Soviet experts to examine the German archives. This is a sign that the Soviet president realized the need to wipe out this "stain" a long time ago.

[Medvedev] Gorbachev realized the seriousness of the problem just 1 ½ years ago when the people's movement in the three Baltic republics became so strong. One of the demands was to publish all the secret agreements with Hitler. The majority of the population in the Baltic republics does not want secession from the USSR, but they want to know the truth about their history and, above all, they no longer want to hear stories about their republics' "voluntary association" with the Soviet Union. It was an act of occupation, of outright annexation. Recognizing this now does not necessarily mean prompting those republics to leave the Union. We have long since recognized that we conquered Azerbaijan in the war against Persia, and that we took part of Poland and Finland. But in the Baltic Republics, this aspect has become a painful problem for the whole national awareness, because annexation was followed by forcible collectivization, imposed industrialization, mass deportations, and executions. For all the Baltic republics annexation is inseparable from this context. The Soviet Government now has no choice but to admit the historical truth. The Congress commission headed by Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, has already reached the conclusion that the secret protocols existed and that their content corresponds to that of the microfilms already published in the West.

[Chiesa] Does this mean that the Commission has worked solely from Western data?

[Medvedev] Not exclusively. In the Baltic region there is a vast literature—very accurate articles and historical research—on the annexation and the subsequent events. There are accurate studies which tell of Moscow's pressures on Latvia and Estonia, of the forced "Sovietization" measures. There are tens of thousands of pages which cannot be disregarded.

[Chiesa] And yet, a few days ago PRAVDA published the photographs and texts of the documents of the governments of the time as if it was still trying to make people believe that the Baltic republics' adhesion to the USSR was legitimate and voluntary.

[Medvedev] It is a strange decision which confirms the existence of a struggle within the party Central Committee. Those documents are totally meaningless. Many leaders of the Baltic communist parties were imprisoned in Moscow, some were released and placed at the head of their organizations to represent the "free association with the USSR." But their mere publication is significant: There are political circles in Moscow which fear that recognition of the historical truth will produce an increase in nationalist tensions in the Baltic region.

[Chiesa] I would like to return to your previous statement on the fact that the Baltic populations do not want secession from the USSR. Frankly, it strikes me that there are large numbers of people who, contrary to what you say, want to leave. The line followed by the local party leadership and by the leaders of the people's fronts, who are trying to control these leanings, are a different matter. But the fact remains that the risk exists. Recognizing that annexation took place might placate some people but stir up others....

[Medvedev] That is true. Many people want to leave a crisis-ridden USSR. But many are realistic. Complete secession would involve enormous problems for those economies. Whether you like it or not, integration with the rest of the USSR permeates all the economic structures. That is why, for the time being, local leaders are trying to secure as much economic independence as possible within the USSR framework. Moreover, the USSR Supreme Soviet has given way on many essential questions, even going against the existing Constitution: For instance the stipulation that a USSR law can only come into force in a Baltic republic after it has been approved by the republican Supreme Soviet. The USSR's existing Constitution does not recognize private property which Estonia and Latvia have already introduced. The plan for "republican self-management" is also in clear conflict with the USSR Constitution. But all this can be handled in political terms. It is only if the conservative forces took power in Moscow that the separatist leanings would gain the upper hand. But that, in turn, would produce a new military occupation. I think that, from this viewpoint, the Baltic republics are objectively exerting strong pressure for the democratization of the Soviet Union as a whole.

[Chiesa] A question for the former dissident. In 1984 you still had KGB policemen outside the door of your house. You are now a deputy of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. And, on several occasions, you have intervened to give open support to Gorbachev, even in polemics with the "radical reformers." Why?

[Medvedev] I certainly support Gorbachev, even if I do not support him on everything. I have never been a "left-wing radical" not even when I was a dissident. Let us say that I represented a "loyal opposition." And my ideas have not changed. However, the state's policy has changed. My books are now published in the USSR—the same books that were once published in the West. As regards my practical behavior in the Supreme Soviet, it stems from a basic political assessment: The country's situation is not stable. I support Gorbachev because I think he needs that support. But I am still an independent scholar. I am not opposed to the creation of an opposition group, provided it does not endanger our

democracy, which is still fragile. Rash decisions can prompt a strong reaction from the right. On the other hand, I do not see the necessary caution in Yeltsin, in Yuriy Afanasyev, or in Sakharov. Moreover, I really do not like the name "left-wing radicals." Does the Italian Communist Party [PCI] regard itself as a left-wing radical party? I think that the term "progressive" is more appropriate. The term radical is very ambiguous: It is possible to be radical on the right too. The term left-wing delimits the possibilities of alliances. In short, I see their activities as vague and that there are dangerous personal ambitions in the group. That is why I am not participating in it. For instance, they have requested the convocation of a new extraordinary congress in September, but this is likely to cast doubt on the whole political framework. They want to approve the changes to the electoral law and the Constitution in 2 days. They can convene it because they have one fifth of the deputies, but that does not mean that the Congress will approve Yeltsin's program. In short, in some conditions they can play a positive role, but I would not like them to take power because they would not know how to exercise it. The only force that can lead the country today is Gorbachev's group.

[Chiesa] There is no doubt that your position pleases Gorbachev and Lukyanov. I think that Gorbachev only argued with you once at the Congress when you said that there are people in the Politburo who organize "underhand blows" every time the number one leaves Moscow.

[Medvedev] There is no doubt about that. Lukyanov told me, a former dissident, that he has complete faith in my action. I am well aware that they could not entrust such delicate tasks as that of the Uzbek mafia to party officials. They would be discredited from the outset. However, Gorbachev has argued with me more than once. He cannot publicly admit that there are divisions in the Politburo, although everybody knows that they exist. He is a realistic politician and has to maneuver.

[Chiesa] In short, he has treated you in the same way as Leonid Abalkin. At the 19th party congress, he criticized him for supporting the need for a multiparty system, and 1 year later he appointed him deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

[Medvedev] He can be flexible. It is therefore possible to disagree with him without making an enemy of him.

[Chiesa] Let us return to the opposition. I attended the constituent meeting and listened to very realistic and serious speeches in addition to others which certainly seemed to be of a different nature. For instance, the one made by Gavriil Popov and the one made by Academician Bogomolov were very different from the one made by Yeltsin, which itself was anything but idle talk.

[Medvedev] With regard to Yeltsin, I must say that he has important qualities: He knows how to talk to people, he tackles thorny questions, he is a professional politician, and he is very popular. He says that he has abandoned privileges, and that may be true, but every day I see him going home in the official chayka to which he is entitled as a Central Committee member. At the congress he came to talk with me and win me over several times. And I was able to see that he has a very limited general education. I do not think that he can seriously aspire to become head of state. He lacks the historical, economic, and legal bases. He needs advisers and uses them, but I must say that they are not the best. He has essentially remained what he was—a regional committee first secretary, an administrator. One day he telephoned me to ask me for information about Yakov Sverdlov. He was secretary of Sverdlovsk for 10 years and he does not know who Sverdlov was. Perhaps his voters want to change the city's name in view of the fact that Sverdlov committed many crimes during the civil war. I am sure that he knows nothing about foreign policy and does not know what difference there is between the PCI and the French Communist Party. As Sverdlovsk first secretary, he did not need to know. Yuriy Afanasyev is of a different caliber and has an entirely different program. Of course, he is not nearly as popular as Yeltsin. Even many deputies confuse him with PRAVDA editor Viktor Afanasyev.

[Chiesa] What do you think Yeltsin's ambitions are?

[Medvedev] He is thinking of political power, and he is saying so openly. The creation of the parliamentary opposition confirms that.

[Chiesa] As an alternative to Gorbachev?

[Medvedev] For the time being as an alternative to the party general secretary. Yeltsin does not intend to create another party, because he knows that he would immediately lose many opportunities. But he may not realize that the parliamentary opposition which he is creating is not just a "faction" in the conventional sense, it is already the embryo of a party, with organizational elements, and its own press organ. However, another fact is also obvious: It contains very different positions and a split, or even more than one is already looming. As I have already said, their program is not realistic.

[Chiesa] You have already said that the country's situation is not stable and that Gorbachev needs support. Do you share the fears of Sakharov and others about the possibility of a military coup or possibly of Gorbachev being overthrown by the more extreme conservatives?

[Medvedev] Sakharov is not a politician. I think that there is only one possibility of a change of direction and that is if Gorbachev himself is forced by circumstances to toughen the regime. I have spoken with General Moiseyev, the chief of general staff, with KGB Chairman

Kryuchkov, and with Defense Minister Yazov. We discussed political questions, but I understood that they all support Gorbachev, primarily because they realize that without him the country could not be governed and that a military dictatorship is absolutely impracticable. I therefore think that, if the chaos were to exceed a specific danger level, Gorbachev himself might be forced to adopt emergency measures, for instance the dissolution of parliament and the creation of a crisis committee. For the time being, this is an abstract hypothesis. But, if it happened, Gorbachev would head it with the aim of preventing the reversal of restructuring while waiting to resume it and develop it further. It would be a strange coup to defend the democratization process.

[Chiesa] I fear that it would be very difficult to take up where he had left off "later...."

[Medvedev] There is no doubt about that. It would be difficult for everybody, for me too and for him.... We are at a point at which nobody can foresee how events will develop.

[Chiesa] Finally, a question to the chairman of the Gdlyan commission. I realize that there is a problem of secrecy. But a concealed struggle is in progress and the stakes are very high. You had to reply in strong terms to PRAVDA which was continuing to publish accusations against Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, the two special investigators, who are now your colleagues in the Congress. How long will it take you to get to the bottom of this? Has the commission had all the vital information for drawing its own conclusions?

[Medvedev] It will take time, at least 2 years. We do not want to reduce the questions to the subject of the Uzbek mafia and its links with Moscow, as Gdlyan would like to do. We—the commission members are generally in agreement with me on this point—think that our task is a comprehensive review of the judicial system and the public order bodies in the USSR. The state prosecutor has agreed to let us see all the documents requested. Following my protest to the Supreme Soviet regarding the fact that the party control commission had not yet given us the necessary documents (and it is 2 months since our commission was set up) we received those too. At the Congress, Gorbachev announced that the Central Committee is preparing around 90 Central Committee and Politburo documents. However, we are requesting the minutes of the Politburo meetings because we are well aware that the replacement of a republic's first secretary, like Usmankhodzhayev for instance, was discussed at that level, as were many others in the "Gdlyan case" when party Central Committee members, regional first secretaries, and Uzbek republic government leaders were called into question and arrested. Gorbachev has assured us that we will have those documents.

[Chiesa] So, you have not yet had them?

[Medvedev] Not yet. The KGB has also given an assurance that it will provide the necessary documentation. In short, the commission has enough strength to obtain what it needs.

[Chiesa] Does the commission comprise really independent people?

[Medvedev] Only I and the writer Suleymenov are really independent. The others are all, to a greater or lesser extent, subject to possible pressures, they are officials of the interior ministry and the KGB, they are officials of the prosecutor's office, and so forth. But I must add that even the two representatives from the Baltic region are not open to influence. It is just that they adopt a narrowly judicical viewpoint and do not fully understand the overall situation. For instance, they say: If guilt is proven, we must immediately ask for a criminal process to be started. And I think that we need to assess the political consequences. There are pressures on us from many sides. There are Gdlyan's supporters who are pressing for a rapid conclusion. And there are the Uzbek deputies who accuse us of sympathizing with Gdlyan.

[Chiesa] I have doubts about the latter's sincerity. If there is anything with is irrefutable, it is the level of corruption in that republic. The deputies cannot fail to know that.

[Medvedev] That is true, but it is an Asian republic where this is a tradition rather than a crime. In addition to that, there is the population's passive acceptance. You cannot sympathize with them, but you must understand them. The very fact that it was impossible to find local investigators capable of carrying out the investigation shows how deeply rooted the situation was.

[Chiesa] Yes, but Gdlyan maintains that they only put a monkey wrench in the works when he began to follow the mafia network from Tashkent to Moscow.

[Medvedev] That is also true. And it confirms that the state prosecutor is not independent and is subject to pressures from the party organs. Gdlyan tried to break that rule and was defeated. But Gdlyan also broke the law to a large extent, he tortured suspects, he exerted illegal pressures, he violated the procedural rules. The prosecutor's office knew that, and did not touch him until a certain point. This is another confirmation of the arbitrary system which demonstrates that the whole Soviet judicial system is virtually the same as it was in Stalin's day. It is the party which lays down the law to the upholders of the law.

[Chiesa] It all comes down to the same root: Article 6 of the Constitution on the "party's leadership role" in society. This will be the focal point of the battle for constitutional reform. What do you think of it?

[Medvedev] When the present Constitution was adopted, I wrote (in the Western press) that it perpetuated a freak of law. I still think that. It will not be possible to suddenly remove Article 6. But in the country's new Constitution—it will take 1 or possibly 2 years—this article will no longer exist. I am convinced of that.

Interethnic Roundtable Submits Plenum Proposals

PM1207085789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Perestroyka and Interethnic Relations"]

[Text] The "roundtable" at the CPSU Central Committee's Marxism-Leninism Institute ended yesterday with the formulation of general recommendations and proposals for the upcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum. For 3 days scientists and party, soviet, and All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League personnel from the country's union and autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs discussed theoretical and practical questions relating to sociopolitical problems of interethnic relations.

The participants in the "roundtable" focused their main attention on questions of improving the national-state structure, the reasons for and nature of interethnic conflicts and the means of resolving them, and problems of interethnic contradictions among young people. Moreover, themes of the influence of religion on national relations and the role and place of book publishing were also within the scientists' purview.

The speakers upheld their viewpoint and vision of the way of solving particular problems in a democratic, heated, and sometimes sharply polemical fashion. Many stressed the need to conduct an in-depth scientific analysis of the entire system of contradictions which have accumulated in recent decades and which were hushed up for a long time and the need to analyze Leninist practice of the leadership of a multinational country from current restructuring standpoints. Mention was also made of the importance of the constructive proposals and thoughts currently expected of theoretical scientists and practical specialists prior to the CPSU Central Committee plenum in the interests of elaborating a contemporary concept of the renewal of nationalities policy.

"Of course, today's dialogue between scientists and specialists will not solve all the existing problems in interethnic relations, but no one expected hasty scientific solutions to this complex mass of contradictions," Doctor of Philosophy E. Bagramov, chief of a CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute sector, told a TASS correspondent. "But this 'roundtable' meeting must not be underestimated. I am sure that it will have contributed to elaborating a scientific concept of nationalities policy. A very important point is that this is perhaps the first time that scientists have tried to make an overall analysis of contradictions in the system of interethnic relations."

Notwithstanding the diversity of opinions voiced at the "roundtable," the main thing—a desire to revive the ideals of social and national equality and justice born of October and restore the Leninist principles of the voluntary union of the USSR's peoples—could be clearly seen.

Cooperatives Blamed for Depleting State Cadres

PM2507095789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Jul 89 Second Edition p 3

[Letter from N. Kuzoro, shop chief of the "Barrikada" association in Volgograd: " 'Refugees'...From Plants: Is It Only Cooperative Members Who Are To Blame for Cadre Workers Leaving Enterprises?"]

[Text] I have been a subscriber to PRAVDA for more than 30 years. I have never written letters or complaints. But the circumstances which have taken shape increasingly push me toward the idea of taking up my pen. You yourselves call upon party and economic leaders to express their opinion in the newspaper on perestroyka's progress.

I have been working for 39 years at the "Barrikada" production association in the cold stamping shop. I worked as a foreman, a senior foreman, and deputy shop chief. For the last 22 years I have been working as shop chief. Before 1973 our shop was lagging behind, it was constantly in turmoil. But when a number of major technical and organizational measures were taken, things improved. This made it possible to progress from being a laggard enterprise to being one of the association's front-ranking collectives. A great deal of attention in our country is being devoted to workers' working and living conditions. This provided an opportunity to stabilize cadres and eliminate high turnover. Before February this year we did not have any cadre problems. In exchange for people who were retiring we took on young people who were disciplined and industrious. We had the choice.

As of March the situation changed. There was a continuous stream of resignation applications. Highly qualified workers, who had worked in the shop for 10-15 years and who should replace those who are retiring in a couple of years, are leaving.

The mainstream of workers is going to cooperatives. The wage at cooperatives is significantly higher than at state enterprises. Although in our country for the first 6 months of the year the worker's average wage jumped from R265 to R296, nonetheless more than 1,000 people left the association in 6 months alone, and the stream of applications continued to grow. If this epidemic continues, then such giants in the machine building industry as our plant will be on the rocks.

After the publication of the resolution on setting up cooperatives we imagined that this was directed at supplementing the workforce from among pensioners, teenagers, and housewives. But by no means to the detriment of state enterprises' work. Now the picture is different. Huge production buildings and premises crammed with expensive equipment stand idle on account of the absence of workers. It is a pity that hundreds of workers are rushing to the cooperatives in pursuit of huge wages.

Article 39 of the Soviet Constitution says that the exercising by citizens' of their rights and freedoms should not harm the interests of society and the state. The present cooperatives, in my view, still bring no great benefits, but they have already inflicted moral damage. And it is difficult to imagine the material harm they will inflict on the economy. I beg party and soviet organs to examine the cooperative question.

Cooperatives have contributed to the rise in the number of parasites. Look at what is happening at the kolkhoz markets: Instead of selling agricultural products, people are speculating in industrial goods. Exploiting our authorities' permissiveness and the humanity of the laws, many citizens have ignored their conscience and lost all sense of decency.

We are moving away from the administrative-edict management of the national economy, but we still have not arrived at economic levers of management. Take the housing question. Many industrial enterprises have their own housing stock which they operate, repair, and fit out, they build new housing every year and spend on this tens of millions of rubles earned by the workers and engineering and technical personnel of this specific enterprise. Some 30 percent of this housing is at executive committees' disposal, while 70 percent is given to enterprise workers and pensioners. The plant has more than enough housing on its books to supply all the plant workers even if it operates a three-shift system. Whereas now many shops cannot make up even a first shift.

I think that for the economic levers of national economic management to start operating properly, what is needed is not half measures but a comprehensive solution covering all spheres of our life and activity.

[Signed] N. Kuzoro, shop chief of the "Barrikada" association and honored machine builder of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic,
Volgograd.

Law on Measures To Improve Pensions, Welfare

18001483 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[USSR Law: "On Immediate Measures for Improving Pension Support and Social Service for the Population"]

[Text] In implementing the decisions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies concerning immediate measures for improving pension support for veterans of war and labor, disabled persons, and families of deceased military servicemen and introducing uniform conditions for pension support for workers, employees, and kolkhoz [collective farm] members, and also for improving social services for these categories of citizens, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby decrees:

Article 1. To increase the minimum amounts of pensions set by the USSR laws "On State Pensions" and "On Pensions and Stipends for Kolkhoz Members":

for old age—to 79 rubles per month;

for disability group I—to 85 rubles, and group II—to 70 rubles per month;

for loss of breadwinners for parents and wives of military servicemen who have died as a result of injury, trauma, or mutilation sustained while defending the USSR or performing other duties in military service, or as a result of diseases related to their being at the front—to 60 rubles per month.

Article 2. Until the new USSR law on pension support for workers goes into effect, to assign and pay pensions to kolkhoz members and their families under the policy and conditions established by the USSR law "On State Pensions" for workers, employees, and their families. Here the earnings of kolkhoz members used for calculating the amounts of their pensions are to be determined according to the rules that are in effect for them.

The time of work on kolkhozes before the present law goes into effect is to be included in the work tenure that grants the right to a pension according to the USSR law "On State Pensions."

Article 3. To establish that for disabled military servicemen who have become disabled as a result of injuries, trauma, or mutilation sustained when performing military service duties or as a result of illness related to being at the front old-age pensions are to be increased by 15 rubles a month without being restricted to the established maximum amounts of old-age pensions.

Article 4. To pay old-age pensions to pensioners working as workers or foremen and also disability pensions to disabled persons in the full amount without taking into account the earnings (income) they receive.

Article 5. To establish that participants in the Great Patriotic War are to receive prescribed medicines free of charge.

Article 6. To grant to participants in the Great Patriotic War and also persons awarded orders and medals of the USSR for self-sacrificing labor and irreproachable military service in the rear during the years of the Great Patriotic War the right to free travel on all kinds of urban

passenger transportation (except taxis) and general purpose automotive transportation (except taxis) in rural areas (within the administrative rayon of the place of residence) under a policy determined by the councils of ministers of the union republics.

Article 7. To extend to the parents and wives of military servicemen who have died as a result of injuries, trauma, or mutilation sustained during protection of the USSR or when performing other military service duties, or as a result of illness related to being at the front, benefits established for participants in the Great Patriotic War who were military servicemen.

Article 8. To increase the amounts of the monthly state stipends for people disabled since childhood: for disabled persons of group I—to 70 rubles, group II—to 50 rubles, and disabled children under 16 years of age—to 70 rubles per month.

Article 9. For financing expenses related to the adoption of the present law, to increase differentially by an amount of up to 30 percent the contributions for state social insurance paid by enterprises, institutions, and organizations except social organizations of disabled persons and pensioners and their enterprises, institutions, associations, and educational institutions.

To increase from 300 to 600 rubles a year the payment for labor resources pertaining to workers of the management apparatus and to introduce this payment for cooperatives and enterprises of other social organizations of disabled persons and pensioners and their enterprises, institutions, associations, and educational institutions.

The rates of contributions for state social insurance and the amounts of payments for labor resources are to be increased beginning 1 January 1990 without changing the economic normatives set for the current five-year plan for enterprises, associations, and organizations.

Article 10. To introduce measures stipulated by articles 1-3 and 5-7 of the present law by 1 October 1989, and by articles 4 and 8, by 1 January 1990.

Article 11. To instruct the USSR Council of Ministers to submit within 3 months to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals to make in existing legislation the changes and additions that ensue from the present law.

Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet M. Gorbachev

Moscow, Kremlin

1 August 1898

Nikonov Visits Drought-Stricken Chelyabinsk

LD1208175289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 12 Aug 89

[TASS correspondents' report from Chelyabinsk]

[Text] Cereals have managed to grow only a couple of inches in the fields of the southern Urals. The ears have withered before ripening; even weeds can scarcely be seen—they have died at the root, as they say. These are the results of the drought, which for the 3d year is making it impossible to grow even the slightest decent harvest here. The five to seven quintals per hectare which they are still counting on in Chelyabinsk Oblast will hardly be able to rectify the severe situation of the local agrarian sector. People on the farms are hoping for assistance from the state, and it will come, undoubtedly. However, they themselves are not sitting around idly. This was noted by comrade Nikonov, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who was in the oblast from 10 to 12 August.

After visiting grain fields and feed plantations and acquainting himself with the scale of the disaster which has affected crop farmers here, he stressed the importance of leasing and of other progressive form of organizing and stimulating labor and pointed out the necessity of the earliest possible practical introduction of effective technologies and drought-resistent varieties of food and feed crops—above all, of corn.

This is being done in Sosnovskiy Rayon, for example, where some farms, having established fruitful cooperation with scientists from the Kurgan Scientific Research Institute for Grain Farming and assimilated the highly effective Kurgan system of corn cultivation, have managed to make the fullest use of the production potential of the land and to avoid large losses, even in this year's extreme conditions. At the training farm of the Chelyabinsk Institute for the Mechanization and Electrification of Agriculture, for example, they are currently calculating that they will obtain no less than 50 to 60 quintals of feed units from each hectare, almost twice as much as on plantations where corn has been sown with traditional technology. In Sosnovskiy Rayon they believe that the 2,500 hectares of corn being cultivated there with technology elaborated in the Kurgan production science system will enable them to prevent a drop in the productivity of cows and a reduction in the weight gain of cattle being fattened.

There are also other places in the oblast where people have managed to confront the extreme weather conditions with non-standard solutions. In conversations with machine-operators specialists and organizers of production, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee repeatedly stressed the importance of a modern scientific approach to economic land management. Unfortunately, a lot is wrong with Chelyabinsk in this very department. A low culture of crop farming and lax handling of technology have exacerbated the negative effects of the

drought even further and sharply reduced the opportunities for replenishing food resources. Therefore the shops are not well-stocked. The summer is ending, and vegetables in the oblast center are a rarity. And bad weather is not to blame. Inability to organize properly the bringing in of the harvest: That is the reason why, for example, a considerable proportion of the cucumber crop is not being brought in from the fields in time, is not reaching the shops, and is losing its quality and being used to feed cattle.

On 12 August, an oblast party committee [obkom] plenum was held with Comrade Nikonov participating. The plenum participants spoke with concern of the worsening problems in industrial and agricultural production and ecology and of the social tension associated with shortages of food and consumer goods. It was noted that the obkom has repeatedly taken encouraging decisions on this subject, but many of them have remained on paper. Last year for example, the people of Chelyabinsk were going to reconstruct and build a number of processing industry enterprises, which would have made it possible to reduce, already in the present season, losses of meat, milk, and vegetables. This would have supplemented food resources. But the planned program is being implemented very slowly. The oblast's agroindustrial units have not been able to change the situation for the better. There has also been sharp criticism of the obkom officials and its first secretary, Comrade Shvyrev. The plenum granted his request to be released from his duties as first secretary and member of the bureau of the obkom.

The search for a leader capable of heading the oblast party organization at such a crucial period was conducted on this occasion in this instance in a nonstandard way: at expanded sessions of the bureaus of the rayon and city party committees and obkom, and at conferences of the party aktiv, 13 candidates were put forward, including party and local soviet officials and managers of major enterprises. In the course of discussion at the obkom plenum three candidates were listed on a secret ballot. As a result of the vote, Comrade Litovshchenko, former second secretary, was elected first secretary of Chelyabinsk Obkom.

During his visit to the oblast, Comrade Nikonov met the secretaries of city and rayon party committees, and the party committee secretaries and managers of industrial enterprises and farms. At the shops of the tube-rolling works, he had a conversation with workers. At the training farm of the Institute of Mechanization and Electrification of Agriculture, there was a discussion about the results of the cooperation between scientists and farmers. The CPSU Central Committee secretary spoke at a conference of oblast leaders from the party and local soviet and economic bodies on issues concerning the agroindustrial complex.

Radioactivity in Ukraine's Zhitomir Oblast Noted

18220185 Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by TRUD correspondent S. Prokopchuk: "'Strict Regime' Villages"]

[Text] **At the edge of the village, a red-and white "zebra" of the gates obstructed our path. Beyond it lay "the zone." It is not safe there, the radiation level is elevated. The militia master sergeant, who is paid a double salary and given additional leave for work on rotating shifts under such conditions, acted strictly in keeping with his instructions: "I cannot let you through. This is not authorized."**

The gates separated two villages, a former village and an existing one, Novoye Sharno and Nozdrishche. The former was evacuated immediately after the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Station] as a "dirty" one. The latter, in which, as it was argued, they can live without harming their health, will soon be relocated to the "clean" areas of Zhitomir Oblast.

Nozdrishche is situated 60 kilometers away from the Chernobyl AES. This is one of the 69 villages of Narodichskiy Rayon within the zone of "strict control," and one of 41 villages in which the level of contamination exceeds 15 curies per square kilometers and which have been fully switched to the "clean foodstuffs" supply. That is, everything is brought in, beginning with milk and meat and through vegetables and fruit. It is not advisable to eat what grows in local gardens because the level of radioactive contamination has been exceeded.

Over 3,000 persons live in 12 local villages located mainly along the river Uzh. A move is in store for them, despite the fact that about 8 million rubles has been invested in the social and cultural facilities in these localities over the years following the accident at the AES. The future evacuees wonder: Why has the money been spent? Why has the move been postponed for so long? Were the Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology] and the USSR Minzdrav [Ministry of Health] unaware of the degree of contamination of a number of villages of Narodichskiy Rayon by cesium-137? It stands at 40 curies per square kilometer.

Deputy Chairman of the oblast ispolkom [executive committee] G. Gotovchits, who is also the chairman of the oblast emergency commission, explained to me:

"The topic of permanent evacuation of at first three, and then of the remaining nine villages came up only late last year. At the time, the USSR Minzdrav adopted long-range criteria of permissible accumulated doses of radiation exposure by the populace—35 rem in 70 years. Naturally, we approached the government...

Let us recall: In the initial days after the accident, only seven villages of Zhitomir Oblast were evacuated, and this was forced by the potent concentration of iodine-131. At the time, they did not pay much attention to

cesium and strontium. At present, the locals doubt it: Did they not deliberately keep silent about it in order not to aggravate the already hot situation? The learned people could not but know that both the cesium and the strontium would make their presence known.

It is understandable that in these most difficult days of April and May 1986 all attention was focused on Pripyat and Chernobyl. However, as soon as the next spring the emergency commission of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Kiev and Zhitomir Oblast ispolkoms had a detailed map of radioactive contamination of the northern areas of Ukrainian Polesye. The map noted the villages and fields in which the concentration of cesium-137, a health hazard, exceeded 40 to 100 curies. Even then it was clear: In these places, life and permanent work by humans are inadmissible, especially in the villages of Yasen and Shevchenkovo of Polesskiy Rayon in Kiev Oblast and in Malye Minki, Shishelovka, Velikiye Kleshchi, and Polesskoye of Narodichskiy Rayon in Zhitomir Oblast. Meanwhile, people live there to this day.

Unfortunately, at the time the desire to belittle the scope of the tragedy got the upper hand in both Kiev and Moscow, because legitimate demands to be resettled could have snowballed, primarily from the almost 200 Belorussian villages in Mogilev and Gomel Oblasts. Dozens of emerging problems were frightening: Where are they to be resettled? What funds should be used for financing and paying compensation? One more thing: In the field, they were afraid that, given a massive outflow of labor, a number of administrative and territorial units, that is, rayons, may have to be liquidated with their considerable management apparatus...

Apparently, this was not the last thought on their mind at the Zhitomir Oblast Ispolkom when they, together with the party raykom [rayon committee], insisted on evacuating four Narodichskiy Rayon villages right after the accident, but "only within the confines" of the area clearly affected by radiation. The physicians objected to such administrative patriotism, but their opinion was ignored. So what? At present, the village of Malye Kleshchi is again looking at resettlement, and into the bargain away from the recently settled new homes, into which the state has invested over half a million of rubles. Who is going to make up the money?

Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology Yu. Izrael asserts that "the first **complete** (emphasis mine—S. Prokopchuk) map of the immediate trace (up to 100 kilometers from the location of the accident) was given to the government commission by the USSR Goskomgidromet as soon as 2 May 1986. Certainly, they knew about it in the affected oblasts. However, the map was not released in keeping with the recommendations of the government commission and the USSR Minzdrav letter "to classify the data on the level of radioactive contamination in individual localities exceeding admissible levels," "to classify the data on the incidence of disease," "to classify the data on the results of treatment." As it were, the oblast headquarters of civil defense and the oblast leadership knew without the map as well that on 27 through 29 April 1986 the level of gamma-radiation in the yard of the local rayon ispolkom exceeded... 1 roentgen per hour. Let me explain: This is 20 times above the level at which immediate evacuation is in order!

"It is primarily the first days after the accidents that concern our mothers, especially those whose children were born in 1986," observes V. Budko, first secretary of the Narodichskiy Raykom of the party. We believe that families in which the children have been sick often and have repeatedly undergone treatment, including at the Kiev Radiology Center, should be given an opportunity to select a place of residence outside the rayon."

In an appeal adopted at a recent meeting in Narodichi, the toilers of the rayon make a number of other demands as well: to bring in clean foodstuffs to all villages and to introduce subsidies for all residents for purchasing them; to extend leaves with a view to a more efficient curative treatment; to increase benefits to retirees not employed and to the handicapped; to allocate extra funds for free meals at pre-school facilities. After all, it is obvious that it is impossible to ensure meals with a high calorie and vitamin content with the 87 kopecks allocated for three meals a day in day care centers. In the opinion of V. Ponomarenko, head of the Zhitomir Oblast Department of Health and Yu. Sipenko, deputy minister of health of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the reasons for more frequent cases of anemia and cataracts among the local children, their excessive tiredness, sleepiness, and dizziness are found in both this inferior nutrition and heightened ionizing radiation...

Therefore, we again encounter what many believe to be one of the main "justifications" for the present situation—money, or more precisely, the lack thereof.

The shortage of funds is exactly the justification for the tactics of half-truths about the degree of danger posed by the radioactive contamination of Ukrainian and Belorussian Polesye, the "teaspoon," which the Council of Ministers of the republic adhered to until recently with regard to the residents of Zhitomir Oblast. The government resolved on a monthly basis the issue of establishing a bonus on top of the rates of remuneration (salaries) increased by up to 25 percent for work in the areas where the level of cesium contamination exceeded 15 curies. The September (1986) instruction of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers listed 45 localities of Zhitomir Oblast, whereas the one for this year listed as many as... 103.

However, is there a guarantee that tomorrow still more such villages will not be officially acknowledged in Zhitomir Oblast? For how long will the desire or opportunity to "coax" the funds for the victims in this oblast restrict the truth about the conditions of life in its northern rayons?

"You cannot save on the health of people," said Chief Radiologist of the USSR Minzdrav R. Turayev.

The poet Boris Oleynik put forth the same idea at the Congress of People's Deputies; he demanded that the government find the funds and opportunities for the urgent permanent evacuation of population from the zones with a harsh radioactive situation.

Listening to the speech of Boris Ilyich, I thought: Why are these issues being raised by a writer? Is this not because the main defender of the toilers, the trade unions, is silent? I mean primarily the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions, and the Zhitomir and Kiev Oblsovprofs [oblast trade union councils]. After all, they did not go beyond what is called superficial measures—restoration of health of the populace, mainly children, residing in the zone of strict control. Apparently, this requires neither courage nor struggle.

"Every oblast organ has its own function. We have been instructed to handle the issues of curative treatment, so we handle them..." responded to the rebuke V. Parenyuk, chairman of the Zhitomir Oblsovprof.

Is this unprincipled position of the trade unions part of the explanation for the plan to permanently evacuate a part of villages with "a harsh radiation regime" in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] as late as 1989 through 1993?

Please note: The process is spread out over 5 years... Maybe, the funds and materials needed should be secured right now in order to "compress" the period of moving to, say, 2 years? After all, thousands of people have already received quite a dose of radiation.

V. Marin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Fuel and Energy Complex, told me without a shadow of concern "This is not necessary. We still have time."

There is time? For whom? Could it be that Vladimir Vasilyevich is not aware of the biological consequences of the effect of small ionizing doses on the organism? In that event, he should, perhaps, take the eighth volume of the BSE [Great Soviet Encyclopedia]. In it, there are lines on page 392 which were, of course, written long before the trouble at Chernobyl: "Given the protracted daily impact of doses between 0.02 and 0.05 rem, initial changes in blood are registered, and that of doses of 0.11 rem—the formation of tumors." Around Narodichi, there already are villages which have come very close to the admissible limit? Moreover, toward the end of next year, the inhabitants of many villages, including in Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts, will have accumulated between 13 and 24 rem, and the dose of their radiation exposure will already amount to between 30 and 80 percent of the norm allowed for 70 years of life...

This summer, schoolchildren from Narodichskiy, Ovruchskiy, Luginskiy, and other rayons of Zhitomir Oblast, and of Polesskiy and Ivankovskiy Rayons of Kiev Oblast have gone for the third time to receive curative treatment at the pioneer camps, preventive treatment facilities, and recreation centers of industrial enterprises and organizations of southern and western areas of the republic—more than 20,000 of them, plus mothers with little children, that is, several thousand more. This means that an equal number of children of machine builders and miners, weavers and chemical industry employees will not get to their resorts yet again.

"This cannot last forever, can it?" observed Secretary of the Zhitomir Oblsovprof V. Kroshko.

In Zhitomir, they are ready to build several pioneer camps in the southern part of the oblast for children from the areas of strict control. In the fall and winter season, the camps could double as treatment facilities for adults. They understand that restoring the health of children and the general populace will take more than a year or couple years. However, thus far they have not received businesslike, vigorous support from either their oblast ispolkom or the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions for which it is simpler to pass down to the field an allocation schedule: where and from whom to "borrow" yet again the slots for the "Chernobyl people" and yet again demand "tactfulness" from the managers of enterprises and their trade union committees.

Of course, additional funds and quotas for contract and construction and assembly work are needed for special-purpose construction. Maybe, the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions will, after all, handle this following the recent AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] resolution "On Additional Measures for Improving the Organization of Curative Treatment of Toilers and Members of Their Families From Areas Adjacent to the Zone of the Chernobyl AES?"

After a tight turn, our plane turned to the northeast. Chernobyl is underneath. I cling to the window. I can see well the deserted villages, green rectangles and squares of abandoned fields and gardens, and mighty tracts of forests dotted by numerous burial sites looking like yellow pock-marks. By now, there are about 600 of them in the basically no-man's zone. Over 3.5 million tons of various radioactive wastes were hastily buried, including 100,000 tons of metal—machines and equipment... Their proximity to this also concerns very much the residents of Ukrainian and Belorussian Polesye and Bryansk Oblast.

What is going to happen to these burial sites? After all, it is still unknown whether the "zone" will be given to the Minatomenergo [Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and Industry] and other departments for research work on the new methods of decontamination and agricultural work in a radioactive environment, or whether they will

succeed in "dumping" it on the republic as a "reservation." Could it be that a plant is indeed required which would help in putting these burial sites in order and process their dangerous content?

At present, technical feasibility studies for it are in preparation. What is going to happen to this enterprise later, once it has used up all the buried "dirt" in the 30-kilometer zone? Where is the stuff to be put which remains after processing the burial sites? Are the defenders of the toilers, the trade unions, concerned with this? Are they going to participate in discussing the design of the new plant together with the population of the Ukraine and other interested regions?

I concluded from my conversations at the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions that over there they have not yet asked themselves this question and are in no hurry to assume the functions which are "not theirs." This is a pity, because there is no guarantee that the ministries will not restrict themselves to half-measures in this case as well with the tacit consent of the trade unions.

Prosecutors Told To Step Up Fight Against Crime

PM2507103189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jul 89 Second Edition p 8

[A Chernenko report: "A Time for Action. At the USSR Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] For the first time in my memory the head of a leading law enforcement system—in this case USSR Prosecutor General A.Ya. Sukharev—has described the developing crime rate situation as critical....

The very fact that the collegium session was attended by V.M. Chebrikov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; A.S. Pavlov, chief of the CPSU Central Committee State Law Department; G.V. Kolbin, chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee; V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs; Ye.A. Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court; F.D. Bobkov, first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB; Yu.T. Matveyev, USSR chief arbitrator; and leaders of other ministries and departments indicates that the quest for answers to a number of questions concerning law and order is becoming complex.

"The prosecutor's office is having no discernible impact on the struggle against red tape and negligence and the covering up of crimes," A.Ya. Sukharev said at the conference. It could be added that sometimes there is no obvious impact even on clearing up certain purely criminal cases which deep down have an ethnic tinge.

Today the "sphere of action" of the USSR Prosecutor's Office is relatively clearly defined. The most sensitive areas in the criminal sphere were also defined at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the first Supreme Soviet session. The main thing now is to overcome the inertia of stagnation, the wait-and-see attitude, and procrastination. It is time to move on from stating facts to taking vigorous action, relying on the assistance of the public and on the professionalism and competence of our colleagues in the law enforcement system.

Aims, Composition of Jurists' Union Assailed

PM0707092189 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 89 p 1

[Article by Candidate of Juridical Sciences L. Nikitinskiy under the "Regular Daily Spot" rubric: "Distorted Face of the Law: Constituent Congress of Union of Jurists Held"]

[Text] Virtually everyone agreed that in principle such a union was necessary: investigators, defense attorneys, the temperamental Armenian delegates who left the hall after the Sumgait prosecutor had been elected to one of the commissions, and the markedly restrained representatives from the Baltic. Thus it only remains for us to applaud and express the hope that the union created on Friday [23 June] will revive the former prestige of jurists and succeed in improving the material and living conditions of justice workers.

This minimum program is quite within the capabilities of the new social organization. Today, however, when we are facing the task of building a rule-of-law state in the USSR, people should strive for more. They should want to take part in an organization of jurists capable of molding public opinion in the country, of giving a well informed comment during the discussion of draft laws, and of independently initiating important legislation.

Think how impressive it would sound: "The Union of Jurists against the death penalty." Or conversely: "The Union of Jurists for the death penalty." But the form in which this union was born will not allow it to elaborate a considered stand on any serious political issue. That became clear even at the congress, when the delegates in the hall howled down the representative of the USSR Union of Defense Attorneys.

In the eyes of some housewives, defense attorneys are unprincipled hirelings of the mafia who protect wrongdoers in court. If a defense attorney had been whistled down in the Red Corner of a housing operation office I wouldn't be at all surprised. But those at the meeting in the Hall of Columns were supposed to be jurists....

In his report to the congress, M.P. Vyshinskiy, USSR deputy justice minister, declared that the country has more than 500,000 workers engaged in juridical activity. In that case we are among the world leaders in terms of jurists per head of the population. However, 3 weeks earlier A.I. Lukyanov informed the Congress of USSR People's Deputies that the country has 217,000 jurists and that there is a disastrous shortage of them.

The numerical discrepancy of more than 100 percent is due to the following distinction: A.I. Lukyanov was talking about jurists with the relevant training, whereas A.M. Vyshinskiy was talking about "people engaged in juridical activity." A fundamental difference: For example, a law faculty spends at least 5 years dinning presumption of innocence into people whereas some militia inspectors sometimes perceive presumption of innocence as nothing more than an annoying obstacle to their work.

To me personally as a scientist the term "juridical activity" is completely unknown. There is the concept of "law enforcement activity," but if you regard a jurist as anyone who engages in any official duties of this kind, a bus inspector is undoubtedly a "jurist."

According to a report in SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA, the organizing committee of the future Union of Jurists worked on the basis that 45 percent of jurists in the USSR are workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] system, who were given 25 percent of the seats at the congress. I don't want to offend them in any way but this is no longer a Union of Jurists but a union of militiamen—an organization which also undoubtedly has a right to exist but has utterly different aims and statutes. Holding virtually one-half of the union's membership cards, workers of the MVD and the KGB will simply swallow up the representatives of the other professional groups. In the chorus of public opinion the voice of the MVD will be passed off as the voice of all jurists.

I have come to know my colleagues quite well in meeting with jurists in the most diverse posts and in the most diverse situations. And I would venture to state that there is a diploma in the subject of "jurisprudence" but that there is no profession of "jurist." Among the possessors of juridical education diplomas you meet people of the most varied and incompatible views and convictions dependent to a considerable extent on professional custom.

Cooperation and peace among jurists must be based on the understanding that in the integrated process of strengthening legality everyone has a role to play, and those roles often conflict, but if silence descends here and debate ends then everyone should be ready to be locked up. The Union of Jurists could promote mutual respect among colleagues from different professional groups and enhance their general prestige only not in the form in which it has been created. Given the rigid structure of the old-fashioned conception of "democratic" centralism, there is a danger that decisions will be made by the mechanical pressure of the majority on the minority.

To create a real union it is necessary to begin by designating clearly defined positions, and only then can these positions be coordinated. At the Ministry of Justice they have forgotten the punishment that befell the presumptuous builders of the Tower of Babel, who began talking in many tongues and ceased to understand one another.

It is no coincidence therefore that the representatives of the USSR Union of Defense Attorneys and the delegates from the Baltic republics' juridical associations created earlier clearly intimated that they refuse to join the USSR Union of Jurists on the basis of collective membership. In their opinion this can only be a union of independent and equal associations of certificated specialists working in different parts of the country and in different professional groups.

What we are seeing is a whole series of so-called social organizations created in response to orders from above which wither and shrivel in conditions of true democracy. But no command today can breathe life into these unnatural freaks, which are defective by virtue of the manner of their birth.

Of course, I am not calling for the disbandment of the newly created Union of Jurists of the USSR, which in itself was an important achievement on the part of our cowed legal community. The first step is the hardest. If the aim of the creation of the union is to found a YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA or to build a House of the Jurist which served decent food I would join like a shot. But if the USSR Ministry of Justice's scheme is based on the desire to monopolize the legal community's right to the expression of free opinion it will not succeed in today's conditions of glasnost.

Internal Service Officials' Competence Questioned

18001463 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by O. Galustyan, major general of the internal service, candidate of jurisprudence: "Professionals and Apparatchiks in Today's Militia Work: Who Is Needed More?"]

[Text] We have begun to speak openly about the state of crime; starting this year, glasnost has come to even this sphere, closed for decades. And the world has not come to an end. But on the other hand, the ruin of the former system of secrecy was clearly shown when even scientists—lawyers, sociologists—fed only crumbs of information, were denied the opportunity to analyze the causes, prognosticate, assist in the adoption of well-grounded resolutions, or warn of crises. The voice of departmental science was barely audible; what could it do, isolated from the world and accustomed to obediently "saluting"?

The crime situation and measures for combating it are now being widely discussed. But God spare us unconditional acceptance of ideas usually expressed in appeals such as "it's time to use power." Using power is not a very cunning matter. The folk saying about this goes,

where there's might there's no need for brains. Power without competence is capable of turning into a destructive force, something of which we, unfortunately, have been convinced on more than one occasion.

And now, about purely professional matters. I will speak a bit on who is making decisions. Over 40 percent of the ministers of internal affairs of the union republics and autonomous republics, the chiefs of the UVD [Internal Affairs Administrations] of the kray and oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] internal affairs departments, of transportation and several other categories of leaders and deputies of the so-called MVD [USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs] nomenklatura and their deputies are not educated in law. These are people with the diplomas of engineers, pedagogues, economists, and commodities experts with party-political education. How is it that cadres without education in law and special training get into managerial positions in the internal affairs organs? This is most likely a rhetorical question, as everybody knows how: These are, as a rule, leading officials of the party and soviet apparatus.

Here are several recent appointments from chiefs of transportation and communications departments of the Communist Party Central Committee of union republics to republic ministers of internal affairs. The first secretary of the party gorkom [city committee] becomes the minister of internal affairs of an autonomous republic. The deputy chief of the obkom's [oblast committee] agriculture and food industry department becomes deputy minister of an autonomous republic; the oblispolkom deputy chairman becomes chief of the oblast UVD... And during the past decade, the situation reached the point where of the 14 MVD's of the union republics (the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Republic] does not have its own MVD), 10 were headed by party officials. Naturally, not professionals. The leadership of a significant number of kray and oblast UVD's was also entrusted to nonspecialists...

I will say right away that it is not a matter of dissent in principle with such appointments. More than one former party official has become a specialist, a professional, but only when he went over to the militia as a conscious choice, and if he had been seeking militia work for a long time; best of all, his whole life long.

Alas, with the reduction in the apparatus of administration, the stream of party officials to the internal affairs organs on all levels has become even more intense. And the perception emerges that some are simply being sent there "for the pension," as the length of service in party work, for example, is counted in full toward service as an officer. And it seems as if the newly turned-out wearer of the unaccustomed uniform with the big stars has served all his lifetime, and will immediately have everything he requires for his service pension. I do not know how to explain the presence of such swift "coming into one's own" next to professionals who receive their titles and epaulets by law, by the rules, by years of labor. Apparently precise order is needed here, openness in such issues.

I foresee the issue of Minister V. Bakatin, a non-lawyer and former obkom party secretrary, in light of the discourse on competence, professionalism, and practice of formation of the organs' commanding body. This matter has already been broached by journalists. I will also try to express my opinion. It would not be a bad thing to see a man with the appropriate education in a ministerial post. However, it is quite clear that such a leader, associated with all areas of the department's public life, must at the same time be a wide-ranging politician, be able to determine the ideology of law enforcement activity, be capable of foreseeing the sociopolitical consequences of law enforcement measures. How can it be otherwise? Incidentally, in view of psychological reasons, professionals do not always possess such qualities. And if it comes to choosing between the professional and the politician, keeping in mind this government post, then the politician should undoubtedly have priority. Apparently it is not in vain that the practical Americans prefer to have a civilian in the post of secretary of defense.

During V. Bakatin's ministerial confirmation by the USSR Supreme Soviet, my thoughts were corroborated once again by this process. A delegate who spoke during the discussions said: "There was a jurist Vyshinskiy in our life, and you know what we got." I could cite even a closer departmental example. In the not-too-distant past, the MVD experienced what it means to have a purely professional minister, V. Fedorchuk. During his time, headquarters were destroyed, centers of operational readiness and coordination for the work of all services; now-restored subdivisions for preventive measures were eliminated. Even the name was banned. A secrecy system was instituted to an incredible extent; suspicion, informing, and fear of the chiefs were cultivated. Any minor offense was grounds for dismissal, even the appearance of offense! And the result was that after V. Fedorchuk's departure, 2,000 groundlessly dismissed workers were restored to their positions.

Thus, education in and of itself is, of course, no guarantee of state wisdom. Nonetheless, we must speak of competence as a required condition for appointment to a position of command in the MVD. Yes, first and foremost, a political leader must be at the head of the multibranch union ministry which resolves a multitude of social problems; managing the practical apparatus of the territorial internal affairs organs, the transportation subdivision, and the corrective-labor institutions should nevertheless fall to the professional.

Why should experienced specialists and militia cadres remain in secondary and tertiary roles? Could it be that there simply are none? There are! Every year over 200 men come from the walls of the USSR MVD Academy,

the specialized administrative institution of higher education for leadership training. However, unanticipated problems arise with their distribution. It turns out that on the scene, they are not very eager for the educated "newcomers"; the local leaders are sometimes not at all enticed by their administrative qualifications, and the work station they cover is at times even less significant than the one they had before entering the academy. To say nothing of the "home-grown" professionals...

The apparatus, which holds in its hands the thread of personnel policy, prefers to nominate its own functionaries to leadership posts; it has cultivated such a practice for years. I recall one such time-wasting letter: "We request that you process for the position..." Nothing better reflects the essence than the very formulation of the "request": the view of the MVD personnel service and its officials as processors of appointments already made, the confident habit of not encountering any refusal.

"Their own" leaders, even incompetent ones, are more advantageous to the apparatus because they maintain the opportunity to command: Rarely will one of their nominees be disobedient. And the dependence here is interesting: The professionally weaker the leader, the more eagerly those he has set up will fulfill his will. Why? Because, he knows that in particular, they will defend him; if the need arises, they will petition for a title. Incidentally, such leaders are awarded titles incredibly quickly. But these do not confer more competence upon the possessor. What I said earlier has nothing to do with the rejection of the party leadership by the law enforcement organs. On the contrary, the militia needs concerned leadership and constant support now more than ever. We are speaking of a faulty personnel practice which produces nonprofessionals.

The incompetent leader usually cannot tolerate the "bright" professionals; he has other concerns, such as making accounts look favorable and reporting well "to the top." Such leaders arrange to bustle about the secondary issues, creating an illusion of furious activity. They usually cover their own failures with showy exactingness and pseudo principles, thinking neither about the heart of the matter nor people's fates.

It reaches the absurd. Until recently a ban was still in effect against militia associates purchasing on credit, or driving a car with power of attorney rather than ownership. Thus economic "overgrowth" was combated, and the purity of the militia ranks promoted. A militia school instructor was penalized for driving the car allocated by social security organs to his invalid father, so he must have violated the ban!

Such an attitude toward cadres exacerbates the erosion of the professional core of the militia. Now, for example, every other worker in criminal investigation, the leading service, is a novice at his job, having worked there less than 3 years. Only 46 percent of the detectives have the appropriate education. One out of nine investigators lacks any higher education in law. Is it really no surprise that the militia proves to be helpless in complicated situations? The unprofessionalism of the defenders of law and order comes around full circle as a tragedy for many citizens.

We have tried to save the cadre situation umpteen times by all sorts of particularized personnel requisitions. I will allow myself to assert that we will not achieve the desired result in this manner.

The roots of the practice of staffing militia with peasants and workers goes back to the early years of Soviet power when the class principle of cadre selection was strictly maintained. Something similar is still put forth now. But thinking clearly, it is hard to suppose that qualified industrial workers, work-toughened people, will go into the militia: They have enough to do at the enterprises. And it is probably not to the country's advantage while it is resolving major economic problems. In the meantime, I see in the mass requisitions by appeal and initiatives as something echoing the long-ago campaigns of "the 30,000" and "the 25,000," which all the same did not elevate agriculture. Now we understand that economic matters cannot be resolved through cavalry attacks. I assure you that the result is the same in the militia, more precisely, in the area of law enforcement.

On the other hand, people's expectations for "personnel requisitions" dampen the personnel apparatus of the internal affairs organs, and to a certain extent take away their responsibility. Here it is probably necessary to take other, more fundamental, long-term and systemic measures. Cheap justice costs society dearly. I say that it is possible, that the very content and psychology of personnel work in the internal affairs organs must change. After all, a person may feel uncomfortable with a salary increase if his initiative is not supported, if the results of his labor are not valued, if his dignity is not taken into consideration.

And here the issue of the work of the personnel apparatus of the MVD and UVD unavoidably arises. As a rule, they are headed by precisely such former functionaries of disparate levels; in the republics and oblasts, these are the majority. Of all possible methods of studying people, they prefer the dossier. And the convictions of a distantly related aunt can be enough to block a capable, qualified youth's path to working in the militia. I am not exaggerating much. For example, in the personnel apparatus, as the devil fears incense, they fear an affirmative response to the inquiry as to "relatives abroad."

I am not calling for a reduction in the requirements for admission to work in the internal affairs organs; however, I am firmly convinced that the determining factor here must be the person's professional qualities and possibilities, and not the presence or absence of divorces or even convictions among relatives. I can remind the

zealots of dossier purity of a well-known historical fact: The talented leader, the "king" of the French investigative police, (Vidok), was a convict in his youth. The opening of general education schools with a legal orientation may help with cadres if adolescents' callings can already be determined while still on the school bench. Their graduates will get into the law faculties, into the MVD educational institutions (only the staffing system of the latter must be changed), and they will fill the cadres of the internal affairs organs. But it must be added that the main thing is to change the "status" of the USSR MVD in the population's eyes. Alas, today new cadres are not flocking to the militia ranks. The discussion of remuneration for this complex work has already taken place on all levels. But I think that it is not just a matter of money. We are accustomed to always fighting against something, and we need to fight FOR more often—FOR man, FOR his interests and rights, defending them against criminal encroachments. Then service in the militia will become prestigious, then new forces will flow into it. Without such openness and striving toward a close connection with the population, increased competence and professionalism, it is impossible to resolve either the external or internal problems of the life and operations of the USSR MVD.

Freedom of Information 'Important' Civil Right
18001433 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 27 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by T. Menshikova, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA's deputy editor for the Communist Indoctrination Department: "What the People Know..."]

[Text] There is a story from the sphere of the oral tradition associated with Stalin. The galley of PRAVDA was always delivered to the Kremlin every morning without fail; it would be carefully checked by the leader. Someone in his retinue once inquired, "Iosip Vissarionovich, why do you need that, when you already know everything without it?" Stalin answered, "Yes, but I want to know what the people know..."

This "fatherly concern" for the state of knowledge of fellow citizens shows a most characteristic peculiarity of our political tradition—the division of information into genuine intelligence, the property of only a narrow circle of individuals, and information that can be presented to the people. Its doses have changed during various eras, but the dosage principle has remained immutable. This is why our restructuring began with the confirmation of "glasnost," even though glasnost itself hardly symbolizes complete freedom of information, rather, a struggle for it. Today we see just how irreconcilably various positions clash on precisely this point of our political existence.

After all, it is obvious that a society closed to precise information generates its own informal net by way of rumors, and a stereotype of informational mistrust arises in response to the dosing. Let us say, for example, that it is hardly uncharacteristic to react to a report on a catastrophe, the number of victims, by saying that they are hiding something again... The people's attempt to overcome the information vacuum has generated in our country a unique system of unofficial, shadow notification, which moves thousands of people to throw themselves at store counters in search of, well, for example, salt or matches.

The fairly painstaking analysis at a recent Supreme Soviet session of the information situation surrounding the Chernobyl accident, and the polemic between our premier and deputies from the Ukraine elicited in me the thought that it is not only a matter of the fact that in extraordinary circumstances the longstanding inertia of silence is at work, but that we have not yet outlived the fear of speaking to the people in time and completely, for we cannot imagine the reaction. The crisis in trust, whether here it is between workers and administration, or there between the obkom [oblast committee] and communists, is to no small extent the consequence of the chronic information crisis, the mistrust of the "dosed" word.

The reproach "Why do you heed the screamers, where is their evidence?" is often heard. Why are such dubious facts in circulation? But isn't this a boomerang, a reflection of this information culture that has been created and fostered when, for example, a person can be stigmatized without a single one of his books being read or his words heard? Social consciousness resists such political ethics. It preserves the details of many events in their true light, undistorted by propaganda. People remember the events in Novocherkassk, and in Tbilisi in 1956... They could say a great deal about what was not written up in the papers. In their own way, even anecdotes filled some informational niches and voids in official interpretations, and even in exaggerated form they manifested the true sense of things. The ordinary consciousness creates its own myths in response to the official ones, only the equation is reversed. They also include payment for the lack of informational freedom.

In its day the conclusion that information is a state matter had been very useful. It was resorted to primarily when there was a need to suppress zealous journalists. However, such an approach shows how the interests of the public and the state, the person and the power, the benefit of one and the other fail to mesh. Thus arose the truth "for people" and the truth stamped "for official use [FOU]." This selection acted more cleanly than any sort of censorship. To this day there are brochures stamped "FOU" containing, incidentally, nothing that cannot now be discussed publicly. The result is easy to examine—social responsibility for information is being replaced by responsibility to the apparatus, and even to responsibility to two or three individuals... In 17th-century Russia a handwritten newspaper entitled "The Chimes" was circulated only to the tsar and members of the boyar duma, and even then not to all of them. Isn't that reminiscent of our communications only by order?

The danger of selective information is not only that this is inequality: Decisions made on the basis of "closed reports" are somehow devoid of any full responsibility from the onset. After all, facts received via special channels may be taken into consideration, or they may not be. The history of the Kiev May Day demonstration of 1986, which still troubles society, is an example of this. No, it is no accident that our parliamentarians have returned to it once again. What, after all, was the sense of the mutual reproaches that were aired? The Ukrainian deputies accused Yu. Izrael, chairman of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, of concealing data on radiation levels. The chairman of the Council of Ministers countered that there had been no secrets from the republic's leaders... And in effect it is not so much the confusion accompanying any catastrophe that is to blame here so much as the principle of secrecy itself. Wasn't it this secrecy that led to the republic's political leadership seeming to spare itself the obligation of having to answer to its own people in that most terrible and alarming period? Since there was no information accountable to public control, children could be taken out into the bright sunshine, regardless of the danger.

It is time to understand that closed information has ceased to be a stimulus toward action. Doesn't the example of the events in Fergana speak of this? They "sent wires" and circulated memoranda among the leadership, but since at the same moment FERGANSKAYA PRAVDA was calmly reporting on how to strengthen friendship, without a word about the growth of nationalities tension, let alone about the dubious appeals and pamphlets, even closed information did not help prevent the tragedy.

The people used to believe that at the very top they know everything. But it has turned out that the habit of having a double standard for truth distorted a great deal here, too. Even when the inter-ethnic conflict was in full swing, the leadership of Uzbekistan did not demonstrate any deep understanding of its origins; the stories of "strawberries at the market" were therefore completely ironic.

The force and efficacy of information is in its fullness, its functional and public nature.

And for how much longer will we preserve the division of information into local and central? Why, we wonder, must residents of Tula read about explosions there in IZVESTIYA? While we continue to speak of the process of hindrance making itself keenly felt in individual regions, it is a process of informational hindrance when it is easier to read about local conflicts in a central newspaper than in one's own oblast or republic newspaper.

One other factor—departmental information. I, for example, cannot understand why no one from the USSR Ministry of Health responded to people's deputy and eminent ecologist A. Yablokov, who wondered how it could happen that, despite having data on the incidents of monstrous contamination of production in infant formula prep kitchens, none of those responsible for preserving the nation's health were sounding any alarms? And five deputies had publicly spoken of this screaming outrage, but no one repented.

You hear sometimes, "Where are you hurrying?" There are fewer and fewer "prohibited zones," and Politburo members may be publicly criticized, they say; don't rush, everything in due time. Of course, impatience is not the best companion for reform, but isn't it time to understand that it is impossible to be partially healthy? Therefore, vague feelings were elicited by the debates on access to archives for repression cases during the Supreme Soviet confirmation of the chairman of the KGB, and earlier of the USSR procurator general by the Congress. On the one hand it would seem that everyone now has the right to find out everything about repressed relatives, and on the other hand, there is no law providing unhampered access to archival documents. Here one wants to ask just one question: Why is it that the only list of names of those tortured by Stalinism (incidentally, they have started to publish it by surnames in LATVIYA) was compiled by the remarkable Dmitriy Yurasov? That is, by a private individual. Did this not occur to any officials of the enormous apparatus of appropriate departments?

And let us take the archives themselves. At the debates that took place, it was heard from the lips of the KGB chairman that we are already giving scholars access to the archives. One wants to believe it... However, from the lips of the scholars, we still hear that everything associated with foreign policy, going back to the 18th century, is closed, as are documents relating to the tsarist Okhrana, not to mention the archives of the OGPU [United State Political Administration] and NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. Would it have been necessary to create a commission of the Congress, headed by a Politburo member, had the opportunity to research and publish the archives from 1939 existed? Incidentally, the lack of archival access prevents newspaper people from responding to the appeals of other readers: "Enough about Stalin!" The subject of Stalinism could be closed if everything were to be published without exception. All the secret documents, lists, minutes, verbatim accounts! Only then would journalistic disclosure give way to profound scientific analysis...

Among the basic positions and characteristics of our society's qualitatively new condition, M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the CPSU Central Committee meeting gave the following: Society provides the omnipotence of the people, complete fullness of human rights... The right to complete information is one of the most important civil rights. Thus, it was fixed in the text of the Vienna agreements as well and, incidentally, it is necessary to

remove any limitations incompatible with the declared right. It is not enough to recognize international responsibilities; they must be brought to life. We will not forget this!

An information monopoly stimulates irresponsibility on the part of both the ruling and the ruled. Freedom of information is an indicator of democracy, as well as an index of the state's responsibility toward the people.

Murmansk Deputy Interviewed on Congress

18001453 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 30 Jul 89 p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Mitrofanovich Obolenskiy, deputy from Murmansk Oblast, by Ye. Leontyeva and Ye. Ponarina in Moscow: "There Are Personalities But Few Leaders"; date of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text]**We recently opened the deputies' club in our newspaper. One of its first members was an engineer designer from the USSR Academy of Sciences Polar Geophysical Institute, Aleksandr Mitrofanovich Obolenskiy, deputy for Murmansk Oblast, well-known as an alternate candidate for the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Today he is the guest of our editorial office.**

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Aleksandr Mitrofanovich, were your expectations for the congress justified?

[Obolenskiy] Expectations yes, but hopes, no. There was no miracle. Nevertheless, the congress must be assessed as a positive phenomenon in our life, as a breakthrough toward democracy. And for the entire country. Thanks to the direct television and radio relays, this breakthrough was made swiftly, and the politicization of society took place literally before our very eyes. It is already different from what it was before the election campaign.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Can the disposition of forces among the deputies change before the start of the next congress?

[Obolenskiy] It probably will change. I think the scales will lean toward the minority. It is growing and will be, I think we can assume, somewhere near halfway. And at that moment the real work will begin.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] At whose expense? We say the congress is a cross-section of our society. And suddenly many people will have a sharp change of opinion?

[Obolenskiy] Everything will depend on the issues raised at the congress. But virtually all domestic issues concerning insuring conditions for the work of the deputies will be resolved. This includes the law on status, the law on procedures for reimbursement of expenses, on recall, and on two or three other matters in this direction. I think all deputies will be equally interested in them and everyone wants to work with maximum efficiency. And this is the ground, in general, for the majority.

There is more. On key issues in the country's life it would be a good thing to propose a voting formula beforehand. The interregional groupings that are now being created must find the kind of formulas that would be acceptable for different categories of deputies.

We, the group of deputies, have been trying, for example, at this congress to put to the vote the question of improving the position of low-income people. Unfortunately, however, we did not succeed. We could not insist on what we wanted; the draft was not accepted. What N.I. Ryzhkov presented in his report was a half measure. For we have more than 40 million below the poverty line, but the measures proposed were to improve the lives of 22 million. What is to be done with the other 18 million? I am happy that the session did, nevertheless, focus on this issue, and more radical decisions will be reached.

We have proposed that a living wage be set immediately. Not just taking some arbitrary figure—R75 or R80, whatever seems right—but asking experts to calculate it, but under the control of the deputies. And then every year it will be amended, and the allowances likewise. And in 1991 we will move to defining a regional living wage, for it is different in the north and the south.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Can a congress made up of 2,250 deputies operate fruitfully? Is not this forum too large?

[Obolenskiy] Perhaps. But the work must be organized differently. I have tried to propose a different model: work half the day in full session for the congress and the other half in the sections, committees, and groups on the basis of interests, discussing specific issues—ecology, public health, education, jurisprudence. Then there will be no need to be always trying to get the floor, or see who can shout the loudest. Ideas and proposals could be smoothed out before being submitted for general discussion, and various solutions could be suggested. And the work would proceed more quickly.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Will representatives of the public organizations also be promoted into the local soviets?

[Obolenskiy] I do not know. But it would be a good idea to resolve this question in the congress. And if they are advanced then it is necessary to do it on a competitive basis. I would in general submit the issue to a referendum. At the same time, I would discuss with the people the question of the advisability of okrug meetings, and the question of holding two posts simultaneously by those people in the Supreme Soviet.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Tell us, was the withdrawal of Kazannik from the Supreme Soviet in favor of Yeltsin prepared beforehand or was this his initiative?

[Obolenskiy] I have no information as to whether it was discussed. But the situation was heated and people were trying to find a solution. The radicals, of course, could have made an agreement among themselves...

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] And how did your self-advancement come about? Rumors are circulating that you played the role of "sitting duck" for someone.

[Obolenskiy] Not at all; my electorate forced me to do it. At meetings they simply terrorized me: You must insure for us the competitive nature of elections to the Supreme Soviet. I said: How can I do this? I will be only one of more than 2,000. But they pushed me into a corner, and so I promised to nominate myself. I have that right legally, and no one has stopped me.

I said it but the rumors are flying. In the television debates they are already asking: Are you entering the nomination? Yes, I say. So the Presidium certainly knew about my plans beforehand. And indeed I could not retreat. Of course, people reacted to this in different ways. But most of them understood that this was a political step, not some encroachment of power.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] A personal question. What is your family's attitude toward your activities as a deputy, and does your family trace itself back to the well-known Obolenskiy family?

[Obolenskiy] My family's attitude toward my activities as a deputy is that it is necessary but terrible. But they are getting used to the idea that I am not at home. With reference to the rare family name... Unfortunately most of us do not know our own genealogy. My great-grandfather was a priest in the Orel area but my interest has never gone further than that. When I go on vacation at my sister's place I shall ask her. She is the only one in our family who has talked about this with our grandmother, and perhaps she will remember.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Do we need a law on the party?

[Obolenskiy] If you are interested in my personal viewpoint, I am against such a law. It seems to me that a law on public organizations would be adequate. The party, of course, is one of them. But a law on public organizations should be passed only after a national debate, and it should be adopted not at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, but of the congress.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] What is your attitude toward the ideas of territorial cost accounting?

[Obolenskiy] I think it is a logical development of cost accounting at the enterprises. Within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic there should be oblast regional cost accounting. In the republics it should be republic cost accounting. Everything depends on the size of the region. Each republic must itself find its own version. It is impossible to manage such a large country from a single center. We have already experienced for ourselves where this leads.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] We are convinced that the country needs political figures. Do you think the electors will take this into account at the next elections?

[Obolenskiy] In general, I do not support the viewpoint that the country should be managed only by professional politicians. I am more inclined to the idea that politicization of the public awareness will bring forth politicians from among the people. The main thing is that a deputy should be able to think and accept information in a critical manner. These are the kind of people who are needed. Specialist politicians are somehow divorced from life, and for them theory always prevails. And this is dangerous.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Whom would you single out from among the deputies as promising politicians?

[Obolenskiy] Belozertsev from Petrozavodsk, Boldyrev from Leningrad, Levashev, also from Leningrad, and Kiselev from Volgograd; these are the young ones... In general, there are personalities but few leaders.

[Leontyeva/Ponarina] Tell us, do you sense any difference between the population of Moscow with whom you have obviously succeeded in your dealings, and those with whom you had dealings in Apatit?

[Obolenskiy] Those with whom I met in Murmansk Oblast after the congress had expected more from it. At the same time, when you start to explain the real situation they understand that it would hardly have been possible to do more...

Komsomol Plenum Makes Appointments

18001440 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Eighth Komsomol Central Committee Plenum: Second Day"]

[Text] Yesterday, the 8th Plenum of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee continued in Moscow.

The discussion of the issue of the situation in the Komsomol continued. The following made statements on this issue of the agenda: First Secretary of the Azerbaijani LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee S. Alekperov, Director of the Youth Center in the city of Omsk Yu. Vetrov, Chief of the Laboratory of Economics and Management Issues of the NTK [Scientific and Production Committee] "Katalizator" from the city of Novosibirsk G. Poleshchuk, Secretary of the Komsomol committee of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine I. Pavlov, Director of the

Research and Practice Center for Social Technology in the city of Sverdlovsk Ye. Korolev, Director of the Scientific and Research Center of the VKSh [Higher Komsomol School] of the Komsomol Central Committee I. Ilyinskiy, and First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee V. Mironenko.

Based on the results of discussing the first issue on the agenda, participants of the plenum adopted a resolution "On the Situation in the Komsomol and the Current Status."

The issue of the Komsomol 21st Congress was discussed at the plenum.

The plenum adopted a resolution "On Holding the 21st Komsomol Congress." It was resolved to hold the congress in the spring of next year.

Participants of the plenum adopted resolutions "On Preparing a New Wording of the Komsomol Statute" and "On Preparing the Komsomol Program," and confirmed the composition of commissions for preparing these documents.

The plenum adopted a resolution "On Restructuring the International Activities of the Komsomol."

Also, a joint resolution of the 8th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum and the 9th Meeting of the Central Audit Commission "On Restructuring Control in the Komsomol" was adopted.

The plenum also adopted a resolution "On the Proposals of Some Komsomol Organizations in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]" which refers to the possible formation of the Leninist Communist Youth League of the RSFSR.

Subsequently, organizational issues were considered.

The plenum adopted a resolution on changes in the composition of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau, pursuant to which the institution of candidate members of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau was abolished. In conjunction with this, the plenum transfered from candidate to [full] members of the Central Committee Bureau G. Golovachev, rector of the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee; A. Nasyrov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek LKSM; M. Pastukhova, graduate of the Voronezh Technical Institute; I. Priyeditis, first secretary of the Latvian LKSM Central Committee; and S. Solod, head of the division of mine mechanics of the A.A. Skochinskiy Mining Institute in the city of Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast.

The plenum relieved S. Chelnokov of the responsibilities of member of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau, and removed him from the membership of the Komsomol Central Committee in conjunction with his transfer to a position at the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat.

The plenum elected S. Kondybayev, first secretary of the Kazakh LKSM Central Committee, V. Kudlash, first secretary of the Belorussian LKSM Central Committee, V. Chepurin, head of the Organizational Department of the Komsomol Central Committee members of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau.

The plenum made V. Kopyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Komsomol Committee, a member of the Komsomol Central Committee and elected him a member of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau.

The plenum removed from the Komsomol Central Committee membership R. Alimov, M. Ganin, V. Gurin, N. Dolgushin, V. Yeremin, V. Isayev, L. Kalashnikov, D. Margvelidze, L. Naletskaya, G. Seleznev, A. Tudvasev, V. Tyusov, D. Shayakhmetov in conjunction with changing the place of employment and in keeping with the requests filed.

The plenum removed from the Komsomol Central Committee membership A. Banit, O. Vaskevich, I. Golovanova, V. Yekimov, A. Medvedkov, G. Sopasheva, Ye. Khlyustova, S. Shevstruk, and A. Shchaulov in keeping with the requests filed.

The plenum removed from the membership of the Komsomol Central Committee G. Marga for violating the Komsomol Statute and failing to disharge the responsibilities of a member of the Komsomol Central Committee, and Yu. Radchenko for failing to comply with statutory requirements and to justify the confidence of Komsomol members.

The plenum removed from the candidate membership of the Komsomol Central Committee V. Kamyshanov and B. Turakulov in conjunction with changing the place of employment, L.. Kolycheva in conjunction with changing the place of employment and in keeping with the request filed, and M. Mukhamedzhanova in keeping with the request filed.

The plenum transferred from candidates to members of the Komsomol Central Committee M. Gibadulin, operator of underground well repairs in the oil and gas extraction administration "Prikamneft" of the the "Tatneft" Production Association, USSR People's Deputy from the Komsomol, city of Yelabuga, Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]; S. Zhuravlev, head of the Komsomol Central Committee International Department; S. Lyamin, head of the Komsomol Central Committee Department of Socio-Economic Issues of Young People; I. Pavlov, secretary of the Komsomol

Committee at the imeni V.I. Lenin Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, Chelyabinsk Oblast; G. Poleshchuk, chief of the Laboratory of Economics and Management Issues at the NTK "Katalizator" of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Siberian Division, city of Novosibirsk; and M. Sinitsyn, first secretary of the Saratov Oblast Komsomol Committee.

The plenum made S. Antonov, deputy secretary of the Komsomol committee at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine in the city of Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast; V. Boyko, first secretary of the Omsk Oblast Komsomol Committee; M. Gadylshin, first secretary of the Tatar Oblast Committee of the Komsomol; S. Gogiberidze, first secretary of the Georgian LKSM Central Committee; N. Grigoryeva, director of the day care center of the lime-and-sand brick plant, city of Borovichi, Novgorod Oblast; G. Dzyuba, assistant chief of the Political Administration of Border Guard Troops of the USSR KGB for Komsomol work; A. Zinchenko, head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Komsomol Central Committee; V. Kormanovskiy, first secretary of the Sakhalin Oblast Komsomol Committee; A. Kuzmichev, deputy secretary of Komsomol committee at the imeni 25th CPSU Congress Mogilev Silk Fabrics Production Association, Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]; Ye. Kuzmicheva, teacher at High School No 274 in the city of Leningrad; V. Medvedev, first secretary of the Ryazan Oblast Komsomol Committee; A. Mishin, first secretary of the Minsk Oblast Committee of Belorussian LKSM; N. Morozov, student of High School No 46, city of Vladivostok; N. Ovechkin, assistant chief of the Political Administration of the Air Force for Komsomol work; V. Slastenin, first secretary of the Kuybyshev Oblast Komsomol Committee, B. Tattybayev, director of the "Molniya" Club for Teenagers at the trade union committee of the imeni M.I. Kalinin Plant, city of Petropavlovsk, North Kazakhstan Oblast, Kazakh SSR; Yu. Tikhomirov, head of the Department of Youth Education of the Komsomol Central Committee; and A. Yakubov, first secretary of the Tajik LKSM Central Committee, members of the Komsomol Central Committee.

The plenum made candidate members of the Komsomol Central Committee A. Baykov, first secretary of the Surgut City Komsomol Committee in Tyumen Oblast; A. Bek, scientific associate of the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences; M. Kodzokov, first secretary of the Kabardino-Balkar Komsomol Oblast Committee; Yu. Medunitsyn, first secretary of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Komsomol Committee; M. Pavlov, second secretary of the Kirghiz LKSM Central Committee; S. Rusilko, fitter-boilermaker of the repair and mechanical shop at the S.O. Prityts kiy Grodno Production Association "Azot," Belorussian SSR; M. Tursunov, first Secretary of the Namangan Oblast Committee of the Uzbek LKSM; and O. Shvetsov, second secretary of the Turkmen LKSM Central Committee.

Participants of the plenum heard a report of USSR People's Deputies from the Komsomol V. Gubin and V. Minin and adopted a resolution "On the Initial Results of Participation by the Komsomol Group of People's Deputies in the Operation of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies."

Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.A. Medvedev spoke at the plenum. (The speech of V.A. Medvedev is published in today's issue).

Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, CPSU Central Committee Secretary G.P. Razumovskiy is taking part in the proceedings of the plenum.

When the newspaper was signed to the press, the Komsomol Central Committee plenum was continuing its proceedings.

Former Kaluga Obkom First Secretary Dies

PM2507114389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Second Edition p 8

[A.A. Kandrenkov obituary]

[Excerpts] Andrey Andreyevich Kandrenkov, personal pensioner of union status and former first secretary of Kaluga CPSU Oblast Committee, died 13 July 1989 in his 74th year. [passage omitted]

[Signed] V.I. Vorotnikov, Ye.K. Ligachev, V.P. Nikonov, A.V. Vlasov, G.P. Razumovskiy, B.K. Pugo, N.Ye. Kruchina, Ye.Z. Razumov, G.I. Ulanov, Yu.V. Blinov, V.S. Volkov, V.M. Gorchakov, A.M. Ivashurov, N.A. Iudin, V.Ye. Oleynikov, N.F. Saprykin, A.I. Stelikov, S.S. Strelchenko, V.N. Goryachev, N.V. Ivanchenkova, V.P. Konovalov, A.A. Lebedev, I.I. Fomin.

Latvian First Secretary Vagris Interviewed

PM1408145189 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 20 Jul 89 p 1

[LATINFORM correspondent V. Semenov report on "Topical Interview" with Ya.Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, on 19 July at Riga Airport: "In the Name of the People, in the Name of Socialism"; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] On 19 July Ya.Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, returned from Moscow to Riga. In the capital he took part in the CPSU Central Committee conference. At Riga Airport correspondents from the State Committee for Television and Radio and LATINFORM asked Ya.Ya. Vagris to answer a number of questions of interest to the republic's people.

[Correspondents] What can you say about the CPSU Central Committee conference?

[Vagris] The conference agenda mainly included questions of internal party work in perestroyka conditions. Everyone should first read M.S. Gorbachev's report. An extensive and thorough report—I do not intend to comment on it because everyone should familiarize himself with it and draw his own conclusions. There was a broad exchange of opinions, 25 people spoke in all. I take a positive view of this conference. The opinion was expressed that such meetings should be regular. A plenum is one thing—official speeches are delivered at them, while here there is more improvisation. Admittedly, there were also prepared speeches, but most listened to the report and expressed their attitude toward it. I did not have a prepared speech either. I dwelt on three points. The first was the union republic's sovereignty, giving this concept real content, and republican economic accountability as a first step to sovereignty. The draft model prepared by us differs from the general union principles on certain principles. The second is about the status of the union republic communist party in the new conditions. I, of course, was talking about the Latvian Communist Party, but I meant all republics' communist parties. If the republic's status as a sovereign state, precisely a state, as enshrined in the Soviet and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Constitution, is enhanced, then, of course, the status of the union republic's party must also be different. Yet there is not even a section called "Union Republic Communist Parties" in the CPSU statutes. Only oblast ones are mentioned. That is, it turns out that although the republic's communist party has its own Central Committee, it is equated to an oblast party organization. And, of course, some kind of increase in autonomy [avtonomizatsiya] is needed here, too. I do not have a readymade model, but it is needed. These questions are also being raised in primary party organizations and they will also be come up during the report and election campaign starting soon. Third—M.S. Gorbachev drew the conclusion in his report, and we, unfortunately, were forced to agree, that the democratization processes in society are progressing more rapidly than the democratization processes in the party itself. So the third range of questions I touched upon concerned the democratization of internal party life. But I will obviously talk in more detail about this at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum which is being prepared by the entire republic party organization, and nonparty members are also helping. We scheduled it for the end of July. But for a number of reasons we will not hold it in July but at the beginning of August. A session must be held first. It is very crucial. Then A.V. Gorbunov became ill. And that also was a factor.

[Correspondents] Incidentally, how is our president's health?

[Vagris] He is recovering. His headaches and temperature have gone. He has a good appetite. But he is still not allowed to have visitors. It will probably be possible to visit him next week.

[Correspondents] Will the session be held without him?

[Vagris] Clearly it will. We cannot postpone the session. Because our model of economic accountability must be examined at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. And they plan to end it 4-5 August. Although I doubt whether they will fit things into this time.

[Correspondents] Has the date of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on interethnic relations been changed?

[Vagris] Apparently it will be held some time in September. In the near future we will receive the theses, and we will be able to discuss them. But these are my subjective assumptions. We will find out the precise date of the plenum from official sources.

[Correspondents] Does Comrade Gorbachev know about the slogans mentioning the possibility of withdrawing from the USSR?

[Vagris] Not only Gorbachev but the entire Soviet Union knows this. I do not agree with this approach. I think that our potential in the federation has still not been exhausted. Naturally, in the restructured, renewed federation. But now that we—I will not resort to foreign words—are trying to live according to the principle of freedom of opinions, we cannot forbid this viewpoint. For the right to withdraw from the union is enshrined in the constitution. And whether it should it be utilized or not is something that should be pondered very seriously indeed.

[Correspondents] Did M.S. Gorbachev meet with the Latvian SSR deputies?

[Vagris] During the session our deputies had talks with him in small groups. But the whole delegation did not meet with him. Although such a meeting in principle has been set. But there was not enough time at the first congress, so Mikhail Sergeyevich promises to hold it in the fall, when the second congress is held.

[Correspondents] What else would you like to say to television viewers, radio audiences, and readers?

[Vagris] Today in the interval of the sitting of the session to which I was invited I had a short—only 20 minutes—but deep and amicable conversation with M.S. Gorbachev, one on one, so to speak. Essentially, the same questions developed: the union republic's sovereignty and the status of its communist party. You can't talk in such detail from the platform, but you can argue more in private conversation. Mikhail Sergeyevich reacted approvingly to the questions I raised. He wished the republic party organization success in perestroyka. As he said: Ever onward, in the name of the people, in the name of socialism. Ever onward!

Latvian Supreme Soviet Chairman Quoted

LD2807125989 Riga in Latvian to Europe 1930 GMT 26 Jul 89

[Text] The 12th session of the republic's Supreme Soviet will come together tomorrow. It will begin to implement the endeavors of our political and economic sovereignty. There are 14 questions on the agenda of the session. The most important, of course, are those connected with transformations in order for the economic life of Latvia to function normally.

Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, will not be able to participate, because he is undergoing medical treatment in Moscow. Here is a telephone conversation Peteris Tabuns had with Anatolijs Gorbunovs. We are giving it in an abbreviated form.

[Begin recording] [Gorbunovs] Well, I am at the central clinical hospital. At present I am feeling well, and the doctors say that it is still necessary for me to recover fully and then I shall be able to throw myself again with full force into work.

First of all, it is a great pity that I cannot participate in the work of the session, because this will be a very important session. There are many questions; perhaps I shall mention just a few.

To my mind, the draft which has been prepared on the republic's sovereignty—although in a general declaration, actually it is not a declaration, but this article is designed already within the constitution—and to my mind, it is rather successfully drawn up. Likewise on Latvia's property—her land, her entrails, forests, waters, sea zone, and other resources—this also, to my mind, is set out very well in the draft, in the (?newly) (word indistinct) constitution.

On the legal sovereignty—whether to ratify the USSR Constitution or its changes, the laws of Latvia for Latvia—this, too, to my mind is dealt with well in the draft there. And I would of course very much want a few laws to be adopted in the field of ecology, where the questions of ecology will be examined, not only to ascertain the catastrophic situation in those painful spots of ours, but also so that laws will be adopted.

But, frankly speaking, I am alarmed by the law on elections. And this alarms me most of all. And personally I am not satisfied with the draft, not with local soviet elections but with the republic's.

We sincerely wanted to hold the congress and the Supreme Soviet. And then, in fact, we gave up direct elections, the very thing we ourselves were very vigorously criticizing in the USSR People's Deputies elections. But the congress in Moscow has shown that it is not possible to elect the best to the Supreme Soviet if there are alternative candidates, because by a majority vote it is precisely the most active ones who are not elected.

And I think that all this, nevertheless, has to be decided by all the inhabitants of the republic by a direct ballot to elect the Supreme Soviet, where, roughly, as we see at present in Moscow there will be approximately 70 percent permanent deputies, as we say. And then there is one kind of organ which is directly elected and which is also able to operate vigorously.

[Tabuns] Now it is not yet, clear, so to speak. Discussion continues whether Supreme Soviet elections or local soviet elections should come first.

[Gorbunovs] It appears to me that all questions, of course, must be discussed. But here—at least for me, as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium—I cannot tell these deputies, or this convocation, to these deputies who are working at the present: Comrades, we are dismissing you, well, before your term is over. A majority of deputies, however, are working actively. So therefore, the elections must be fixed before their term expires. At least I have no such arguments: Therefore, this question must be discussed.

[Tabuns] On Thursday [27 July], when the Supreme Soviet's session starts, when you of course would like to be in the presidium and to chair this session, but, but....

[Gorbunovs] Yes, unfortunately, I will not be able to participate.

Well, if the esteemed colleagues, the deputies perhaps want to hear my thoughts, then for this very important session I would, nevertheless, recommend Janis Vagris, our first secretary. It appears to me that on questions of principle, about which we shall decide at this session, our opinions coincide.

To conclude about that question on the law on elections, it seems to me that my colleagues are acting properly by having the first reading of this draft law at the session. And we, all of us together and together with our republic's inhabitants, will once more consider what this law should, after all, be like, all the more so since in Moscow it has been officially announced that all that is a concern of the republics. And after that the Congress of USSR People's Deputies will make appropriate amendments to the USSR Constitution. Because of that, one would like very much indeed for it to be well-considered so that we will be able to be proud of this law of elections of ours.

[Tabuns] Yes, thank you Comrade Gorbunovs. We await your arrival here in Riga as soon as possible.

[Gorbunovs] Sincere thanks also to you all. [end recording]

Lithuanian Komsomol Member Views Resignations

LD2807135389 Vilnius KOMJAUNIMO TIESA 20 Apr 89 p 1

[Interview with Linas Linkevicius, deputy section chief of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Leninist Communist Youth Leaque, by Fausta Bruzaite: "Did A Bomb Explode?"; date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpts] Before my eyes 117 Lithuanian Leninist Communist Youth Leaque [Komsomol] members of the Art Institute quit their organization. [passage omitted] Thus, this news spread immediately and not only among students. People are saying that the Komsomol at the Art Institute has perished in disgrace and Komsomol leaders in trying to bring back to sanity those who quit, experienced a tremendous fiasco, with the death blow being dealt them not just by anybody but by the institute's party organization secretary.

Well, it was not quite that dreadful. In reality, Raimundas Syvis, first secretary of Vilnius, Leninskiy Rayon, was handed an impressive heap of declarations with Komsomol cards. It is true that Linas Linkevicius, deputy chief of the Lithuanian Komsomol organization, Central Committee Section; Vilma Bernotiene, secretary, Vilnius Leninskiy Rayon Komsomol Committee; and Raimundas Syvis were alone in that large crowd of young people. It would be incorrect, however, to label the discussion which took place at the Art Institute as "a play toward one gate." It also re-echoed the thought: "We want Lithuania's Komsomol to be a serious organization."

[Bruzaite] But that constitutes the remarks of a chance bystander. What does one of its participants, Linas Linkevicius, think of this?

[Linkevicius] I will begin by stating that the meeting at the Art Institute convinced me even further that we must begin sociological research, to find out what sort of impact our initiative will cause in Vilnius, Kaunas, Rokiskis, the Art Institute, the VISI [Vilnius Institute For Construction Engineering], at enterprises and in state farms [kolkhozes].... It is important for us to learn to model a perspective.

[Bruzaite] The discussion we are referring to may be considered an inquest of sorts. What did you learn?

[Linkevicius] That a massive load of mistrust is tailing the organization and stifling any of our efforts to draw the youth to us. Whatever new direction we attempt (and some of it is really radical), people don't notice, or else, convince themselves that it can not be because it is the Komsomol. This is very depressing to experience, although it is not surprising. Political reform is taking place throughout the country, but the political institution—I have in mind, the Komsomol—basically, has not changed. Our organization appears insignificant in the face of the creative associations that have already declared themselves independent. That is why I am anxiously awaiting the Lithuanian Komsomol Congress because I am counting on great changes in it.

[Bruzaite] You tried to mention this to the Art Institute students, however it fell on deaf ears. Not one among your opponents came forward with: "Perhaps we should wait for the congress, maybe it will truly bring about a lot of changes?"

[Linkevicius] Alas, I attended the meeting, not for purposes of agitation (that would have constituted an exercise in futility), but to clarify why people are dropping out. Their arguments have merit. I have sifted through their declarations, by the way, and found some thoughts that I would support without any reservations. I can understand perfectly those who want to with one sweep cut off ties with a boring organization which is compromised. I think it's natural for artists, who are especially sensitive to social injustice and idealogical subterfuge, to react in this manner. I do also visualize another path, however—to stay and work in a concrete manner, toward Lithuania's rebirth. To utilize all opportunities that exist in the current political situation.

[Bruzaite] In other words, in spite of everything you are a Komsomol patriot?

[Linkevicius] No. Today, I am not a patriot of yesterday's Komsomol, but I think it can be active today.

When I stop thinking that I myself will leave the organization, I follow a naive trend of thought: We are still young, after all, would we desire evil for anyone? This is what I was anxious to discuss with the youth.

[Bruzaite] How do you assess the events at the Art Insitute?

[Linkevicius] I do not think this was a "bomb explosion," as people are calling it. Of course, it isn't an every day occurrence to have a hundred drop out from the primary organization membership. The diminishing of Komsomol ranks is a natural process, however, one must not construe this as a tragedy. It is very regrettable that those who are leaving are those who could be very useful to the organization. For instance, I have heard some very good opinions of the lads in the Art Institute's parliament and I think they could establish an active Komsomol organization if they so desired. Some of those remaining at the institute have neither demonstrated a desire to leave, nor a desire to strive for the good of their organization. Such quiet—doubtful toward everything—people can not bring credit to any organization.

[Bruzaite] It seems to me that discussion can be described as open and rather accurate. In truth, I find it very unexpected that the institute's party organization secretary has volunteered to become an opponent of the most energetic Komsomol workers.

[Linkevicius] In general, the discussion left me with a good impression. Some interesting thoughts were aired and the atmosphere itself was not bad, considering the start did not bode any good. Could a more suitable place for holding a discussion not have been found than in the institute's hall? It is difficult to express one's thoughts when some are walking around, some are writing, and others are whispering and giggling behind your back. I am not annoyed on my own account, but because of the important matter which was to be discussed. As far as the "most energetic opponent" is concerned, this individual, in my estimation, failed to act in a responsible manner. Being a party organization secretary, Giedrius Kazimierenas can not be ignorant of what benefit the Komsomol has given him and at what cost. Thus, we were left in the dark as to whether the party organization secretary is destroying the "old" Komsomol or the Komsomol in general? Much criticism can be offered, but there are things that the Komsomol can not accomplish today, no matter how much it would like to do so. In attacking us, the secretary obviously wanted to gain popularity among the students. The greatest amount of ill will was generated because of such a position. It seems to me, however, we parted with the students on friendly terms. I heard their well-intentioned thoughts and I must admit that I like to recall them.

Lithuanians Discuss 'Greens' Conference

LD2807141189 Vilnius KOMJAUNIMO TIESA 26 Apr 89 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Alvydas Karalius, sociologist; and Saulius Lapienis, deputy chief, presidium section, Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences; by Alis Barbierius: "The Greens Will Assemble in Rumsiskes", place and date of interview not given.]

[Text] [Barbierius] It has been recently announced in KOMJAUNIMO TIESA that the Lithuanian Greens Congress will take place in Rumsiskes, Kaisiadoriai Rayon, on 30 Apr-1 May. What are the basic goals of the coming forum of the Green movement?

[Karalius] The goals are similar to those of 6 months ago in Kedainiai. Our political orientation needs to be more accurately defined and the program concerns, in general, need to be more vividly outlined—who are these Greens? We also must confirm the movement's fundamental tasks and identify actual problems and their solutions; we will attempt to provide a more obvious direction for the movement. It is no less important to expand the organization through involvement in the movement of new people, to formulate a Greens' ideology, and to pass it on to others. The concept "Green" must become meaningful and comprehensive. In comparing ourselves with Western Greens, we realize we are not yet alike. As we view many things much too narrowly.

[Barbierius] Perhaps this concept should in truth be formulated to clearly indicate who among our public is, or has the right to be called, a Green?

[Karalius] This must be more clearly reflected in our program. This question has been accorded insufficient attention in the first draft where general Greens' principles were discussed at greater length. Almost every political movement and every political party use the same generalizations and similar principles, thus making it imperative to discuss our outlook as well as the view and concept of the ecological world. I see a very wide area for action that needs to be tilled concurrently. Restructuring in only one area can not yield good results. We will not solve anything by focusing on nature protection alone. Complex decisions are a must. Ecological education, in the broad sense of the word, is one of the most important directions in my view as a sociologist.

[Barbierius] how many Greens' clubs are there in Lithuania presently?

[Karalius] About 40 active clubs. There are more; some are registered, others are in the process of being established; also, there are the Sajudis ecological groups. This information is being compiled by one of our coordinators, Arturas Abromavicius. In general, we don't as yet have information on all clubs or groups. There are some clubs concerning whose action we have not heard anything about, perhaps they are more interested in being known as Greens without actually being such.

[Barbierius] All those who either are or consider themselves to be Greens are no doubt most interested in learning how delegates will be selected to the coming congress?

[Karalius] We had announced in ZALIOJI LIETUVA the deadline for all club registrations. Their representatives will be those participating in the congress. We hope to in this manner avoid "empty" clubs, which may have appeared simply in order to gain entry into the congress.

[Barbierius] Obviously, you will not be able to avoid such inactive clubs?

[Karalius] Apparently, there are some of those already and more are still cropping up. In general, this club boom is decreasing. Not only as far as the Greens are concerned, but also in other organizations and even in parties.

[Barbierius] Relations between Lithuanian Greens and foreign Greens and other ecological organizations are broadening. A large U.S. delegation recently visited here.

Two USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, leaders of our Green movement, Professor Vaidotas Antanaitis and candidate of physical science Zigmas Vaisvila, visited the Swedish Greens. This is why I wish to ask you whether there will be some foreign guests at the Greens' forum?

[Karalius] First of all, there are some Greens from the Soviet Union among those who wish to participate with whom we have established relations. We have not specifically invited foreigners, perhaps, we are not prepared for that yet; however, they may be invited on behalf of the various clubs or individual coordinating council members.

[Barbierius] I would like to ask Saulius the following question. The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences has supported the Greens' since the movement's inception. Many scientists, from the youngest to the academicians, also participated in the initiative conference in Kedainiai. Will the most progressive, nonaligned Lithuanian scientists be most probably invited to this congress?

[Lapienis] It is obvious. Some of them will most probably not be delegates, but will attend as our honored and welcome guests. First of all Academician V. Statulevicius, the godfather of "Zemynas" Club, and others.

[Karalius] A mandate of 10 delegates has been assigned to the consultative council. In general, there will be more young scientists participating, especially those who are among the organizers of the Green movement. We wish to identify and form that nucleus of the Green movements, which will organize the movement in a purposeful manner.

[Lapienis] Raimunis Budriunas, director of Kaunas Botanical Garden, phrased it well in one of his interviews when he stated, "The Greens are soldiers who create disturbances over every sore subject and don't allow the government or the scientists to become permissive or to fall asleep."

[Karalius] I always accentuate one additional Greens' goal—to seek alternative solutions to those sore ecological subjects. We must not only eliminate the results, but also seek new paths and new technologies in order to forestall those painful results before they happen. This involves not only production, but also a way of life, ecological consciousness, and the formation of a Greens' philosophy of life.

[Barbierius] Should we perhaps remind all Lithuanian Greens and their supporters who the main organizers of the coming congress are, to whom people can address their most pressing inquiries to?

[Karalius] Arturas Abromavicius is the mandatory commission chairman. He is in charge of all information gathering and concerns himself with organizational matters. I am in charge of the program, while Juozas Dautartas will explain the tasks. Rumsiskes representative, Vingaudas Baltrusaitis, is in charge of local organizational and living concerns. Generally speaking, there is not much time left before the Greens' congress but no end is in sight for all the work.

Whereabouts of Lithuanian Art Treasures Noted

LD0808130589 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 27 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by Leonidas Zilevicius, entitled "Let Us Treasure Our National Cultural Heritage," under the rubric "Situation Awaits Solution."]

[Excerpts]

Roads and Crossroads of Lithuania's Treasures

The shipment of enslaved nations' artistic and cultural heritage to Moscow and Petersburg centers commenced while still under the tsarist rule. The Russian nation was subjected to the same fate during the Stalinist era. Most valuable regional and rayon cultural and art treasures were brought there during the centralization of Moscow and Leningrad archives. The archives became the lodger of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Commissariat. They were researched only by well "investigated" specially-badged individuals. "Harmful" to science, feudalist and capitalist era funds were not inventoried or recorded, but were sealed with the "secret" stamp, doomed to destruction or auction sales abroad. Lithuanian cultural heritage that had been taken away after the first revolts of 1831, and 1863, and World War I, were thus placed among those doomed.

Some time ago, it was possible to determine that a large number of linens, archeological excavation finds, numismatic collections, graphics, drawings, and other art treasures have been transported by various means from Lithuania to the Hermitage. This was how in 1851, Volmer (in the Russian language documents, this name is rendered in several ways: Volmer, Volter) bought at Pazaislys Monastery (owned, at that time by the Orthodox Church) seven Western Catholic art linens, for R100. This same name crops up alongside other Lithuanian art treasure collectors in the Hermitage Archives, attesting to the resale of art treasures. The above-mentioned buyer was able to purchase, not only linens by M. Palonis, but also those of other famous European artists which had been acquired by the Pazaislys Monastery founder, K. Pacas. This was instrumental in making a final determination of what treasures found their way from Lithuania to the Hermitage, and later—abroad.

Unfortunately, I did not receive the cases from the Hermitage manuscripts which I had ordered when I arrived in Leningrad in early March of this year. Having

lectured me at great length, the 18-year old depository employee suggested that I ask the director. Upon entering the office of Academician B. Piotrovskiy, I saw the cases I had requested on his desk with other cases piled there. The director categorically refused to show them to me, but suggested that I fill out a request form, detailing the exact items I am looking for, when and by whom were they removed from Lithuania, and promised to locate them for me. I sensed his inherent academic cleverness immediately: He needed a so-called "key," with the use of which a case or two could "disappear" from his office, and with it—the last traces of Lithuanian art treasures sold abroad. How many such cases have vanished already....

In 1930 [as rendered in source], after the art treasure "Antikvariatas" began functioning, the largest museums in the country were given quotas, as to which ones of them would have to annually provide a certain number of paintings, graphics, sculptures, jewelry, ancient glass applied art objects, and even picture frames, to the Hermitage. These art treasures were loaded into trains and transported to foreign auctions. Western paintings of religious art taken from Lithuania, the Ukraine, Belorussia, St Petersburg, the Catholic Spiritual Academy, various churches etc, were highly in demand. Remaining art and jewelry treasures that had not been purchased by foreigners were returned to the Hermitage or else divided among various offices and organizations. Later, art treasures were being sold by the most important leaders of the country, culture ministers etc.

This is why it is not surprising that because of attempts to maintain secrecy regarding the monumental offences against our culture, almost 50 percent of unregistered archival documents remain in the Ministry of Culture system and research of manuscripts is restricted.

Last year, a request was made, by the USSR Communist Party Central Committee, to prepare a report on difficulties that exist in researching state archives and manuscripts. It was sent out as requested; marked with the correct address, however, it reached a different member of the committee. Since it mostly concerned shortcomings within the Ministry of Culture, it was sent by the CPSU Central Committee to the above mentioned ministry on 5 December. Unfortunately it was not seen by the leadership, while a chancellery employee noted in a journal that it was sent on 14 December to the Central Archives for Literature and Art. Several inquiries later, it was established that the archives had not received any such material and thus, it had disappeared. meanwhile, T. Vinogradova, head of the section, continues to search for it to this day.

When Will the Ice Begin To Move?

Our neighboring Belorussians, Ukrainians and representatives of other countries, seeing how their cultural heritage and art treasures are vanishing, many years ago set up search groups and are now successfully completing their research. This problem is still in its embrionic stage in Lithuania. The Lithuanians' belatedness in researching national archives was discussed by several former directors, M. Avtokratova (LITERATURA IR MENAS," 5 Oct 1985) and I. Toropovas (STATYBA IR ARCHITEKTURA [Construction and Architecture] No 10, 1986, p 29. Unfortunately, things did not improve after that. Thus, even later, one can count on one hand's fingers the number of regular archives employees. Our compatriots do not like the Hermitage Science Library, either; here are concentrated the world's most important art literature and periodicals. The only ray of hope is provided by an occasional Lithuanian student who finds his way here. Could it be that our art critics and intructors at the Art Institute do not require such cultural nourishment? I often gaze with great respect at Russian youth, seated red-eyed, at the reading apparatus from morning to night. I often think it a pity not to see seated there the valiant Lithuanian youth who have reached so high and are flying up there like the Lithuanian tri-color. No valorous deeds are possible without spiritual culture and deep thinking. Won't there come a day when our neighbors will say to us: "Stop bragging and look around."

Saving our scattered, dying cultural heritage should occupy an appropriate place among other important restructuring tasks. Who can guarantee a unique director will not appear once more at some state archive and begin with self-sacrificing zeal to "set in order" archives brought from Lithuania, mixing them up in such a manner that they can not be set right to this day; perhaps a fire might start a fire at one of the repositories, containing books taken from Vilnius University, the Radvilai, and other library books....

The above and other ideas were discussed at the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Culture. Provisions were made for continuing the search in the land for cultural treasures. It was decided the Main Archives Administration under the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers would become involved in the return of archives that have been taken from Lithuania. To date this work was done by the researchers. [passage omitted]

This undertaking should be assisted by representatives of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences, higher education, monument preservation and restoration, construction and engineering, and other institutes.

Archives Await Researchers

The last and most important problem is selection of proper research staffers. The work will last many years and will have to be done in various cities. [passage omitted]

True, you will not become famous by working in the archives; by working dilligently you will earn a degree in science, thereby increasing your pay, which will be considerably less than that of an ordinary cooperative worker. You will face complicated problems concerning hotels, meals, and other things, you will seldom hear a word of Lithuanian, you will be homesick etc. However, when while paging through centuries-old, dusty documents, you feel the breathing of your still-living land and sense its sufferings and its noble spirit, and you will become forever enamored of this work.

Balts Reply to 'Federative Union' Article

PM2807142189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jul 89 Second Edition p 3

[Feature under the "Discussion Tribune" rubric comprising letter by R. Gudaytis, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, writer, and secretary of the party organization of the Lithuanian Writers Union; and B. Genzyalis, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, doctor of philosophical sciences, and secretary of the party committee of the Vilnius State University: "So Who Does Know the Formula?"; letter by Professor I. Gryazin, USSR people's deputy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and doctor of juridical sciences: "Is It a Question of Federalism?"; and untitled afterword by the PRAVDA Ideology Department]

[Text]

So Who Does Know the Formula?

The authors of the article "Federative Union," N. Mikhaleva and Sh. Papidze (PRAVDA 12 July 1989), clearly do not like the natural constitutional processes taking place in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. That is their own personal business, but we USSR people's deputies are extremely surprised by the stand taken by the CPSU Central Committee organ, PRAVDA, which published this article under the rubric "On the Upcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum." Surely no one can seriously hope that it is possible to make any constructive contribution to the preparation for the upcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum with such tendentious, conservative publications?

The authors of the article totally gloss over the conflict situation which arose during the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. This is no accident. After all, the sharply divergent views on the question of establishing a USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee were prompted by a clear constitutional crisis. It was essentially admitted at the congress that the sovereignty of the union republics, the level and degree of their competence, and the quality of their mutual ties and ties on an all-union scale are coming into collision with the present union constitution. That is why the congress spoke out in favor of forming a new USSR Constitution.

The authors of the article do not like the fact that each republic has the sovereign right to improve its own constitution and its own legislation. But we believe that without this, the radical restructuring of the economy and all spheres of life is inconceivable and the democratization of society impossible.

One can polemize with the most conservative views even if the chances of persuading one's opponent are not very great, even if he does not wish to see and hear. But how can we argue with authors who claim to give an "exhaustively objective" picture of the situation in our republics? We protest categorically against the fabrications and insinuations of these authors to falsely represent everything that is taking place in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and to depict these republics as a source of "constitutional evil" and intimidation. We will leave the political accusations, which come across as a political denunciation, on the conscience of the authors. We will simply dwell on the question of the "legal competence" of the authors and on the attempts to set some republics in opposition to others, and some peoples in opposition to others.

The article analyzes resolutions and legislative acts passed by the Estonian Supreme Soviet and Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in the same context as the programmatic aims of the People's Fronts and "Sajudis." Why? Because this is more to the advantage of the authors when it comes to proving their presumptive truth: to speak out in favor of preserving the old model of the union, because, by using vague arguments, the desire for republic sovereignty can be portrayed as a terrible evil.

Conscientiously doing someone's bidding, at the beginning of the article the authors very significantly make it understood that they are well informed about the idea of confederation. This does not accord with the truth: In Lithuania, for example, this idea has never been seriously discussed by anyone. The authors of the article categorically state that "demands to renew the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR are legally groundless." Where has this pseudoscientific generalization come from? In Lithuania, the idea of such a union treaty has never been suggested nor is it being suggested now, and, with regard to the question of **treaty relations** between the republics and the center, this is a question for the future and will, of course, depend on the choice made by the citizens of every republic, the choice of every people. After all, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies spoke unequivocally in favor of a qualitatively new union and treaty relations between the republics and union bodies.

We know all too well the true value of "internal and external limiters" (they have always existed and are so dear to the authors), so we cannot be frightened by the mechanism of "compensating the union budget for expenditure on the development of a republic and state subsidies or by enterprises of union jurisdiction being either dismantled by the union or bought back by a republic." But why do the authors conclude this passage

with a very significant passage on the "resettlement of large groups of citizens"? Such a provocative statement can produce nothing other than protest and outrage.

Where is the elementary logic if, on the one hand, the article admits the flaws in Brezhnev's union constitution and the far from perfect union legislation but, on the other, condemns the amendments to the Estonian Constitution and Lithuanian Constitution—amendments directed against the infringement of these republics' legal rights and the limitations on their sovereignty?

We must point out that the competence of the authors in this situation is questionable. For example, they skirt the issue of the constitutional processes in Latvia having their own specifics. They launch an attack against the decisions and actions of the People's Front Duma but fail to mention that the Latvian people have become the minority on their own national territory. May we ask: When did the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia hand their rights over to union jurisdiction? Perhaps it was in 1940? It would be interesting to find out how this happened and what the real mechanism of "voluntary participation" really is. The Baltic peoples know, without the scientific "revelations" of N. Mikhaleva and Sh. Papidze, of the deeds committed by Dekanozov in Lithuania (the Lithuanian people should be "grateful" to this butcher for the elections to the National Assembly and its decisions), by Vyshinskiy in Latvia, and by Zhdanov in Estonia, and they also know how the sovereign rights of the republics were replaced with pressure and blatant diktat.

We categorically reject primitive "arguments" that the economic independence of the Baltic republics supposedly pursues isolationist aims. Only people whose thinking is based on the old stereotypes of national policy and labeling could deem as absurd the idea of introducing a national currency into circulation in the republics. This is aimed at readers unfamiliar with the concept of economic autonomy.

We strongly protest against the way that in their article the authors try, without any facts to back this up (these facts do not exist), to create a picture of three selfish Baltic nations (these nations are allegedly trying to establish themselves at the expense of the national dignity of other peoples)—you really do need to have the right to make this kind of "scientific revelation."

The right to a conservative monopoly in the sphere of interethnic relations. The right to tendentiously select your facts. That someone has accorded them this right, the authors fully confirm as follows. They very much dislike the Baltic republics' language laws and strongly recommend other republics to follow the example of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic's basic law. This reflects the wish that every republic should have identical constitutions and systems of legislation.

Expressing the will of our electorate, we ask PRAVDA, which has so willingly offered its pages to one-sided, clearly tendentious articles like the one entitled "Federative Union," to also give the floor to the accused.

The accused--the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian peoples—with the hearts and minds of their legal experts, economists, historians, philosophers, and writers, have something to say to PRAVDA readers and have the right to deflect attempts to blacken our peoples and set them in opposition to the Russian people.

To the concluding phrase of the article—"The friendship of our peoples must not be consigned to nationalism and chauvinism"—we would like to add this: "Or consigned to neo-Stalinist, antirestructuring forces."

Is It a Question of Federalism?

The thrust of the article by N. Mikhaleva and Sh. Papidze, "Federative Union," published in PRAVDA 12 July this year seems perfectly simple: Our federation is a central power which possibly has some moral limitations and which occasionally bestows various rights on its component parts—the republics included. The response could be this: It would have been enough to read the documents of central organs of party and state authority in the Baltic republics and of their popular movements, and also some textbooks on state law not burdened by the ideological cliches of the past, for this article not to have appeared at all. But, as the position was expounded more extensively than required to express its simple idea—an idea which has long since become traditional for our country—any objection to it cannot be confined to one or two sentences.

The key to the whole article can be found in the following phrase: "The USSR has total, unlimited sovereignty." This opinion, which could, in principle, become a well-founded theory, remains a slogan. This is no accident. Because the arguments in its favor sound discordant against the background of current ideas. Indeed, to infer the primacy of the center from the Soviet Union's direct, total inheritance of the tsarist empire or from the political and military superiority of the center over the individual republics at the end of the 20th century is really awkward. Thus, instead of arguing its own theory (it is repeated throughout in various forms), the article develops its criticism of the views of its supposed opponents.

Let us hear this criticism.

The first point. The Baltic republics are trying to replace union principles with confederative principles. This is bad because (1) "a confederation is not a union state but an interstate union" and (2) "as history shows, this kind of formation is only temporary." But the USSR Constitution (although itself not a model of legal literacy and extremely out of real democracy) proceeds, in Articles 70 and 76, from a standpoint opposite to the claims made

by the authors. It interprets the USSR as a union of "sovereign soviet socialist states." And as far as the stability of a confederation is concerned.... In my opinion, neither Canada nor Switzerland, for example, have shown any sign of falling apart so far and evidently have no intention of doing so. And their economies are the kind of harmonious, judicious, effective whole which it would be premature for us to even dream about at present.

The second point. Estonian legislators made a bad move when they proclaimed the supremacy of their own laws over the federal laws. Lithuanian legislators made an even worse move when they did exactly the same thing (and, to be honest, even in a more successful form!—I.G.) after the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium had "explained" in its decree of 26 November 1988 that this was not allowed. In short, "working on the basis of the essence of the present USSR Constitution, the supremacy of union legislation is incontestable."

Again, it is hard to agree with this. We will start with the fact that this supremacy stems not from the "essence" of our constitution but from its letter—Article 74. As far as the essence of the constitution is concerned, in this particular case, contrary to the rules of philosophy, there are in fact two of them (essences, that is). The constitution contains articles expressing the democratic principles of our union—Articles 70 and 76, and also Article 72 (the right of a republic to secede from the union), Article 78 (the prohibition against changing the territory of a republic without its consent), and others. It also contains articles stating the opposite—Article 74, already mentioned, and also Article 166 (the public prosecutor of a republic is appointed by the center), Articles 73 and 113 (the competence of the center is unlimited), and so forth, not to mention departmental centralism in practice. So the author of the article "Federative Union" perceives just one essence in the constitution—the one which turns the USSR into a strictly unitarian state with territorial units slightly tinged with national color. But the majority of people living in the Baltic and their legislators perceive the other essence—perceive even in this extremely imperfect document the shoots of new, democratic transformations in our state.

With regard to the act which, according to the article, "explained" the unlawfulness of the decisions made by Estonian legislators on 16 November 1988, it should be borne in mind that this decree was not a good-natured exhortation but a decree which deemed invalid the expression of the will of one republic's legislative organ. This was done in direct violation of Section 2 of Article 64 of the USSR Supreme Soviet regulations, which do not give its presidium any right to abolish legislative acts passed by sovereign republics.

I think that these are enough points to be going on with for now. What is most dangerous, however, is not the expression of these opinions in the article but the desire to consolidate at all costs the centralist system which has existed all these decades and brought us to our present crisis. Here is one example. The authors "feel it advisable to consolidate the right of the union republic to appeal to the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee if it considers a union law to be...an infringement of its rights." To the inexperienced reader this sounds almost democratic. But this is a dirty trick. The USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee is a body of union authority which currently has the formal right to not only "oversee" the legislation of a republic (Article 125, Point 3). Recent amendments to the USSR Constitution which created this body give the center a completely new power: to suspend a republic act (Article 125, Section 5), which hitherto was possible only by illegal means (that is, by breaking the USSR Supreme Soviet regulations). The very dramatic refusal of the majority of deputies from the Baltic republics to take part in the congress vote on forming a USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee with such powers was no accident, and it was not a very noble thing to do to move such a proposal in the hopes that people would not know the ins and outs of the law.

Those sections of the article which ascribe certain aims and views to the people's fronts must be dealt with in a separate column. All this talk of Russophobia, however, is not as innocent as it may at first seem. Addressed to them, it is intended to sow a feeling of enmity in Russians for these "refractory Balts" and to serve to conceal the praise and justification of the centralist system which has proved its pernicious influence on the fate of Russia to no less an extent than on that of the other republics. And possibly on the fate of Russia more than any other. Is it not time to ask one of the most classic legal questions: To whose advantage is all this?

From PRAVDA's Ideology Department

Articles on the problems of interethnic relations have prompted an enormous readers' mail. A broad range of the most diverse opinions has been represented in the traditional PRAVDA "roundtables" "The USSR Is Our Common Home," and under the rubrics "Discussion Tribune" and "On the Upcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum."

PRAVDA readers have had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the opinions of authors representing virtually every union and autonomous republic and national okrug.

Those who have taken part in the discussion of these issues in PRAVDA include the following: Estonian worker U. Khaas, the Latvian poet Ya. Peters, Vilnius University Rector I. Kubilyus, representatives of the Armenian and Georgian intelligentsia, and workers and peasants from Belorussia, the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], the Tatar ASSR, and the Chuvash ASSR. Dozens of people feeling the need to share their opinions on and their concern at the state of interethnic relations in the country.

Today we published two letters written in response to the article "Federative Union" (PRAVDA 12 July 1989): A letter from I. Gryazin, a USSR people's deputy from Estonia, and a joint letter-rejoinder from B. Genzyalis and R. Gudaytis, USSR people's deputies from Lithuania.

We ask future participants in the continuing discussions on interethnic problems to voice their thoughts and opinions regarding these publications through PRAVDA.

However, we cannot fail to mention one particular feature of the letter sent to PRAVDA by the Lithuanian comrades. We are amazed that two representatives of the Lithuanian intelligentsia, an intelligentsia which has always been distinguished not only by excellent scientific argumentation but also by a high standard of discussion, should choose the method of berating their opponents instead of offering a calm, considered analysis of the article "Federative Union." PRAVDA readers can judge for themselves how pluralist, scientific, and democratic, how much in the spirit of our times the following terms really are: "We categorically reject primitive 'arguments,'" "people whose thinking is based on...labeling," "we strongly protest," "the right to a conservative monopoly," "the tendentious selection of facts," "the accused—the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian peoples," "accusations which come across as a political denunciation," "conscientiously doing someone's bidding," "provocative statement," "attempts to blacken our peoples," "neo-Stalinist, anti-restructuring forces," "fabrications and insinuations," and so forth.

And the last point. When we opened rubrics on national issues last year we urged the broadest range of our readers to take part in the PRAVDA discussion. We regret that Comrades I. Gryazin, B. Genzyalis, and R. Gudaytis were not among those who responded and that only the appearance of the article "Federative Union" compelled them to express their opinions on those fundamental problems which have been discussed in PRAVDA for more than a year now. It is also a pity that their letters were not sent to the editorial office direct, through the normal democratic channels, so to speak, through which all PRAVDA authors go—and not only writers for our newspaper in fact—but via the highest authorities.

Georgian Deputy Minister of Justice Interviewed

PM1008081489 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 15 Jul 89 p 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Taliashvili, Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic deputy minister of justice, by Aleksey Sinelnikov: "End of the Era of 'Informals'?"; date, place of interview not given, first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] The new Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet decree could cause us to delete the term "informal" from our vocabulary, since it opens the doors for all civil initiatives to engage in normal organizational activity. How was the decree drawn up, what significance do the compilers themselves attach to particular provisions—Aleksandr Taliashvili, republic deputy minsiter of justice, who played an active part in drafting the document, told us about this.

[Sinelnikov] Aleksandr Georgiyevich, I am very pleased to note that the decree is an example of the positive independence of republican legislation from union legislation. To the best of my knowledge the Union has no such law as yet, nor does one exist in republics like Russia or the Ukraine. Why did the ministry take the initiative, and what was the need to adopt this decree at this time?

[Taliashvili] True, no union legislation yet exists on the registration of independent social organizations. Nonetheless it is known that such a law is being drawn up and people's deputies are working on it. Similar decrees have already been adopted in Lithuania, Estonia, and Kazakhstan. In our work we drew mainly on Lithuania's experience, because it seemed to us that the Lithuanian version is the most democratic.

What made us tackle this problem? The specific reason was this: Representatives of the informal group "Democratic Elections in Georgia" turned to us. This group is engaged in monitoring the compliance of election procedures with the Law on Elections. The group's statutes and an account of the tasks it sets itself were submitted to us. The aims, let me say, incidentally, are of the noblest kind, and as lawyers we can only welcome the group's assistance in maintaining the rule of law during elections. But we immediately came up against the absence of a mechanism for registering "informal" groups. You remember that formerly the republic Council of Ministers registered such groups and societies only on a decision of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau. This mechanism no longer meets today's needs and is not appropriate to the level of democracy we have attained. We needed a law clearly and precisely defining the procedure and time scale for registration and listing the necessary conditions. We could not wait for a decision to reach us from above, because we were under great pressure from below. In such cases legislation has no right to lag behind practice.

[Sinelnikov] Who worked on the draft decree, how speedily did the work proceed?

[Taliashvili] A collective from the Ministry of Justice and the legal department of the Supreme Soviet Presidium apparatus did the work. The work went very speedily. I would like to draw your attention to this point. The decree is provisional, which means that the adoption of a permanent law is still to come. We expect the registration procedure to exist in its present form for 6-8 months. It contains democratic groundwork for that

period. Note the points that protect the rights of "informals" in registration. A complaints procedure is stipulated, registration can only be refused for a stated reason, and the time scale for the decision is laid down.

[Sinelnikov] This, of course, makes life difficult for bureaucratic activity. But please explain: The decree states that the organizations' statutes must not be contrary to normative acts. Could you clarify precisely what acts are meant?

[Taliashvili] The republic Constitution, its laws, Supreme Soviet Presidium Decrees, and Council of Ministers resolutions. Departmental acts are not laws, and in this respect are not taken into account.

[Sinelnikov] What amendments were made to the draft decree during its discussion?

[Taliashvili] The draft made no particular mention of the powers of Tbilisi City Soviet Executive Committee in registering "informals." In the decree, it is granted these powers. So even during the final work on the draft, we progressed toward democratization.

[Sinelnikov] And how will the registration of social organizations take place in the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR], the Adzhar ASSR, and the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast? Nothing is said about this in the text of the law.

[Taliashvili] The procedure for registration of social organizations and associations of citizens on their territory is common to all of them, namely, it takes place through the Georgian Council of Ministers. Let me stress again that the law is very necessary and timely. But it is open to improvement. Practice should show in what direction it should be changed.

Georgian Development Study Groups Confer

PM1408142189 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 18 Jul 89 pp 1, 2

[GRUZINFORM report: "Georgia's Party Organization: National Development Concept Elaborated"]

[Text] A combined sitting of the working groups to elaborate the Georgian party organization's concept in the sphere of national development was held 15 July at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee. Set up by decision of the 15th Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, their task is to prepare a document which is to profoundly and thoroughly reflect questions of Georgia's political, economic, social, and cultural development, interethnic relations, and demographic and environmental policy. This document should clearly define the position, strategy, and tactics of the republic's party organization in national-state building and highlight a real action program for the immediate future and the long term.

The sitting was chaired by Givi Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

The following took part in discussing the question: Guram Muchaidze, doctor of historical sciences, head of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers Economic Management Institute Marxism-Leninism Department; Poet Dzhansug Charkviani, director of the "Sabchota Sakartvelo" Publishing House; Levan Aleksidze, prorector at Ivane Dzhavakhishvili Tbilisi State University and corresponding member of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences; Vakhtang Dzhaoshvili, head of department at the Vakhushti Bagrationi Geography Institute and corresponding member of the republic's Academy of Sciences; Guram Koranashvili, doctor of Historical Sciences, senior scientific staffer at the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences Ivane Dzhavakhishvili History, Archaeology, and Ethnography Institute; Rismag Gordeziani, leader of the Tbilisi State University laboratory investigating Mediterranean culture and corresponding member of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences; Eduard Kodua, head of Tbilisi State University Sociology Department; Mariya Lordkipanidze, head of the Tbilisi State University Georgian History Department and corresponding member of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences; Academician Nodar Amaglobeli from the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences; Revaz Glonti, chairman of the Georgian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade; writer Levan Sanikidze, chairman of the Georgian Demographic Society Board; and others.

The discussion was frank and profoundly committed. It covered virtually every aspect of the upcoming great and difficult work. Concerned at the republic's future and the prospects for its sociopolitical and socioeconomic development, the participants in the sitting voiced constructive proposals on the whole spectrum of the real problems of Georgia's national rebirth.

It was noted that the elaboration of the concept of the republic's party organization in the sphere of national development is an extremely complex, multifaceted, and at the same time extremely crucial matter. No mistakes and errors are permissible here. No aspect or facet of the problem should be overlooked and it is necessary to clearly realize and analyze the lessons of both the past, the present situation, and the future. This is what predetermined the need to set up seven working groups on a democratic basis to elaborate such a significant document. These include groups on questions of political development, economic development, social development, the development of science, education, culture, and interethnic relations, the improvement of the demographic and environmental situation in the republic, and an editorial group. In them, alongside party, soviet, and economic leaders, prominent scientists—historians, jurists, economists, social scientists—teachers, journalists, highly qualified specialists in all sorts of fields, and

public representatives are broadly represented. Naturally, membership of these working groups will not be restricted. All the proposals regarding improvements in their composition will be examined. It seems beneficial to recruit additional specialists and consult with them in order to substantiate particular questions and prepare recommendations. Even the working groups themselves must cooperate closely with one another. It is the task of young people and the broad public to take an active part in the work of these groups.

Democratization, glasnost, and the processes of perestroyka have sharply galvanized public life, it was said at the sitting. They have brought to the fore problems of national and interethnic relations in all their acuteness. One can sense the awakening of national consciousness everywhere and in everything along with a concern to preserve and maintain a solicitous attitude toward language, culture, traditions, the legacy of the past, and other national assets. Now, more than ever before, people react in a very sensitive and acute fashion to restrictions on the sovereign rights of the people and the republic and to each and every deformation, however small, in interethnic relations. One cannot fail to take this objective reality into consideration, the speakers stressed. There is no task more important for the Georgian Communist Party and the republic's government than the solution of specific pressing national questions. It is here that they need the support of the broadest public today.

The participants in the sitting expressed the profound conviction that the republic's party organization must turn sharply—through 180 degrees—toward solving nationalities problems. One must not take fright at this formulation of the question since it is the only correct path. But resolution of the problems in question must be approached in a well considered and constructive fashion.

The party initiated democratization and the broadening of glasnost. This necessitated radical perestroyka of the forms and methods of party work. As M.S. Gorbachev pointed out in his speech at the Leningrad CPSU Oblast Committee Plenum, the party is faced with the need for profound internal transformations. The party must rapidly restructure itself in order to effectively fulfill its role as the political vanguard and coordinate and consolidate society around the tasks and aims of perestroyka. It is a matter of a question of cardinal importance for the fate of the country—bringing all party activity into line with the situation in society. We must see the reasons for the critical attitude toward the party since people assess the practice of perestroyka and its real results by this yardstick. The main thing now is to find one's niche and change the style of work. It is also indisputable that close contacts with working people and the people must be regarded as of paramount importance in all party

The elaboration of the Georgian party organization's concept of national development is also one of the first serious steps to restructure the work of the republic's party organization. There is no need to prove that concern for national development means, above all, concern for the people's interests: For the party belongs to and exists solely for the people, expressing their interests. If we want to ensure that this is no bare statement of fact, if we want to fill these words with specific, real substance, Communists and the party organization must radically change their attitude to the problems that have accumulated in the national development sphere. Moreover, they must not only change their attitude but also take on the task of revealing, analyzing, and solving these problems. The main thing here is to possess the ability to predict and see the future. The prestige of primary party organs, elected party organs, and the republic's party organization as a whole directly depends on this.

It was stressed that the republic's party organization wants and is able to enlist broad strata of the people in elaborating a profoundly well thought-out and analyzed and thoroughly well considered national development program. It is this program that must consolidate all healthy forces in society, unite the efforts of the Georgian people and all peoples living in the republic, and normalize their mutual relations. Unusual, innovative, and bold decisions are needed most of all in the national development sphere. Concern to strengthen Georgian statehood and concern for the interests of the indigenous nation must be an expression of concern for the interests of all nations inhabiting the republic, since this is a unified dialectical process. That is a clear viewpoint, position, and irreversible stance to which there is not and will not be any alternative.

It was noted that the substance of the concepts of nationalism and the national must be separated and that the urgent problems of national-state building placed on the agenda by glasnost, perestroyka, and democratization must not be seen as a manifestation of nationalism, just as the contrasting of nations' interests and elevation of scientific disputes and domestic conflicts to the level of big-league politics must be condemned. It was also said that none of a nation's cultural treasures should be artificially diminished. More must be done to expose and study the legacy of unjustly forgotten writers and public figures.

The republic has taken definite steps of late to raise, study and resolve problems that have accumulated over the years in the sphere of national development. A Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution has set up a representative coordinating commission, which has set to work and is preparing proposals on the broadest questions of national-state building. Working groups have been formed under it on questions of implementing real sovereignty for Georgia, introducing the status of officials of the Georgian SSR and conditions governing the operation of USSR laws on Georgian

territory, restoring national troop formations, and ensuring that the republic's draftees do their military service on the republic's territory. Groups are working under the leadership of this commission to prepare a draft Georgian SSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the Georgian SSR Constitution (Basic Law) and draft Georgian SSR laws on elections of Georgian SSR people's deputies and Georgian SSR local soviet people's deputies. Commissions to make a political and legal assessment of the violation of the 1920 treaty between Georgia and Soviet Russia, study immigration processes in the republic, and elaborate concrete proposals on these questions have also begun their work. It is very important, it was said at the sitting, to ensure that the activity of all these commissions and working groups is carried out under conditions of complete glasnost and receives broad and regular coverage in the press so that the documents they elaborate become the subject of nationwide discussion.

Thus the party organization is not personally monopolizing the resolution of questions of vital importance for the republic. One cannot at the same time allow any other department, organization, or individual to monopolize the right to resolve these questions. All of us have one homeland and that is why the political, economic, social, and cultural tasks facing the people must be resolved by joint efforts and we must take care to develop our spiritual sphere, native language, and culture, and preserve the legacy of the past together.

What specific proposals have been made regarding the Georgian party organization's concept for national development, which is now being elaborated? A keen and constructive exchange of opinions on this question revealed various viewpoints; however, the speakers were unanimous in saying that the program document must reflect clearly and unequivocally the stance held by the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's entire party organization along with their attitude to urgent problems of national-state building. It must be a long-term program which clearly shows the people and the public how the Georgian party organization imagines the future of our republic, the Georgian people, and all Georgia's peoples. The concept must be noted for its profound democracy and humanism, must consider as far as possible the interests of the Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples, and must incline the representatives of Russian, Armenian, Azerbaijan, Greek, and other peoples living in the republic to live a peaceful and harmonious life on Georgian soil.

That is our people's noble tradition. It is at the same time necessary to ensure that the non-Georgian population regards the legitimate interests of the indigenous nation with the proper respect and respects its language, culture, traditions, and national values. In short, we need an innovative and unconventional program in line with the time of perestroyka and glasnost, a program which will release us of the heavy burden and dogmas of the past. A concept arising from the real situation and future tasks must reflect everything of concern to the people and our society, all the sensitive issues, and all the problems which it is now or is becoming objectively possible to solve.

In this important matter there is no need to find out who is the father of the nation and who is the most ardent patriot. We now need to unite and pool our efforts and cooperation. It is absolutely necessary to keep calm and self-possessed and follow common sense. Otherwise the most complex problems cannot be resolved. Calm, self-possession, and common sense are necessary to ensure that various processes and various phenomena do not acquire a dangerous character and do not develop in an extreme fashion. Every department, every organization, every establishment, Communists, and nonparty members must rise to serve the nation. Political, economic, social, and, at first glance, even purely technical problems must be approached from the viewpoint of national development. The activity of a ministry, department, establishment or organization cannot be assessed positively now, whatever good indicators they may have, if their actions and their every step are not gauged in terms of benefit for the nation.

The participants in the sitting expressed the conviction that the members of the working groups and the broad public will tackle with their characteristic responsibility and activeness the nationwide work of elaborating a national development concept for Georgia. It was stressed that the main point here must not be forgotten: Strenuous work, supreme professionalism, and competence, love for the cause, order, a calm atmosphere, and mutual respect and cooperation are needed in order to implement this program.

Things have never been as difficult for Georgia as they are now. That is why the idea was stressed over and over at the sitting that all forces in society need to consolidate, engage in dialogue, and unite in order to ensure that the national development concept is elaborated in the shortest possible time and at a high qualitative level. For the future of Georgia and all its people depends to a decisive degree on this concept and on how consistently and purposefully it is implemented.

The following took part in the sitting: Comrades O.G. Vardzelashvili, G.N. Yenukidze, T.V. Lordkipanidze, B.D. Makharashvili, G.A. Metonidze, A.Yu. Pavshentsev, O.Ye. Cherkeziya, N.A. Chitanava, N.R. Sadzhaya, and P.P. Chkheidze.

Court-Ordered Property Seizures Ineffective

18001353 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Jul 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by G. Orlovskiy: "Wearing Gold Chains. How the Farce Is Played Out After Court-Ordered 'Property Seizures'"]

[Text] Recently, after the trial of a bribetaker, I decided to share my impressions with member of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme

Court V.I. Cherkasov. The profiteer received a stiff sentence, with a property seizure thrown into the bargain. A major sum that he has appropriated from the wallet of the people was charged to him....

"As far as the 'people's wallet' is concerned, I do not share your optimism. The embezzled money will hardly end up there...."

Many years of familiarity with the court practice certainly have not left me so naive as to believe that all that has been stolen from the state will be recovered rapidly and without a problem. However, I admit to not suspecting that literally a tragicomic farce is played out after sentencing, as V.I. Cherkasov told me. I decided to take a closer look at the so-called "enforcement cases."

Alas, the debts of spoilers and profiteers reaching into the millions are collected poorly. For example, according to the sentence, R27,000 had to be collected from M. Ivanov, sentenced for theft in 1961. Now, 27 years later, he owes R14,000. However, these are "historical debts." I am more concerned with recent cases.

A summer cottage sits on the mountain of Novyy Akhun in Khosta Rayon (this is Sochi). It belongs to A. Merzlyy. To be sure, it is not referred to as a "summer cottage" officially, because it qualifies as a "shack" in the "South" gardening cooperative. There is no need to explain to the citizens of Sochi what kind of a "shack" that is; anyone can see it. Another thing needs to be explained: Why does this cottage still belong to A. Merzlyy, though this structure (more precisely, the value of it, as well as of everything surrounding it)...was confiscated by a sentence of the Supreme Court as early as 1985?

Before I offer my own version of this almost detective story, I will recall who it is about. Yes, this is the same A. Merzlyy many people have heard about. The readers of our newspaper have certainly had their memories refreshed after reading our recent publication "The Medunov Arrangements." A degenerate, former first secretary of the Sochi Gorkom [city committee] A. Merzlyy, who lived the sweet life under the wing of his protector, was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment for bribery. It was resolved to collect from him R18,759 in damages inflicted on an array of organizations, as well as R26,627 in proceeds of the state as being obtained illegally in the form of bribes. As of today, R2,573 of indemnity have been collected (this is what they managed to confiscate during his arrest, according to the inventory). A "small" debt of R46,312 remains. Now for the summer cottage. Obviously, proceeds from selling it could have helped cover the loss at least to a degree. However, this "shack" still stands, and no one gets close to it.

For 4 years now not just anyone but the Supreme Court has been trying to have the sentence enforced, but to no avail. Court orders were sent to the Central Rayon People's Court of the City of Sochi as early as 1985, in a timely manner. Chairman of this court A. Pesotskiy fell silent for a year, and then responded to a request with something inarticulate. Correspondence began with threatening instructions going to chief of the justice department of the krayispolkom [kray executive committee] A. Shinkarev and Judge A. Pesotskiy. Why is the sentence not being enforced? They were silent, writing back to the Supreme Court on rare occasions that the execution of the sentence was hampered by the countersuit brought by the daughter of Merzlyy seeking to strike from the inventory... a piano. What has a piano got to do with it? They tore their hair out at the Supreme Court. The further they went the thicker it got. In 1987, Deputy Minister of Justice Yu.D. Severin, who was brought into the "fray," communicated after conducting an inspection that the court orders were handed on time to bailiff V. Danshin, but were not enforced due to the lack of control on the part of A. Pesotskiy. The Ministry of Justice reported that A. Pesotskiy and V. Danshin do not work for them anymore. A. Shinkarev was disciplined.

Would you think that actions followed this? Chairman of the Khosta Rayon People's Court (turns out the cottage is situated here, previously this "was not known") V. Ryabus, new bailiffs, and employees of finance organs joined in the dawdling. (I can find no other word for it). However, all the time something "prevented" them from enforcing the sentence. I would like to quote a document dated as recently as 5 June of the current year. I believe it is the last one signed by Ye.A. Smolentsev in his capacity as chairman of the Supreme Court of the [Russian] Federation (he has been elected chairman of the USSR Supreme Court). Addressing Minister of Justice V.A. Abolentsev, the author writes: "I am compelled to address you through the present letter in conjunction with the unprecedented procrastination by the employees of the Central and Khosta Rayon People's Courts of the city of Sochi in enforcing the sentence in the case of A. Merzlyy... I request that an opportunity be found for an immediate and precise execution of the sentence and disciplining of employees who have allowed the red tape."

You can see to which heights "beyond the clouds" the case on confiscating just one cottage has soared. The entire mighty mechanism of justice got stuck in front of the little house of Merzlyy, and has been spinning its wheels for 4 years now. Should we acknowledge the helplessness of this mechanism? I would not like to draw this sad conclusion. Should we then settle everything with the "disgraced" bailiff? This is too simple. Could it be that in the field someone just pretends to be "enforcing," as, unfortunately, is the custom not only in the justice organs? I tried to check out this version. Curious details came up. They did try to enforce the sentence on confiscating the cottage after all. To this end, the simplest operation had to be performed: A new "member" had to be accepted by the "South" gardening cooperative who would have contributed the sum set for the structure—and the papers had to be transferred to the state.

Now I would like to render almost word for word a letter from N.I. Titova that lifts the curtain covering the "secret":

—I have long dreamed about acquiring a garden plot with a shack. My daughter is handicapped. They suggested that I join the "South" cooperative and buy a confiscated house. I paid the value of the cottage—R7,415. However, they did not give me the house. I went to see anyone and everyone: the prosecutor, Judge Ryabus. They said the daughter of Merzlyy would not surrender the key, and I supposedly had to go to court. Why on earth should I go to court for my money?

Subsequently, the letter says: "The daughter of Merzlyy came wearing gold chains and diamonds... and said: 'The state will not give you money back, but I will!. There is nothing to be afraid of for you—you paid the money, and I use the cottage. My father will come back soon...' You tell me why I knock on the doors of courts, the prosecutor's office, and financial organs for my hard-earned [money]. Why should I bow down to I. Merzlaya?"

I am not about to comment on this letter, but I will refer to the opinion of V.I. Cherkasov, member of the RSFSR Supreme Court, who has been trying to get this sentence enforced for many years now. He said this entire story indirectly confirms the reluctance to enforce the sentence. The words of Merzlaya 'My father will come back soon' are not a matter of chance... I admit that it was painful to hear a judge say this.

There are strong words about the "unprecedented red tape" in the letter of the Supreme Court chairman that I have quoted above. I am compelled to disappoint the author. I familiarized myself with the enforcement of the sentence in one more notorious case, that of Mosglavtorg [Moscow Main Administration of Trade], the "Tregubov case." Specifically, on 8 September 1986 Tregubov's former First Deputy A. Petrikov was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, chief of one of the departments G. Khokhlov to 10 years, both of them for bribery, and with the seizure of property. Petrikov was to pay R83,350, and Khokhlov R28,095. As the reader would guess, the cottages, i.e. downpayment contributions, the cost of structures and plantings in the gardening cooperative "Friendship" of the Main Administration of Trade of the Moscow City Executive Committee were to be confiscated. What came of it? Court orders forwarded to the Vidnoye People's Court (the "Friendship" in question is located in this jurisdiction) were returned. Why? "The structures are not subject to forfeiture as they have been constructed by the 'Friendship' Gardening Cooperative without a permit. The right of property does not apply to such structures. The enforcement case has been dropped by the court." Period.

However, I have visited "Friendship"; it is 4 km away from the Moscow Beltway. It is a good settlement that is well taken care of; it has existed in the forest and park belt for many years. I have been courteously escorted along its streets by "Friendship" Chairman G.V. Lysko. I have seen the cottage of Petrikov. This is no mirage, but a well-built house (just in case, I took a picture of it lest it "disappear," as it did when the time came to confiscate it). Later I visited the Khokhlov compound, and even met the owner (he is already back: amnesty, points for good behavior, parole). Let us not dwell on the fact of the meeting itself. The man is old and sick... Maybe, the time he has already served would suffice. However, I was interested in something else, the debt! There is no apparent prospect of having it repaid. The most interesting point is that "Friendship" attempted to help the bailiff enforce the sentence, but... according to the records, the settlement does not exist!

This is no mysticism. For decades this marvelous settlement has existed next door to the capital city, but the land here was allocated without the right to develop it many years ago. Both in the Vidnoye City Ispolkom and the Moscow Oblast Soviet, they know full-well that this is a fiction. Here they are, the cottages. It is high time to legalize the existence of the gardening cooperatives, but in this case the interests of "some" of its members will suffer. After all, here "the fathers" are already returning! The houses could be confiscated, but... there is no property right. Still, the old owners and their relatives live in these homes! I have no reason to suspect Chairman of the Vidnoye City Executive Committee V. Golovin and Chairman of the Moscow Oblast Executive Committee I. Cherepanov of malevolence, but the Supreme Court has asked them many times to resolve the issue of the fate of the settlement and legalize its "structures" in order to resolve the issue of confiscation. There have been no responses or decisions.

This is to say nothing about little-known and quiet cases. Damages to the state are repaid over decades, literally in drops. In 1972 a large group of thieves was sentenced, 29 persons, who had inflicted damages of R175,000 on the Rostov Oblast Department of Health. Just one of them, R. Saakyan, was charged with R28,000 in losses. It has been 17 years since, and the debt has decreased to...R21,000. Many such examples can be quoted. There are also some statistical "rays" that illuminate the overall picture. I found out at the RSFSR Ministry of Justice that "the residual under the sentences of past years" (that is, damages not indemnified) amounted to R177 million between 1984 and 1988! Why beginning in 1984? Previously there was no such clear-cut accounting. It was only known that by the "base" year damages not indemnified to the state amounted to R129 million. At present the trend is upward. For the sake of objectivity, it needs to be said that some of the assets stolen are successfully returned to the state coffers: in 1987, R43 million; in 1988, R28 million. To be sure, the sums of stolen assets "according to the sentences" are almost one-half greater.

Incidentally, I asked about the indemnification of damages due to crime to the citizens (previously, only damages inflicted on the state have been discussed). It turned

out that... such statistics do not exist at all, as if people were not suffering losses due to theft, banditry, arson, and car theft. This discrimination against the citizens compared to the state is entirely without explanation. What kind of a "mechanism" is it that is supposed to collect the damages to citizens and the state coffers due to crime, and which works so atrociously? At present it ensures damaged indemnification rather than the indemnification of damages. Let us look at the details of the mechanism.

The bailiffs, of which there are 6,503 in all of Russia, are the main players in this mechanism. They are the ones who should ensure the actual enforcement of the sentence as far as collection is concerned, as well as numerous rulings in civil cases. The salary of a bailiff is R100 to R120, and 92 percent of them are women (a majority of them young, accumulating work tenure; flexible hours of work are also lucrative). Out of them, 7.5 percent have paralegal and college diplomas. Imagine the real visit by such a girl for enforcing a severe sentence of confiscation! In the process of working on this material, I have met dozens of bailiffs. There are enthusiasts and genuine defenders of the interests of the state among them. However... they may be denied entry to an apartment for conducting enforcement actions; they cannot seek the services of a merchandise specialist for an appraisal; they have no facilities for storing the assets confiscated. Where are they to get sworn witnesses? How are the valuables to be delivered to state storage depots? At times they have no transportation and no funds to travel to the debtor! They are just... petitioners rather than representatives of the state. N. Nakonechnaya, the bailiff from Vidnoye, was simply denied access to the compound when she decided to take an inventory of the assets of Petrikov. Up to 650 enforcement cases per person—is this realistic? To be sure, there is an incentive—5 percent in bonuses for the actual indemnification of damages due to theft. Bribes and abuses are another category, as if it matters how the state coffers were plundered. There is no end to such unsoundness.

Why am I narrating this sad story about bailiffs. (It can also be carried on)? I wish they would not forget this forgotten detachment of law enforcement in the course of developing the legal reform. After all, tremendous losses due to the poor indemnification of damages are also the result of a disastrous situation in an important part of an "executive mechanism" of jurisprudence.

At present, judges are put in charge of enforcement cases, whereas departments of justice are in charge of hiring and firing the bailiffs and training them. The duality of "management" brings about the dispersion of responsibility, as is always the case. In many cases this is a burden for the chairman of the people's court; after all, many court orders concern "someone else's cases," whereas other court echelons do not have bailiffs. The investigators who are the first "to get close" to the criminal have no special interest in ensuring future collection. They need just the evidence; they have no time to search for the assets of the accused secreted in the residences of relatives. Try to find these assets after the sentencing! It is only on TV that they show "mountains" of money and valuables. In reality, this is rarely encountered. Later, after the sentencing, the relatives bring lawsuits seeking to strike from the inventory the assets supposedly belonging to them. One person steals, and many get to use it. The result is such that the fear of having to indemnify for the loss disappears. They are afraid of prison, but they are not apprehensive of economic sanctions. "The debt hole" does not exist, but it would be a great deterrent!

This is how many negative problems have come on approaches to the topic of indemnification for damages. Does our justice know the way to improve the state of affairs? They propose to set up the position of a judge for administrative affairs, and turn over to him all enforcement cases; expand and clearly set forth the rights of bailiffs; and entrust the indemnification of damages to other law enforcement organs as well. They even suggest holding confiscated assets "auctions," because at present jewelry is accepted as scrap of precious metals. There are a lot of proposals... Be that as it may, merely R12 million a year are collected in withholding from the salary of those sentenced, even with the "scope" of theft being what it is in our country! Everyone is reflecting and thinking. The only thing not apparent is interest, concern for the state coffers, and actions.

Much more can be told about other "miracles" involving indemnity for the damage inflicted on the state and the citizens by criminals. However, this is enough! Indeed, I do not want to overburden the reader with problems. With much regret, I may state: If we do not change the entire approach, the entire organization of the endeavor of indemnifying the state coffers for damages, Merzlyy, Petrikov, and others need not be concerned too much. "The fathers" will return to "their" cottages....

Ufa Explosion 'Could Have Been Avoided'

18220154 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[Article by V. Orlov: "Signs of Trouble. The Tragedy Near Ufa Could Have Been Avoided. They Were in Too Great a Hurry With the 'Early Completion Report'"]

[Text] **One wants to shout so that everyone can hear: "People! Why are you so indifferent? After all, you prepared the tragedy at Ufa with your own hands."**

I shall cite two official documents. On 30 August 1988 (9 months before the catastrophe) a senior investigator at the Tyumen Oblast procurator's office, V. Smirnov, sent a message to the chief of the Ural-Siberian main petroleum pipelines in Ufa, R. Vitayev:

"The procurator's office for Tyumen Oblast has investigated a criminal case of poor-quality capital construction on the section of the main product pipeline through

Western Siberia-Ural-Povolzhye in the southern part of Tyumen Oblast. A number of serious construction imperfections and defects have been revealed in the form of incomplete backfilling, defects in insulation, mechanical damage to the body of the pipe, and repeated breakdowns and failures involving destruction of the pipes and leaking of the product being transported. From the materials of the criminal investigation and testimony from witnesses, it is clear that the construction of this pipeline on the section operated by your administration was also carried out with imperfections and defects.

"Reporting this, I am requesting that you organize an inspection of the quality of the work done on the section of the pipeline within the territory of the administration of the Ural-Siberian main petroleum pipelines, and if defects are revealed that you send the materials from the inspection to the appropriate territorial procurator."

Many months passed. Having received no answer to his message, on 18 May of this year (16 days before the tragic night) senior investigator Smirnov sent the following reminder to this same chief of the administration of the Ural-Siberian main petroleum pipelines in Ufa, R. Vitayev:

"On 30 August 1988 the procurator of Tyumen Oblast sent you a message regarding an investigation of a criminal case involving poor-quality construction of the main pipeline on the Siberia-Ural-Povolzhye section and suggested that you organize an inspection of the quality of this pipeline on the section served by your administration, and send the results to the procurator's office. I request that you report to us the results of your disposition of the aforementioned message."

The people in Ufa remained silent as usual. But soon something erupted there that shook the entire world.

And yet a young investigator from Tyumen had warned them almost a year ago of the trouble that was threatening them. No, Viktor Lvovich Smirnov is neither an oracle nor a seer. He is a normal, conscientious person. He is 28 years old. He has been through the law school at Omsk University. Then he worked for a year as an investigator for a military procurator's office. And this is his fourth year as a member of the collective of the Tyumen Oblast procurator's office.

It was he who ended up with the letter sent from PRAVDA written by a large group of workers from the Tyumen petroleum pipeline administration for verification and proper action. This letter was concerned with many cases of defective work in the construction of the ill-fated petroleum pipeline. A criminal case was initiated and an investigation begun. With the help of scientists and practical workers he collected a large number of expert opinions, analyses, and tests. He questioned hundreds of witnesses. He himself climbed over dozens of kilometers of pipelines.

He collected voluminous investigatory material—more than 20 volumes. In V. Smirnov's opinion, he had established the reasons for the defects and violations on the pipeline. In the indictment he charged the leaders of Glavsibtruboprovodstroy [the Main Siberian Pipeline Construction Administration] with rushed, poor-quality work. The chief of the investigatory section of the oblast procurator's office, G. Antipin, praised his young colleague for his enthusiastic work. Now it would be logical to proceed—to court. But the unforeseen happened. The careful and lengthy investigation unexpectedly encountered an obstacle in the final stage in the...board of the procurator's office. For some reason it found unconvincing the volumes of evidence collected by V. Smirnov showing that the Tyumentazpromstroy under the Glavsibtruboprovodstroy had committed the grossest violations in its area, as a result of which several accidents had already occurred. The board unexpectedly decided to conduct a further investigation.

At this board meeting the former deputy procurator, V. Orekhov, stated outright that the decision was the result of pressure from the leadership of the oblast and ministry, who were trying to squelch the matter and steer the blame away from the leaders of the construction project.

PRAVDA spoke out against this decision of the board. In an article entitled "Pressure on the Procurator" (22 November 1988), we insisted that workers of the Tyumen Oblast procurator's office not give in to the pressure from the series of telephone calls from protectors in high places, and that the case against those guilty of rushed, slipshod work be brought to completion.

But the newspaper's wishes were not taken into account. Apparently the advice from the other "side" outweighed our wishes. The chief of the investigatory section, G. Antipin, and investigator V. Smirnov argue in support of this. It was their deep conviction that the written instructions from the oblast procurator, V. Bagin, given to them when the case was sent back to them for further investigation, would lead only to dragged out proceedings.

"Judge for yourself," says V. Smirnov. "In order to carry out these instructions, during the course of the additional investigation I would have had to halt the operation of the pipeline, dig up 143 kilometers of mainline, bring up the pipes, show the defects, eliminate the problems, and dig them under again. According to construction norms, this would have taken about 2 years and almost R3 million of capital investment. It is not without reason that the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] deputy procurator, I. Zemlyanushin, drew V. Bagin's attention to the fact that to carry out his instructions was "not expedient since it would involve significant material expenditures and nonproductive expenditures of time and human resources."

"I assert," said G. Antipin, "that the oblast procurator and the board did not assist the investigation but hampered it."

It is difficult for me to be a dispassionate arbitrator in this conflict. One thing is now evident: The leadership of the procurator's office of Tyumen Oblast acted slowly and indecisively. At the same time, those who conducted the investigation were not completely persistent, and as a result, on 20 January of this year an order was given to close the criminal case concerning mass defects in the pipeline. This order was approved by the oblast deputy procurator, N. Kostko.

I spoke with him. Of course, Nikolay Borisovich agrees, if this case had been taken to court at the end of last year the tragedy at Ufa might not have taken place. The attention of the public and union organizations would have been drawn to this project. But at the same time the board failed to send the case to court, not because someone was putting pressure on it, but because it felt that the guilt of those accused in the investigation had not been convincingly proved. Why cast the shadow of a lawsuit on respected leaders?...

"At the same time," said N. Kostko, "if V. Smirnov and his boss, G. Antipin, were convinced that they were right, why did they not properly appeal the board's decision and go to the republic procurator?"

"Yes, now I blame myself for being too timid before the leaders," Viktor Smirnov laments. "At the same time, you must understand my position. Getting into a confrontation with the procurator and the board?... After all, we are in different leagues! I did my tedious and difficult work honestly. I did not present any forged documents. I did not keep the accused under guard. I did everything I could to find not scapegoats, but the real guilty parties. It is my deep conviction that these were the leaders who were specifically responsible for the construction of this section of the mainline. They included representatives of Glavsibtruboprovodstroy, the Ministry of Construction for Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, and the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry."

"Where do the roots of what happened lie?" I asked V. Smirnov.

"The essence," answered the investigator, "is that the ministries and party and soviet agencies of the oblasts and republics through which the pipeline passes were in too great a hurry to report an 'early start-up' of this important national economic project. They took the path that had been tested—they separated a so-called start-up complex out of the project. Numerous anti-emergency measures were thrown overboard from this 'complex': reserve lines that duplicate the mainline in places where it crosses rivers and ravines and runs near cities. They also eliminated dispatcher communications. It became impossible to contact people working on the route. They also 'curtailed' the automation of the gate valves in the pipeline that would have made it possible to close any gate valve on the mainline by pressing a button from the dispatcher point. Therefore, now if there is an accident, a special brigade flies in by helicopter, looks for the location of the break, lands, and closes the gate valve by hand... When the pipeline was released for operation with pomp and speeches 4 years ago there were promises to complete what had not been included in the start-up complex. But nothing has been done to this day. More than a thousand kilometers of pipeline are being operated blindly."

Among the witnesses questioned by the investigator was one with the same name as his—the general director of Soyuzneftegazpererabotka [All-Union Industrial Association for Processing Petroleum and Gas Products], A. Smirnov. He was in charge of the state commission that accepted the pipeline for operation.

"The state commission that A. Smirnov explained to me," the investigator continued his discussion, "is something like a general at a wedding. He is there for solidity. But the work it does is a formality since the pipes have already been dug into the ground when the pipeline is accepted. The work of the commission members consists in verifying the paperwork, making sure that the documents have been filled out correctly. The chairman of the state commission told me that all the papers were 'in order.' But when I began to work on the investigation I was amazed by the number of sham documents, falsified names, and various jobs for which credit was given but which were not done. Even our most experienced experts said that from these 'reports' it would be impossible to establish who did what or what each builder or collective was responsible for... This is the way it was arranged by the leadership of this most important construction project!..."

But even the prolix order of the Tyumen Oblast procurator's office to close the criminal case did not protect those responsible for the shoddy workmanship. On 19 February of this year an article entitled "An Accident on a Moonlit Night" discussed a major emergency on the Western Siberia-Ural-Povolzhye pipeline. This occurrence was like the last warning, a "dress rehearsal" for the Ufa tragedy, for the break in the mainline occurred right next to the railroad. A hard freeze and the lack of wind contributed to the fact that the immense cloud of toxic and explosive fog did not go near it, saving the lives of the passengers on those trains.

"I shall never forgive myself for not standing my ground at the time," G. Antipin, chief of the investigative section, also laments. "For even in August of last year Smirnov and I prepared a letter to the RSFSR procurator, S. Yemepyanov."

I hold in my hands a typewritten page that could possibly have saved hundreds of lives.

"From the materials of the investigation one can see that there was defective work in both the northern and southern sections... In order to prevent accidents on the Western Siberia-Ural-Povolzhye pipeline, I request that you petition the USSR Council of Ministers to make it incumbent on the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Industry and the USSR Ministry of Construction for Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises to take immediate measures for a complete inspection of the quality of construction and installation work and the retesting of the entire pipeline."

"Why did you not send this letter?" I asked G. Antipin.

"The oblast procurator did not sign it. And I could not decide to do it myself...."

I have not yet managed to find out why the procurator, V. Bagin, would not sign this letter. Valeriy Andreyevich went on vacation recently. But still I wish to emphasize that even without this, the RSFSR procurator was well-informed of the investigation in Tyumen that had lasted for more than a year and about the major accidents that had been occurring on the pipeline one after another. For after the February accident and the article in PRAVDA it rescinded the order to close the criminal case. But again it did not sound the alarm to the government but passed the clearly prolonged investigation on to the Tomsk Oblast procurator for further investigation...

As an official document for a government commission I wish to quote a letter that arrived recently at the PRAVDA correspondence point in Tyumen from the collective of the Tyumen petroleum pipeline administration:

"During the past 2 years the newspaper PRAVDA has repeatedly returned to the subject of the half-built Western Siberia-Ural-Povolzhye pipeline," it says. "Our collective is very eagerly following your articles because it operates this 'facility' and had the faint hope that just the articles in PRAVDA would force the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Industry to admit to its own mistakes in planning, determination of the 'customer,' and organization of supervision of the pipeline construction. Our hopes were not fulfilled. The Ministry of the Petroleum Industry does not wish to stain its reputation. And not only that; it is trying to conceal the real state of affairs from the public.

"The actual condition of the pipeline as of today can be shown from the example of our 350-km section. Up to this point the reserve lines at the Iska, Duvan, Pyshma, and Iset Rivers and the Tura shipping river have not been constructed.

"An inspection with instruments of the condition of the insulation on our section showed that it is of poor quality in 345 places with an overall distance of about 4.5 kilometers.

"For the state commission and all the public let us explain how we came to the tragedy on the section of the railroad between Chelyabinsk and Ufa. As a result of the terrible quality of construction and the lack of supervision on the part of the 'customer,' and as a result of pressure from party organs and the ministry in 1985, the pipeline was released for operation with extremely great deviations from the plan, norms, and rules. The insulation was wound by hand over dirty, unprepared pipe. The electrical protection system was not put into operation. Electricity was not brought to the line cock units or the gate valves....

"Find out who signed the documents of the work commissions and the state commissions for accepting the pipeline. Find those highly placed bureaucrats of the party and state apparatus in the category of 'active figures.' Find them and give them their due.

"... By order of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry a commission was created for acceptance and transfer. But when they familiarized themselves with the pipeline on the spot and with the documentation, the commission drew the conclusion that the construction of the pipeline had not been completed and there could be no discussion of acceptance and transfer.

"The obstinate commission was called to Moscow and there our representatives were forced to sign a document for acceptance and transfer of the pipeline from the books of the Almetyevsk [City] administration to ours. Imagine—from the books of an organization which itself would not accept it. Find the people who prepared and signed these orders. Find the people in the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry who even in the autumn of 1988 could accept it but did not take measures to improve the pipeline.

"And here is the tragedy. Completely innocent people and children died... We appeal to the government commission not to stop with the 'scapegoats,' but to reveal the chain of irresponsible and indifferent workers of all ranks and give them all that they have coming."

It is impossible not to agree to the demands of the authors of the letter.

Soviet Germans Society Chairman Interviewed

LD2407214989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0945 GMT 24 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jul (TASS)—TASS correspondent Viktor Chistyakov writes: The recreation of an autonomous republic of Soviet Germans on the Volga, which was abolished in 1941, would mean the triumph of historical justice, would give them a real opportunity to revive their culture, to preserve their mother tongue and national traditions, Gugo Vormsbekher, cochairman of the All-Union Society of Soviet Germans, has stated. In a conversation with a TASS correspondent, he also noted that the practical solution of this question may come up against serious problems, as Soviet Germans do not have

their own territory, and are scattered in different corners of the USSR, and therefore the creation of a Soviet German nation and territorial formation may affect the interests of other peoples.

"Soviet Germans cannot and do not want to build their future by encroaching on the interests of representatives of other peoples who are residents on the Volga," Gugo Vormsbekher stressed. "We will seek out and propose various models which would allow political and social guarantees to be ensured for the local inhabitants. Solutions acceptable to everyone can only be found in a situation of glasnost, of open discussion of controversial issues."

According to Gugo Vormsbekher, cooperation between Soviet Germans and local residents will create the prerequisites for the acceleration of the economic development of the Volga area and raise the standard of living of the entire population of this region. "Only all together, respecting the rights and dignity of each person, shall we overcome all the difficulties and build our own common home," the cochairman of the "Revival Society" stressed.

Baku Commission on Draft Bills Continues Work

NC2507105489 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1600 GMT 21 Jul 89

[Text] The commission, which draws up draft bills on the [words indistinct] and addendums of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, The Azerbaijan SSR Constitution, the election of the Azerbaijan SSR deputies, and the election of deputies to the local soviets, convened under Comrade Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov on 20 July 1989. The draft bills that have been drawn up by the commission's [word indistinct] were examined with the participation of [word indistinct] experts.

Comrade Vezirov, in summing up the work of the meeting, noted the political importance of the work carried out to effect reforms in the republic's judicial domain. Particular attention was focused on the need for a wide-ranging debate on the draft bills with maximum consideration given to public opinion.

When [words indistinct] is being drawn up and new laws are being enacted in connection with (?individuals), we should consider the experience gained in the country in restructuring the political system and try to enhance the important changes which have taken place as a result of the democratization process in the society.

The commission decided to continue its work on the draft bills in the light of the recommendations made during the meeting.

High Central Asian Infant Mortality Noted

18300742a Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 28, 15-21 Jul 89 p 8

[Report by Yu. Savin]

[Text] *Recently there have been reports in the press about the growth of infant mortality in the USSR. Could you give us some specific figures?*

[Signed] S. Abdurakhmanova, Chirchik, Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic

According to data of the USSR Ministry of Health, the number of children under 1 year of age who died in our country was 142,200 (figures for 1987). Out of every 1,000 children born, 25 died before reaching the age of 1 year. In the republics the most alarming situation was found in Turkmenia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where the numbers of infant deaths were 56, 49, and 46 per 1,000 newborn infants. The lowest infant mortality rate in the country was registered in Latvia and Lithuania.

Among main reasons for infant mortality, the most common is diseases of the respiratory organs: 79 died out of every 10,000 born (in the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan—240-246). In the Central Asian republics there was a very high mortality rate from infectious diseases: 180 died out of every 10,000 born. (For the USSR the average was 44, and there were 7-9 deaths in the Baltic republics).

At the same time 188,000 women or 4 percent of the pregnant women in the USSR gave birth prematurely. The death rate of premature babies is 12 times higher than those that go full term. There was also a sharp increase in the number of women under 30 years of age who smoke (about 40 percent), and the premature births among women who drink alcohol in our country reached 30 percent.

Poisoning of Birds, Mammals Reported on Sakhalin

OW1208032989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by Sakhalin correspondent V. Feoktistov]

[Text] The shooting of this report on the death of a large number of birds occurred in two stages, but was shot at the same place—the shores of Aniva Bay. The first stage was in early spring when, as happens every year, a tremendous number of migratory birds gathered there. The birds rest on the water surface which is free of ice and feed before leaving for their long flight, grateful for this place for the abundant treat—the bay is very rich in fish, mollusks, plankton—and for their undisturbed sojourn across Sakhalin, where migratory birds are under

protection during their flight. From there the birds leave for their nesting places further north. This happens every year, in the spring and the fall. [video shows migratory birds at Aniva Bay]

Here you see Aniva beach as it is today, on a hot and sultry summer day. [video show beaches littered with corpses of birds and a seal] Bodies of dead cormorants, sea gulls, guillemots, and storm petrels are seen every 10 or 15 meters, as are beached corpses of seals, and more birds everywhere, solitary or in groups, in secluded coves and on crowded sandy beaches.

The beaches had to be closed to the public. Many people who used Aniva beaches for recreation have visited clinics with symptoms of unknown skin deseases. Disturbing rumors, assumptions, and guesses have begun to spread. The Environmental Protection Committee has received a report on a massive discharge of pollutants by one of the Yuzhno - Sakhalinsk boiler factories. The facts about the discharge have not been proven, but this by no means excludes such a possibility. Finally, like a thunderbolt from the sky, came the report by the Sakhalin Hydrometeorological Station that the cadmium content in the Aniva Bay water is almost 2,000 times the maximum permissible concentration.

It is not difficult to guess from where the cadmium came. It is likely from Korsakov Port—the home of transport, fishing, and oil and gas prospecting ships, as well as naval ships of the Army and Navy garrison. The port is very near. Required for any fleet base are hull painting work, alkaline electric batteries, and waste from galvanic works. Cadmium accompanies all these materials and processes. It is known to be a heavy metal, one of the most dangerous to human life.

Nobody can say yet which of these hypotheses is true. Both local and central organs, including the USSR Ministry of Health, are intensively engaged in a search for the answer to what has happened in Aniva Bay, and who is responsible for the tragedy. We must also wait for an answer, but one thing must be said now: The possibilities of the most serious ecological catastrophies have fluorished on the beaches of Aniva Bay. Had even one of these possibilities occurred in spring or fall, the magnificent Aniva Bay bird markets would remain captured only by our camera.

People, however, are not migratory birds. They live permanently on these shores and are, with increasing persistence, demanding that both civil and military authorities be sensible and act resolutely on the normalization of the ecological situation.

Economic

More Oil Exports Needed for Hard Currency

18200440a Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 9 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by Igor Lavrovskiy: "The Hard Ruble Out of the Petrodollar"]

[Text] The issue of convertibility of the ruble has been of concern to me for a long time. A message about the competition held by the (Fiors) Fund spurred on my work. Everything associated with the competition is very prestigious and promising. However, at present I am more concerned about the $20 billion a year in proceeds from trade in energy resources that our country cannot use judiciously than about the $20,000 offered as the first prize. Time is short. This is why I cannot accept the condition of anonymity of work imposed by the sponsors and wait for the results until the middle of next year. I appear openly. Now is a time in which ideas should be put to use in a timely manner, as at a Japanese factory.

I am embarking on a more voluminous study that meets the conditions of the competition. If someone manages to build on the ideas put forth in this article sooner and better than I do, I will only rejoice in our joint success.

We have a strange economic ideology that declares what is profitable to be unprofitable, and that declares the economically unacceptable to be the only possible way. A complex of national inferiority is being persistently drummed into our minds. All kinds of people have slighted the Soviet raw material trade. It is believed that it is dignified to trade in machines as Japan does, but it is undignified to trade in oil as we do.

Are raw materials indeed such disadvantageous merchandise? Let us look at, for example, the United States. In 1987 it sold $30 billion worth of raw materials, and $23 billion worth of farm goods. Now, for Canada: $25 billion worth of raw materials, including $10 billion worth of oil and gas. As we can see, the Soviet Union, with its $20 billion in proceeds from the sale of energy resources, cannot claim the role of a leader.

The United States and Canada are not an exception. Great Britain and Australia, the Netherlands and Norway are no less active in the raw materials market. Are all of them operating at a loss by virtue of this? Not at all. The discovery of an oil deposit causes exuberant joy anywhere. Therefore, raw materials as such have nothing to do with this. In a strong economy all sectors are strong—the raw material, the agricultural, and the processing ones. There is no reason for us to experience complexes due to raw material exports. We should count our blessings because we have this opportunity to repair our account at the expense of the bowels of our native land.

The popular "motif" on the topic of technical backwardness that supposedly is the result of the raw-material orientation of the economy cannot stand up to criticism. Scientific requirements of the oil industry in the West approach the level of space programs. After all, it is not important what you produce, but how you produce it. The technical backwardness of all our sectors, including the raw material ones, is not the result of oil extraction, but the result of "successful" application of ideology in the economy and isolation from the world market.

The economy is governed by the laws of demand and supply. We sell abroad one-quarter (!) of the passenger cars we make, and in return we secure just one percent of the entire export proceeds. What would yield no less than R2.5 billion in the domestic market gives us a mere 600 million foreign-currency rubles. Now let us address raw materials. The situation here is different. Investing approximately R40 billion a year in oil and gas, we receive in return about $20 billion, plus we satisfy our own needs and those of the CEMA countries. Even if we managed to use the entire volume of fuel produced ourselves, this would not enrich us substantially: The extra proceeds would not exceed R10 billion.

Such is the economic reality. It is advantageous for us to trade in raw materials and disadvantageous to trade in machines. The world market, indifferent with regard to our economic ideas, impartially evaluates the product of our hands and our underground layers, and the latter fetch a much higher ranking than our hands. This is why we have "petrodollars" and almost do not have "machine dollars."

Let us look now at the fate of petrodollars in the USSR. Naive people believe that the oilmen intercept them, and even demand hard currency from them for filling some trifling order. However, these comrades are in grave error! The petrodollar bypasses oilfields, all of these Klondike-Samotlors, and ends up in the very hands that rank so low in the world market. We buy with these funds grain, machines, and just a few consumer goods. Up to 40 percent of the hard currency is spent by the machine-building complex. In the long run, a further increase in this share is planned.

Raw material exports generate a lion's share of our hard currency. It would be natural to expect that the wisdom of planning is to ensure the highest world level of productivity and quality, a higher standard of living in exactly the raw material industries. Not at all. Machine-building is our "sacred cow." While producing one-sixth of the world output in machine-building, the Soviet Union claims only 0.1 percent of the world market of machine-building products denominated in freely convertible currency! As far as the share of finished products in export deliveries is concerned, we trail not only Western countries and Japan, but also many developing countries—for example, Malaysia where this share stands at one-third of exports. Such is the milk yield of the "sacred cow."

To a dear friend one would give the shirt off his back. Once again they want to take the shirt off our backs and give it to machine-builders. According to Gosplan [State Planning Committee] studies, the volume of production of machine-building should increase by a factor of four in the next 15 years. The amount of capital investment should double as early as the 13th 5-year plan compared to the 11th. Is recouping these considerable funds realistic?

In essence, machine-building has been marking time for 3 years now instead of making "the great leap" expected of it. In 1986, 43 percent more capital investment was used for technical retooling and reconstruction of operating enterprises than in the previous year, and in 1987, only 0.8 percent more. Dashing and standing still alternately. It cannot be otherwise if we take into account the scope of structural and technological problems. After all, only 6 percent of Soviet metal-cutting machine tools are up to the world standard—and this is the foundation of machine-building.

It is not difficult to predict further actions of machine-builders. As the failure of the 5-year plan becomes increasingly clear, they will more and more loudly demand hard currency from the oilmen. This is a traditional move. As early as the period of industrialization, three-quarters of all equipment installed was of foreign provenance. At the time it was paid for in grain and blood, and at present it is paid for in oil and tears. A powerful machine-building lobby in the government will most likely get its way. However, is this not the time to stop? Emergency shifts of resources to failing sectors are a parody of socialism. We will never get rich this way.

In April of this year began a mass "swim" by our small producers (isolated not only from the world, but from the national market as well) in the stormy sea of world trends. I am an optimist, but I am afraid that many of them will not reach the shore; we will have to pay for it from the state coffers once again, and once again at the expense of oil.

Our producers are being tempted to auction off everything that can be sold, thus baring the domestic market in order to stay afloat somehow. Later, new bans and a new wave of monopolization of foreign trade will follow as a means to save whatever still remains. The ministries plan to retain the market through a system of quotas and licenses. However, there is no ban that cannot be circumvented. They will forbid the export of rare metals, and "finished products" made of these same metals will appear, but at the price of raw materials, and so forth.

There are grounds enough for such fears. In countries such as the United States and Great Britain, 80 to 90 percent of export products are turned out by industrial giants, which are among the 600 largest companies in the world and whose sales exceed $1 billion. Now imagine the competition of our inexperienced newcomer with such an international corporation... It is easy to guess who is going to march to whose tune.

All industries except for those that generate real currency—that is, the oil and gas men and so forth—receive hard-currency allowances for their benefit. They receive a dollar tax. In turn, in the major exporting industry, dollar allotments reign. There is a system of "hard-currency justice" of sorts; it is the very foundation of the lack of ruble convertibility. Hard-currency funds are siphoned away from those who generate them to those who bury them in the ground. If this siphon is shut off, the ruble will become convertible that same day. Hard currency must remain in the hands of those who generate it—in the same industry, at the same enterprise—in this case, with the oilmen. The circulation of hard currency in the country should only begin when the needs of export production are fully satisfied. Look at what happens now: In the only competitive sector of labor productivity in the main sphere, well drilling, it is five times lower than in the United States! Is this not shameful?! This must be redeemed by petrodollars.

Now let us address the West Siberian Region. It is enough to fly to Nizhnevartovsk to understand that you are not in Rio de Janeiro. In any country except ours the discovery of oil causes an economic boom and rapid construction. American oil capitals—say, Houston—strike the witnesses with their urban splendor. In Alaska the oilmen have pools and tennis courts. In our country they have log huts, or, simply put, slums in which 17,500 families huddle together. It turns out that the center has turned the periphery into its raw-material colony, and neither the center nor, obviously, the periphery are better off due to this. The ugly linkage between investments in housing construction and the social sphere and those in production makes the region hostage to monopolistic ministries. It makes the region put the noose around its neck with its own hands because there is no other way to solve the social problems except to build up the already overdeveloped production potential.

The state apparatus tries to play the role of a universal benefactor, but in reality it ruins everyone, both the export industries and the oil-producing regions, by depriving them of an opportunity to develop properly, and those who receive the hard currency they have not earned, by corrupting and disorienting them. It is understandable that the convertibility of the ruble and centralized hard-currency redistribution are incompatible. They suggest that we wait until the products of machine-building become competitive, and only then solve the convertibility problem. For goodness sake, by then it will be late! Why is the fate of the entire country tied to that of one industry?

We do not have a machine-building export potential comparable to the opportunities of the United States or Japan. However, we share the first and second places in the world oil market (and, let us add, in the gold market). Oil-gold dollars. This connection is well-known in the world. Oil and gold generate enough dollars for us to ensure the convertibility of the ruble right now! Our hard-currency export proceeds are not as high as in Japan and the FRG, but they are not that small either. The ruble should become convertible right away, otherwise our "comprehensively pacifying" idle run will last indefinitely. To this end we should consider the fundamentals of mutual relations between our export sector and the outside world, as well as the economy as a whole. We should overcome internal colonialism. Everyone should get his own, and, first of all, man must get what is human. This is easy to proclaim but difficult to achieve. However, this is the subject of the next article.

Abkhaziya, Other Unrest Affects Railroad Network
18290245 Moscow GUDOK in Russian 29 Jul 89 p 2

[Interview with Pavel K. Kharitonovich, chief dispatcher of the Ministry of Railways, by correspondent V. Varyshev at the Ministry of Railways Central Dispatch Office: "...And Shake Up the Whole Network"; date of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The discussion was long, endlessly interrupted by phone calls from deputy ministers, chiefs of the main administrations, managers of other branches. All were interested in the transport of grain and coal, bread for the people and "bread" for the workings of industry. The chief dispatcher of the MPS [Ministry of Railways] Pavel Konstantinovich Kharitonovich answered quietly and thoroughly. One could feel that the man really holds his finger on the pulse of the network. Our correspondent V. Varyshev talks to him.

[Varyshev] How did the conditions on the network change starting with the events in Abkhaziya?

[Kharitonovich] At 1600 on 15 June, between Adler and Sukhumi, the train traffic was interrupted. These were passenger trains destined for Batumi and Tskhaltubo. At Sukhumi we had to send passengers from Adler back. The Yerevan and Tbilisi trains went by way of Baku. At the same time a stoppage occurred at contact point Veselyy between the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian lines.

[Varyshev] Should we conclude that an extraordinary situation developed on the entire North Caucasian line?

[Kharitonovich] Even earlier this line operated with difficulty, and here we were compelled to stop in transit up to 150 freight trains. Many trains reduced their speed on the Southwestern, Donets and Volga lines. Therefore, in a number of places, switching activity slowed down and the moving of local freight almost came to a halt.

Of course, we sent by way of Baku selected and urgent loads to the regions of Armenia damaged by the earthquake. But here also, at the railroad junction of Samur, the flow of additional passenger trains, which could not use the road through Sukhumi, caused enormous difficulties in our work. Furthermore, in many regions of the country it became necessary to stop accepting loads destined for the Transcaucasian line.

[Varyshev] What's the total of the loads held up in those days?

[Kharitonovich] That is difficult to calculate. But roughly, an average weight of a freight train is 3200 tons, therefore almost 250 trains were stopped. These were only the visible losses. Disruptions could not but have an effect on the earnings of many railroad workers. Then there was a very important matter of timing: In the South the harvest is being gathered and we could not supply it adequately with freight cars. The losses to the sectors involved and the country as a whole are enormous. I think detailed analysis is still ahead. The work of five lines encountered great difficulty, and to one degree or another, events in Abkhaziya and the Sukhumi depot strike had an effect on the whole network.

[Varyshev] The strike is over, the movement of trains is restored. How much time will be needed to stabilize the situation?

[Kharitonovich] Yes, at 1500 on 23 June the first mail-baggage train went to Yerevan over Sukhumi. Today we intend to exchange 10 pairs of freight trains over the Veselyy junction. The technical plan calls for six. We restored the normal routing of passenger trains, only two still take the circuitous route. And we'll need a minimum of 10 days to restore the normal work patterns.

[Varyshev] Incidentally, freight aside, how did the passenger transport work out in those difficult days?

[Kharitonovich] The situation on the section between Adler and Sukhumi became urgent. Furthermore, Aeroflot also suspended flights temporarily. Under those conditions our ministry turned to sailors, and they delivered people. There was exchange of transport workers, but I would not like to be in the position of vacationers who were then in Abkhazia.

[Varyshev] Pavel Konstantinovich, and how is the network now?

[Kharitonovich] As chief dispatcher I can say that the majority of railroad workers show an appreciation of all the difficulties of our present situation. It is not a secret that here and there strike calls are being distributed. The chiefs in the ministry and the central committee of the labor union have taken a number of measures. The railroad workers have been informed about them. A bigger effort is being conducted in places. So far the conditions on the network are normal.

Certainly, we have significant difficulties. The engineers work very hard, many social problems are unsolved... However, I repeat, news from the tracks gives reason for hope. The situation pertaining to unloading of rolling stock is highly disquieting. We have a daily shortfall of nearly 6,000 cars which the users fail to return. This extent of it hasn't been occurring even in winter months, when it could be blamed on vagaries of nature.

As I see it, the coal miners' strike and other well-known events—in the Baltics, in Fergana, in Nagorno-Karabakh, and other places—all have had their effect. In only one day in the entire country 14,000 cars failed to be unloaded. This, it seems, is also the fault of railroad workers who work badly with the users. Enterprises keep rolling stock above all norms and blame us for not furnishing cars.

[Varyshev] And how did the miners' strike affect transportation?

[Kharitonovich] In general, it is very hard to work this year. Day-by-day we see that one or another section is stopped up. Why? Some places are blacked-out. They try to somehow conceal a defect or accident, to not report it. Sometimes we find out what happened only through internal affairs organs.

When it comes to mine strikes then, by way of example, on the Kemerovo line we loaded 2,000-2,500 cars daily, instead of the required 7,000—around 30 percent of the plan. The Donbass daily fell by 2,205 cars off the plan. On the Dneiper line they fell 467 cars short. On the Northern—602. The total daily shortfall due to user fault was 3,638 coal cars. Later, trying to fulfill our task, we'll begin loading, but will not be able to manage the flow.

The railroad workers' material and moral losses in connection with this already are and will continue for a while. This is the effect on us of a strike in another industry.

[Varyshev] And how are things with the other principal types of freight?

[Kharitonovich] The principal freight is grain. There was a good harvest in the land around Stavropol, Kuban, and the Odessa Oblast. For instance, today we must deliver 1,000 grain carriers to the North Caucasian line, the plan calling for less by a half. The day before there were 4,352 cars loaded with grain on the network, while the plan called for 2,500—almost twice the plan, but even that is not enough.

We constantly have to watch the loading and delivery of petroleum products, machinery, equipment...Often one gets dizzy, but we work and get involved in local situations so as not to aggravate the overall functioning of the network. Today any condition of traffic at any point can cause unforeseen consequences.

Regional Railroad Chief Engineers Confer

18290250b Moscow GUDOK in Russian 4 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by V. Manenkov: "Council of Chief Engineers"]

[Text] In Novosibirsk a conference of the chief engineers of the South Urals, West Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Tselina, Alma-Ata, and West Siberia railroads was held with the participation of vice deans for research of the transportation colleges of Alma-Ata, Tashkent, Omsk, and Novosibirsk. The conference was held on the initiative of the MPS [Ministry of Railways] Main Research and Technology Administration and the VNIIZhT [All-Union Research Institute of Railroad Transportation].

The need to set up a regional council of key specialists has been coming to the fore for a long time. After all, it is very important to coordinate the development of applied science and implement new equipment and technology in a comprehensive manner on entire directions situated within the confines of several railroads. As an example, Chief of the MPS Main Research and Technology Administration I. Kharlanovich referred to the case of the South Urals Railroad increasing its capacity, introducing new technologies, and now being able to freely handle heavyweight and long-draft trains. However, they cannot be handled on the entire direction, which would yield considerable results. The neighbors are not prepared for that; they operate the old way.

During the consideration of organizational issues, it was resolved to change the chairman and his deputy every year by rotating them in—that is, the deputy would become the chairman, and a member of the council would become the deputy.

This time, Chief Engineer of the South Urals Railroad V. Nikolayevskiy was elected the chairman, and Chief Engineer of the West Siberian Railroad B. Storchous was elected his deputy.

It is expected that the chief engineers will meet twice a year.

Agricultural

RSFSR Peasant Farms, Rural Co-ops Hold Conference

Peasants To Form New Association

18240219 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Aug 89 p 3

[TASS Report: "The Association of Peasant Farms of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] The founders' conference of the representatives of peasant farms and rural cooperatives of the Russian Federation has taken place in Moscow. Representatives of peasant farms from the union republics also participated in the conference. The purpose of convening the conference was to prepare for the congress, at which the Association of Peasant Farms and Rural Cooperatives of the Russian Federation [AKKOR] will be formed. The new association will function on the principles of complete economic accountability and independence.

The AKKOR initiative group included representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, the VNII [scientific research institute] of the agricultural economy, the newspaper IZVESTIYA, the magazine SELSKAYA MOLODEZH, the ZNANIYE society, "Roskrolikovodosoyus," and managers of agricultural cooperatives of the Russian Federation.

In his speech, USSR People's Deputy and VASKhNIL [Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences] Academician V.A. Tikhonov noted in particular that our country has no organ representing the interests of the peasant farms and the rural cooperatives. The aim of the newly created organ is not to set the peasant farms in opposition to the active kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]. Its main task is to insist on equal rights in the development of all structures of the agricultural economy.

A resolution was adopted at the conference that defines the basic principles of the approach to the development of the country's agriculture; the genuine emancipation of the peasant farms via legal and economic independence and the equitable relations of all partners.

The resolution also noted that the lack of laws on leasing, on the peasant farm on property, on the preservation of obsolete statutes in the land legislation introduces uncertainty into mutual relations with the kolkhoz and sovkhoz administrations, the local soviets, financial institutions, and economic organizations. Many managers on various levels recognize only intra-farm leasing and are hampering the owner-toilers' departure from the kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

A total of 222 representatives of 39 oblasts of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] participated in the conference.

The convening of the founding congress of the representatives of peasant farms of the Russian Federation is planned for the end of this year.

Further on New Peasant Association

PM1408083189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

[I. Abakumov article: "There Are Masters on the Land! Peasants Set Up Their Own Association"]

[Text] In the space of just 3 days the myth that there is no one to take possession of the land has been scotched once and for all; it had been claimed that no people wanted to be masters anymore. Life has shown that the myth was engendered by those for whom a genuine lease system and the consistent revival of the diversity of equal forms of labor in the countryside is a thorn in their sides that

prevents them from governing in the old way. Not daring to "surgically" excise this inconvenience, they created and still create intolerable conditions for lessees, restricting their economic freedom as much as possible and constantly maintaining uncertainty about the future. All this makes people waste valuable time on endless litigation and takes them away from their work on the land. Now, seeing no other way to protect their interests, leaseholders have started to organize themselves. The first news was received in the spring from the Baltic republics. And the constituent conference to prepare for the creation of a Russian Association of Peasant Farms and Rural Cooperatives (AKKOR) was held in Moscow 28 through 30 July. Taking part in it were 222 representatives from 39 territories of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and several union republics.

The entire conference was organized by IZVESTIYA, the central TV program "Country Hour," the journals SELSKAYA NOV and SELSKAYA MOLODEZH, enthusiasts from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, the "Znaniye" Society, the Russian Rabbit and Animal Breeders Society, economists, and a number of agricultural cooperatives.

It was attended not by windbags but by crop farmers. According to figures from a questionnaire by Aleksey Karpov, more than half the participants already have their own farms, and the remainder are in the process of setting one up. Some 81 percent have higher and specialized education, 38 percent are members or candidate members of the CPSU, approximately half are below 40 years of age, and many of them are heads of rural family clans. They are substantial people. And there was no off-the-cuff rabble-rousing in their speeches: With the peasant thoroughness common to all they grasped the bull by the horns from the outset. The conference resolution was also in keeping with the attendance.

I quote: "Despite the new political course on the peasant question worked out by the CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum, there is still a misunderstanding in society of the importance for socialism of reviving the peasantry as a class of worker-proprietors. In the time since the plenum there has been no positive breakthrough in the feelings of the bulk of specialists, farm leaders, and state and party workers. Therefore, in the majority of cases peasant farms receive no ideological, moral, or economic backup and support," which condemns them to exceptional difficulties that often lead to bankruptcy.

It went on to say that in the absence of the necessary range of laws many leaders recognize only intrafarm leasing and create the greatest obstacles to keep worker-proprietors from leaving the confines of a state farm [sovkhoz]. "All this means that time is wasted, work in agriculture becomes increasingly difficult, the food shortage is being exacerbated rather than resolved, land fertility and the state of the environment are deteriorating catastrophically, and the countryside loses workers. The slow growth in the number of family and cooperative peasant farms is in itself hampering their effective functioning as a factor in reviving the activities of collective farms [kolkhozes] and sovkhozes and bringing about their internal transformation, renewal, and perestroyka...

"Peasant farms by their intrinsic essence and in accordance with the principles of a rule-of-law state should be entitled in practice to unlimited-duration land tenure, the right to freely plan their current activity, the right to freely sell their produce, and the right to freely use their income. Statewide farming legislation should promote rational and effective land management and increase rural working people's contribution to boosting the country's food stocks and financial payments to soviet budgets from their income.

"The creation of favorable legal and social conditions for the development of peasant farms is an inalienable function of organs of legislative and executive state power. At the same time, the conference believes that in order to protect the interests of peasant farms and to give them help it is necessary to create a sociocooperative system—an association of peasant farms and cooperatives in Russia and the other union republics.

"The association should be a self-governing organization of worker-proprietors in free association in their own interest and in their common interest. It should fulfill its main functions through meetings and gatherings of rural proprietors and cooperative members, conferences, and congresses; second, through its representatives in the soviets at all levels and in the elected organs of social organizations and unions that cover peasants; and third, through the mass media and through educational work in families, schools, vocational and technical colleges, technical colleges, higher educational institutions, special schools, and courses.

"The association is a profoundly democratic organization. Its grassroots components are not answerable to or under the control of higher organs."

There are lines in the document that answer those who still inundate the authorities with "warnings" about the alleged "resurgence of capitalism" in the countryside. The clarity of the formulas proposed by the peasants are the envy of economists. "This form does not run counter to socialist basic principles. It is based on the interplay and conjunction of socialist forms of ownership: individual (labor), collective-group, nationwide, corporate, republic, and regional-communal ownership. The main principle in this form of activity is the socialist principle of 'from each according to their abilities, to each according to their labor'—that is, without parasitism and wage leveling.

"The ownership of means of production by a peasant family and members of small agricultural cooperatives to the extent needed to efficiently carry out their business should not be a reason for a hostile or inimical attitude

toward peasants. The basic principle in this important matter should be... the qualitative transformation of social ownership on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Whatever production collectives in which Soviet people work, they should have their own share of joint ownership clearly registered by an accountant. The causes of and reasons for social hostility toward today's kolkhoz members, sovkhoz workers, and peasant farmers and their cooperatives owning the means of production on the basis of individual or share ownership will then disappear."

This is a serous document. It is not a complaint or a request. It is a program for the congress planned for the end of the year, until regional associations are set up. An organizing committee has been elected with the participation of USSR people's deputies, and, apart from anything else, it has been instructed to take part in drawing up draft laws on land ownership and peasant farms. For the time being it has been decided to finance its work through voluntary contributions. Proposals have immediately come in from cooperatives. But it needs its own bank.

The feelings in the auditorium were characterized by one response to an amusing demand that everything be handed over to the State Agro-Industrial Committee for editing: "If we don't produce food by next year, the miners will 'edit' all of us..."

Now let's come back to earth. Timur Kadyrov, chairman of the "Snyatinok" cooperative in the Moscow suburbs, chaired the meeting, knowing that the Moscow Rayon Power Administration had cut off the power to his cow shed and there was a real threat of trouble for his 250 steers. The electricians have been engaging in extortion. Were this to happen at a sovkhoz, the bureau would be assembled; but when it happens here no one pays any attention. That is the reality. That is why the association is meeting; we need to protect ourselves and feed the people....